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Abstract 
 
 
The burgeoning literature in IR has pointed to the importance of global communication for 
enriching our understanding of global politics. However, practically, few works provide 
comprehensive analysis of meaning construction that goes beyond the notion of strategic 
persuasion. This work will address this limitation by opening up to another, tactical level of 
discourse through the analysis of ‘competing’ discourses. This dissertation aims to advance 
understanding of framing and counter-framing in world politics with reference to the case 
study of RT. Empirically, it analyses how RT framed the Syrian Crisis in 2013 and the 
Annexation of Crimea in 2014. It focuses on the dialogic nature of international 
communication and applies a systematic methodology of framing and counter-framing to the 
case studies. The study analyses the dialogue between RT and its discursive rival, CNN, that 
emerges as a result of tactical efforts of the channels to promote interpretations. Making 
theoretical advancements in framing theory, the work proposes a structural model of data 
analysis. In particular, the work employs textual, visual and intertextual methods to extract 
sub-frames and identify meta-frames of the discourse. By exposing the countering strategies 
and the internal dialogism of RT’s narratives the work theorizes on the origins and 
implications of Russia’s defensive rhetoric. 
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Introduction 
 
“{I}t is difficult for us to expect any positive steps from Washington. With 
russophobia raging over the ocean, the potential for cooperation in international 
and bilateral affairs remains largely unfulfilled”  
(Lavrov, 2017). 
 
 
a. Objectives of the Study 
The Syrian crisis and the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea have dashed the hopes of those 
aspiring for a ‘reset’ in US-Russia relations (Monaghan, 2015). In fact, the two sides have 
fallen into the familiar Cold War discourse (Ciolan, 2016; Wintour & Washington, 2016). Yet, 
the tensions sparked by these conflicts are only chapters in a much longer tale of suspicion and 
mistrust between Russia and the West. NATO policymakers and EU officials describe these 
tensions as the conflict that has gotten out of hand, fuelled by the decades of socio-political 
antipathy and competing strategic objectives (MacAskill, 2016). Thus, the existing lack of 
common purpose on the policy front is continuously portrayed in terms of the ideological 
disconnect. Sustaining if not reinforcing this divide are the media discourses both in Russian 
domestic news outlets, the country’s broadcasting abroad, and the mainstream media in Europe 
and the US. Moreover, EU and US policy-makers continuously raise concerns over Russia’s 
ability to employ its public diplomacy tools for undermining the legitimacy of the current world 
order. In particular, the use of international broadcasting and social media as the platforms for 
disseminating ‘fake news’ has been driving the debates (Reetman, 2017).  
 
This lack of prospect for reconciliation or even a noticeable improvement of the bilateral 
relationship has sparked academic debates. The situation is often assessed in realist terms as 
Kremlin’s resistance to submit to the Western hegemonic world order and thus seen as a 
struggle for power. In this context, Russian foreign policy is often evaluated as predominantly 
driven by material interests (Sakwa, 2008; Sussex, 2012) or by “authoritarian resistance” 
(Ambrosio, 2009; Silitski, 2006). In other quarters, the burgeoning literature in a constructivist 
vein looks at Russian identity, in particular focusing on the country’s great power status 
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(Neumann, 2015, 2016) and mapping the terrain of its legitimacy (Hopf, 2005, 2016; Morozov, 
2009). While the literature on identity has provided valuable insights into what structures mean 
for the actors in world politics, and thus sheds new light on understanding the strategic 
priorities of states, the relational aspect of foreign policy has received much less scrutiny. This 
is in large part due to the dominant focus on official speeches as the object of research and the 
neglect of the dynamic media field as an avenue for empirical study.  
Liberal research has been engaging in public diplomacy analysis, fuelled by the popularity of 
the catchy soft power concept (Dolinsky, 2013; Dougherty, 2013; Just, 2016; Lukyanov, 2013; 
Saari, 2014a). While all of these works, although to a different extent, recognise global political 
communication as the legitimate object of study, they are bound by normative limitations of 
the concept. The special issue of Politics on The Soft Power of Hard States has provided a 
number of articles that address this dominant positioning of Russia and China as the polar 
normative ends in the international system (Barr, Feklyunina, & Theys, 2015; Kiseleva, 2015; 
Wilson, 2015). These works have contributed a great deal to the discipline by problematizing 
the conceptual limitations of soft power, in particular in application of it to the foreign policy 
of the states that are not deemed part of the ‘liberal world’. Within this group of researchers, 
some voices have articulated the importance of using the framework of relationship when 
assessing soft power (Feklyunina, 2015). However, by adopting the constructivist framework, 
these works still maintain the analysis within the realm of strategy.  
This study thus contends that the discipline could benefit from a more inclusive operational 
research toolkit for assessing the relationship at the ideational level. This objective for finding 
analytical tools for understanding the relationship between the competing discourses is the 
starting point from which I embark on the journey of this research. The overarching purpose 
of this study is thus to suggest a way to correct this oversight through attending to methodology 
that would better deal with the questions of persuasion in foreign policy choice. In particular, 
I propose that frame and counter-frame analysis methods applied to the competing discourses 
that manifest themselves in the international communicative environment can help closing this 
gap in IR.   
While frame analysis has been used extensively by the Social Movement scholars (Benford & 
Snow, 2000; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996), counter-framing is the phenomenon that 
lacks coherent conceptualization, both within the discipline of IR and the broad field of 
Political Communication studies, the large group of interdisciplinary approaches that 
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popularized the method and advanced its practical application. In IR, constructivist research 
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Payne, 2001) has often pointed to the utility of this method. In 
fact, constructivist norm research looks at framing within the concept of persuasion and thus 
focuses on strategic meaning construction (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Payne, 2001). In this 
sense, the constructivist research agenda has pointed towards the potential of frame analysis 
but to date has failed to adequately to deploy it in practice. 
 
The reason for this is that these scholars often dismiss the fact that central to meaning 
construction is the journalist. In fact, reporters work in an environment where their professional 
practice is limited by the form of the journalistic product that they are required to produce. 
These limitations come from various sides – be it the editor’s vision of the news agenda, 
procedural factors, or the ethical norms guiding journalistic conduct. In this respect, the 
practice of reporting is largely bound by the notion that they cannot tell stories effectively 
without packaging the story elements in a way that conveys meaning (Van Gorp, 2010). 
Moreover, frame-building process is often a result of constant communicative exchange 
between journalists and elites (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Hänggli & Kriesi, 2012; Tuchman, 
1978). Thus, in order to understand better the mechanisms of meaning construction within the 
process of persuasion, it is necessary to direct our attention to the dynamic media field. Thus, 
the purpose of this study is to bring news analysis to the field of IR, integrate the 
methodological know-hows – developed by frame analysis practitioners – into a systematic 
analytical model that can be applied across paradigms in the discipline, and apply this 
analytical lens to the empirical example of Russia with the aim to generate novel insights about 
meaning construction in foreign policy. Thus, this work does not claim to offer groundbreaking 
empirical conclusions but rather proposes broadening the analytical lens to include another, 
tactical dimension of meaning construction. 
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b. Research Strategy and Guiding Questions 
This research understands framing as a social phenomenon that can be looked at from three 
different angles. First, it is an object of research, the process of communication that we can 
analyze through the conceptual prism of persuasion. Second, it is a methodology that allows 
us to study how the meanings are constructed in the international. Within this traditional 
understanding, the focus is on strategic framing. Indeed, strategic efforts are an important facet 
of communication that by all means should be taken into consideration. This is the very reason 
why this study will not sideline this angle. Third, although frames are commonly used 
intentionally to promote an opinion in order to achieve a shift in meanings (Hänggli & Kriesi, 
2012; McAdam et al., 1996; Payne, 2001), it has remained unclear to what extent the meaning 
construction process may be subject to communicative distortions of rival discourses in the 
international ideational environment. In attempting to synthesize and build upon the 
advancements of the fragmented field of framing research, this dissertation sets off to provide 
theoretical insights into the process of meaning construction that will be guided by the 
following questions: 
 
RQ1. What are the mechanisms of shaping understandings in world politics? 
 
RQ2. How can news framing and counter-framing analysis advance our 
understanding of meaning construction? 
  
Thus, RQ1 concerns framing as an object of research, while RQ2 points the study towards 
finding the correct methodology for understanding this process. In addressing these questions, 
the work will develop a multi-level frame analysis model. With this methodological strategy, 
the study will be able to delve into the facets of discourse that were previously side-lined. Thus, 
the predominant focus on strategy in frame construction will be expanded to include the 
tactical dimension of framing. In doing so, the study will fulfil its objective to expand our 
understanding of direct framing and conceptualize counter-framing. Unlike previous studies 
that evaluate counter-frames and counter-narratives as elements of monologic discourses, the 
approach of this research will treat is a process that is relational and dialogic.  
 
In fact, the dialogue is the concept that overarches this research. Drawing on Bakhtin’s concept 
of dialogism (Bakhtin, 1981), the study treats the implicit conversation between competing 
discourses as the realm within which framing and counter-framing operate, analyzing which 
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we are better able to see the co-constitutive elements of meaning construction process. With 
regard to instrumental framing, my primary focus will be on Russian international broadcaster, 
RT. Since its launch, the channel has transparently targeted an international audience to justify 
Russia’s point of view on current affairs. With the desire to keep up with the West on the 
ideational front, the Russian government sought to strengthen its position in the global 
discourse with the help of public diplomacy tools (Simonyan, 2013). Within Kremlin’s 
understanding of soft power, the tools of global communication are paramount. In fact, the 
dominant understanding of the role of soft power outlets is that they pose an inherent threat to 
stability within the country by the constant attempts to infiltrate the society on the ideational 
level and thus destabilize the government, stirring revolutions, for example (Kuhrt & 
Feklyunina, 2017; Saari, 2014b). In this respect, the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine and 
the Russo-Georgian War in 2008 are often perceived by the Russian political elite as concocted 
by the Western powers through the successful exercise of soft power and ultimately public 
diplomacy. Thus, in order to evaluate the strategic framing, this study will highlight how 
frames function at the level of public diplomacy through the use of persuasive communication.  
 
In particular, the process of adopting new ideas does not necessarily work in a direct way, from 
‘frame sponsor’ government to target state government. Public diplomacy works at a different 
level, by engaging the public of the target state, which in turn has the potential to influence 
policies of its government (McDowell, 2008). Thus, strategic framing can be understood as 
part of public diplomacy efforts. In Figure 1, I illustrate how normative ideas within the 
persuasive process travel through a chain of sub-targets in order to reach an ultimate audience 
and subsequently the persuasive goal, which can be, for example, the behavioral change of the 
target state that is favorable for the frame sponsor state. Thus, the project draws a theoretical 
link between the normative ideas, or the structural pillars of discourse, strategic framing and 
audiences. To theorize foreign policy as a discursive phenomenon is to acknowledge that 
normative interpretations and policy are constituted through the process of dialogic meaning 
construction. This process of continuous narration, responsive communicative adjustment to 
rival discourses is what reshapes subjects and objects. 
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Figure 1. Framing and Public Diplomacy. 
 
Through this analytical lens, the study will look at the empirical example of Russia, focusing 
on how it advances the interpretations within its public diplomacy. By exposing the various 
contextualisation techniques, the work will shed new light on the ideational elements that 
inform Kremlin’s discursive practices, and thus contribute to understanding of Russian 
foreign policy. Although Russia sees its broadcasting abroad as part of the country’s soft 
power, this research is not a study of soft power as such but rather of the mechanisms of 
shaping understandings and constructing meaning in world politics. In this respect, the work 
will deal with the ideas that Russia sees as potentially attractive to foreign publics and how 
these ideas are framing the interpretations of events. Thus, the secondary aim of the project 
is to elaborate on the following sub-question: 
 
SQ. What can the analysis of the Russian international broadcasting tell us about 
the country’s foreign policy? 
 
 
The research will argue that framing within the methodology proposed in this research can be 
used to theorize the constitutive relationship between international norms, their interpretations 
and foreign policy messages. The empirical analysis will be structured around the two case 
studies, the coverage of the of the Syrian crisis in 2013 and the 2014 Referendum turmoil in 
Crimea. Although my primary objects of analysis are the discourses promoted by RT, they will 
not be assessed in the isolated, ‘sterile’ environment of the monologue. In accordance with the 
project’s objectives to transcend the boundaries of strategy analysis, I will look at the discourse 
in a relational manner. In this respect, RT’s coverage will be assessed in its relation to CNN’s 
Normative 
Ideas (i.e. 
Russia)
Persuasion
(Strategic 
Framing)
Foreign
Public Target State (i.e. USA)
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narratives. The choice of CNN as the discursive opponent of RT was dictated by RT’s explicit 
countering of the channel in its coverage of events.1 I will specifically look at the dialogue 
between the news outlets which emerges as a result of counter-framing. In particular, the Syrian 
crisis demonstrates a situation in which Russia explicitly attempted to block the American 
intervention in Syria, acting as a peacekeeper against the aggressive US, as constructed by 
RT’s strategic framing. The White House and CNN framed the events in terms of a 
humanitarian intervention, where the US is driven by the issue of national security and acts as 
the responsible world policeman. The Crimean crisis demonstrates an almost polar situation, 
in which the main actors –  namely Russia and the USA – virtually exchanged their discursive 
roles.  
 
Unlike similar studies which look at objectivity and bias in media framing, this research 
focuses on how opposing discourses create new meanings by deconstructing opponents’ 
rhetoric. Although the object of analysis in the focus of this research is the Russian state-funded 
international broadcaster RT, this work does not study freedom of the press in Russia, nor does 
it aim at evaluating news objectivity. Moreover, the guiding idea of this research is to delve 
into the mechanisms of meaning construction rather than assessing the effects of framing. In 
fact, analyzing the effects of framing is the exact methodological puzzle that this study wishes 
to distance itself from. Instead of focusing on the political structures in a positivist sense, the 
project chooses to tackle the discursive realm. In this respect, the claims that this work 
generates are not aimed at explaining why, for example, Russia supports Assad, but rather to 
provide insights into the choice of contexts employed by the channels.  
 
Practically, the study applies the intertextual method of analysis to the news discourses of RT 
and CNN. Although intertextual analysis has been used by some representatives of the post-
structuralist strand of IR, it mainly applied to the analysis of representations in society, in 
particular with respect to marginalized groups. Thus, the topics that are explored are primarily 
situated around society and cultural meaning (Kristeva, 1980). Some of the linguists also apply 
the method to study media discourse (Fairclough, 1995; Hodges, 2015). However, these 
approaches rarely take it forward to explore what it means for our understanding of foreign 
policy. Thus, this study uses intertextuality as the starting point for the overarching multi-level 
frame analysis model. Therefore, conceptually, this work is broadly situated within the post-
                                                        
1 A detailed justification of the case selection is presented in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.  
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positivist strand of IR, critiquing the attempts of liberal scholars to apply a rationalist lens to 
discursive processes. At the same time, the project distances itself from the overly normative 
premise of post-structuralist approaches that are essentially aimed at uncovering the hierarchies 
in societies. The multi-level framing model of this research instead provides a rather neutral 
theoretical backdrop for the analysis of meaning. In this, the study pushes the agenda of a more 
inclusive conceptual framework that does not side-line the various channels of communication.   
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c. Television News as Source Material 
In IR, written communication is often given a privileged position as object of analysis, while 
images and even verbal communication tend to receive much less scrutiny. In fact, this 
linguistic focus persists even in the field of Political Communication (Griffin, 2001, p. 434). 
This study will address this gap by directing its attention to the medium of the global political 
information exchange that conveys meaning through the synergy of written, verbal, and visual 
communications. The reason why international broadcasting will serve well as the source 
material for this study is that the immediate, responsive nature of the 24-hour news channels 
can offer researchers a better view on the tactical elements of persuasive practices. Television 
is thus “ephemeral, episodic, specific, concrete and dramatic in mode” as it combines often 
contradictory signs in order to produce meanings, and its ‘logic’ is both, “oral and visual” 
(Fiske & Hartley, 1978, p. 15). 
 
In fact, television discourse is unique in its resemblance to the spoken reality that is achieved 
through the combination of text, voice, sound, and image, all transmitted in a homogenous flow 
of information. Television has its own language encoded in the signs that resemble social 
reality but are nevertheless at one remove from it. Unlike the written forms of journalism, 
broadcasting has borrowed a large number of its genres from various forms of performing arts 
(Camacho & Manvell, 2015). In this respect, news broadcasting analysis enriches the research 
with a form of reflection that emerges out of television experience. It is due to this resemblance 
but at the same time due the density of interpretive material that emanates from the screen that 
understanding structures behind television messages can help us shed new light on the way in 
which social relations work (Fiske & Hartley, 1978). Moreover, television is an important stage 
for political communication. In fact, it is the exact platform that familiarizes the public with 
political figures. Thus, dismissing the information that is conveyed through this medium means 
closing up the research to the whole segment of socio-political reality. 
 
Analysing news broadcasting has its peculiarities because the nature of television context 
dictates the methods of analysis that are distinct from those of any other form of written or 
verbal text. In fact, traditional discourse analysis applied to TV texts would generate limited, 
incomplete inferences due to the dismissal of the key elements of conveying meaning, the 
images. Moreover, framing as a strategy of meaning construction is inherently linked to visuals. 
Just like the frame of a painting defines the boundaries of what is essential for constituting an 
 24 
art piece, each frame of a film is intended to exclude what is redundant from the composition. 
In this respect, framing is more concerned with the form rather than the material. It is indeed 
this notion that will guide this dissertation – that the overarching assembly of the discourse 
may be no less informative than the analysis of the exact meanings which are conveyed through 
persuasive practices.  
 
In sustaining this argument, the study will develop a multi-level model that is inclusive of the 
various methods of textual and visual analysis. In fact, the combination of the two forms of 
frame analysis under one conceptual umbrella is one of the key methodological novelties of 
this dissertation. Within the framework of relational, intertextual framing and counter-framing, 
the study will thus focus on the internal dialogism between the image and the text (Metz, 1974). 
In this respect, despite the impression that the television output gives by showing only precise 
things, such as particular people, television image can also bring ambiguity by showing and 
not explaining (Stephenson, 1976). This intrinsic internal relationship between the visual and 
textual information contributes to the meaning construction will be one of the facets in the 
focus of this research. The multi-level frame analysis model applied to television news can thus 
explain the mechanisms of framing within the persuasive practices of the countries, which, in 
turn, can shed new light on the ideational elements of foreign policy.  
The audio-visual materials represented in this research through textual quotations and visual 
captions were accessed via two sources: RT’s online archive and the Multimedia Archive of 
the British Library.  
 
  
 25 
d. Conceptual Innovation and Key Argument 
 
The novelty of this study lies, on the one hand, in its systematic methodological approach that 
expands the dominant focus on strategy in persuasion and the assessment of foreign policy 
within monologic frameworks by directing its attention to the discursive dialogue between RT 
and CNN, including the facets of discourse that were previously side-lined. In this respect, it 
offers an analytical tool that can be applied across the different approaches in the discipline. 
On the other hand, by presenting a detailed examination of the discursive processes that take 
place at the two levels of communication, this work will demonstrate how the various 
contextualisation techniques that shed the new light on the ideational elements that inform 
Kremlin’s discursive practices, and thus contributes to the understanding of Russian foreign 
policy. Here, I will address the paradox that while consistently appealing to liberal norms, 
Russia often promotes its great power identity (Hopf, 2005; Just, 2016; Kiseleva, 2015) and its 
desire to be perceived as a ‘special’ power (Massari, 1998).  
 
In fact, public diplomacy research on Russia often highlights the country’s foreign policy 
inconsistencies (Just, 2016; Saari, 2014b). This project will reconcile these insights by tracing 
the discursive underpinnings to it. As the following chapters will demonstrate, both RT and 
CNN, while intending to achieve opposing outcomes, utilized very similar framing 
mechanisms, i.e. appealing to liberal norms. Thus, at the tactical level of discourse, the 
journalists of RT operate with ad-hoc justifications that are rather responsive to the ‘rival’ 
discourses. This allows to counter the traditional approaches to Russian foreign policy that 
portray the country’s persuasive efforts as operating in a vacuum. This analytical bias results 
from the methodological frameworks that have traditionally been used to study it. Unlike the 
Soviet Union that was characterized by the high degree of isolation, Russia is highly embedded 
in the international ideational environment. The argument here, however, is not to deny that 
there are normative elements that constitute Russia’s rhetoric. Instead, by breaking down the 
normative ideas, meta-frames and sub-frames and exposing the dynamics versus statics of these 
elements of discourse, the analysis can explain how they relate to each other within the process 
of persuasion. 
 
This study argues that the process of shaping understanding is not monologic but rather dialogic 
in the sense that its strategic efforts are highly connected to the volatile context and the 
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communicative distortions of rival discourses. In this respect, it is useful to look at counter-
framing that, as the following chapters will demonstrate, can take various shapes. Firstly, there 
is direct countering when the frame sponsors explicitly identify the narratives they wish to 
contradict and reinterpret. Secondly, it can also take the form of implicit countering, when 
frame sponsors pre-emptively engage with the potential counter-arguments that they anticipate 
from their discursive rivals. As the text of this dissertation will demonstrate, this internal 
dialogism in large part determines the way in which interpretations are produced. By looking 
at this process through the prism of the multi-level frame analysis model, this work will 
showcase that the process of shaping understandings happens at the two levels of discourse and 
entails both strategic and tactical efforts of frame sponsors.  
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e. Research Outline 
To address the issues problematized above and fulfil the objectives of this research, the 
dissertation is organized as follows: 
 
Chapter 1 reviews the literature on Soft Power, Public Diplomacy and Constructivist research. 
It identifies the methodological limitations of these three bodies of literature, all of which 
recognise global communication as an important element of international relations and deal 
with ideational matters in world politics. The chapter critically engages with the conceptual 
and empirical works of these approaches, highlighting the epistemological inconsistencies that 
result in the lack of analytical toolkit for comprehensive evaluation of relational aspects of 
foreign policy. In turn, it illuminates how the methodological limitations have resulted in the 
inability of the three bodies of literature to provide systematic analysis of Russia’s foreign 
policy messages. The chapter concludes by arguing for the need of developing the right 
methodology that would allow researchers to better deal with the ideational questions in IR. 
 
Following up on this objective, Chapter 2 proposes a methodological solution for this problem. 
By delving into the conceptual advancements and limitations of framing, discourse analysis 
and intertextuality, the chapter develops a conceptual framework that organises the study. By 
separating the levels of discourse and fitting the structural frame analysis design into these 
dimensions, the chapter goes beyond the strategic bias surrounding the analysis of meaning 
construction and opens up to the tactical facet of communication. In turn, it presents a multi-
level framing model that can serve as an analytical tool for various approaches in IR. 
 
Chapter 3 deals with the methodological particularities of applying this model in practice. In 
particular, it argues for the combination of linguistic and visual frame analysis under one 
conceptual umbrella. It explains how each of these methods can enrich the analysis and 
contribute to our understanding of meaning construction. In doing so, the chapter outlines the 
empirical research strategy employed in this project by explaining the rationale behind case 
selection, data collection and coding procedures.  
 
Chapter 4 lays out the setting for the case studies of this dissertation by putting RT in a 
historical perspective of Russian broadcasting abroad. In particular, it highlights the role of the 
state-funded international news broadcaster in Russia. Based on semi-structured interviews and 
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secondary literature, the chapter highlights the distinct Soviet tradition that has influenced the 
practice of RT’s journalists. In this, it provides a setup for the following Chapters 5 and 6 that 
will study the way in which the channel constructs meaning. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the detailed frame and counter-frame analysis of the way in which RT 
covered the Syrian crisis in 2013. The chapter follows the structure of the multi-level frame 
analysis model and thus looks both at the strategic and tactical efforts of the channel to 
construct meanings and promote interpretations. This is achieved through the in-depth analysis 
of the implicit dialogue between the Russian state broadcaster and its discursive rival, CNN. 
In doing so, it exposes the various tactical framing techniques and juxtaposes these with the 
strategic framing process. Thus, it not only sheds light on both the process of framing and 
counter-framing as well as the ideational underpinnings of Russian foreign policy but also 
provides a useful point of comparison for the second case study.  
 
Chapter 6 presents the Case Study II by delving into the way in which the Crimean Referendum 
was covered by the channels. This chapter is structured around the same discursive levels, 
strategic and tactical. The purpose of this chapter is to showcase how the channels reported a 
different political situation in which the actors of the conflict, Russia and the US, exchanged 
their discursive roles. In this, it further enriches the investigation with the empirical data to 
illuminate the mechanisms of meaning construction that is achieved both through strategic and 
tactical framing.  
 
The final Chapter 7 pulls together the insights generated by the two case studies and presents 
the conclusions arrived at through comparative analysis, followed by more general theoretical 
inferences. It stresses the differences between the processes of strategic and tactical framing 
and explains the mechanisms of counter-framing. Subsequently, it highlights how the 
conclusions of this project contribute to the discipline of IR and maps out avenues for future 
research. The study closes with the section that speak back to the problems raised above and 
concludes this dissertation.  
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Chapter 1. 
 
Situating the Project: A Literature Review 
 
“Just imagine that, for the purposes of your everyday social practice, you had to find 
your way by means of, say, deductive theory testing (“trial and error”), or the 
inductive derivation of theoretical propositions from empirical observations. You 
would get lost, stumble around, and eventually share the fate of the astronomer-
philosopher Thales of Miletus, who fell into a well while observing the stars and was 
consequently scorned by a female servant who had both feet firmly on the ground. At 
the bottom of our hearts, we all know that the way we produce knowledge in our 
everyday social practice has advantages over standard scientific methods”  
(Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009, p. 702). 
 
 
a. Introduction 
 
Following the growth of disappointment with the dominant explanations of international 
politics by neorealist and neoliberal theorists, scholars of International Relations (IR) shifted 
their focus of research from material and tangible factors to ideational aspects of global 
politics2. This trend has streamed through various and often mutually exclusive research 
programs that work within different ontological frameworks, enriching the discipline with 
conceptual reorientations. New critical voices have sought to re-evaluate problems of agency, 
causality and power. These deconstruction efforts have revealed dominant narratives in the 
discipline leading to a key postmodern postulate that theory is never benign in the sense that it 
always influences practice even if one does not acknowledge it. In this critical vein, the field 
of Social Sciences appeared in a sense a discursive creation of scientists themselves3. This 
radical notion has brought a degree of confusion to the practice of research in IR that needed 
to be conceptually reoriented; as a result, the discipline has found itself in an epistemological 
debate.   
                                                        
2  For a review of the ‘Third Debate’ and genealogy of constructivism, see Fierke & Jørgensen (2001), 
Introduction, in “Constructing International Relations: The next generation”. 
 
3  For the development of this point, see Ashley (1988) in IR and Lyotard (1984) in Philosophy. 
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In general, although rather contested, terms the split is between the so-called ‘positivist’ 
approaches and ‘postmodern’ research paradigms (Klotz, 2008). While this classification is 
contested, with few modernists strictly adhering to the ‘positivist orthodoxy’ and many 
postmodernists rejecting ‘extreme relativism’, the split is rooted in rather substantial 
ontological and epistemological disparities. Advocates of positivist approaches maintain that 
the traditional theory-testing research defends the field’s right to scientific inquiry, continuing 
the quest for incontrovertible variables. The opposite camp of post-modern scholars insists on 
moving away from the form of objective claims pointing towards the failure of traditional 
epistemology to provide ‘incontrovertible’ foundations of knowledge. But despite their 
philosophical nature, the ultimate problematique of these debates is the domain of empirical 
research. The advocates of positivist tradition, for instance, are reluctant to include language 
as an object of scientific inquiry, even when it comes to interpreting meaning (Wendt, 1999), 
relying on the “mind-world dualism” (Jackson, 2011). Postmodernists insist on the mutual 
constitution of objective and subjective variables, rejecting direct testing against reality 
(Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009).   
 
This meta-theoretical debate has resulted in the empirical research still lacking practical 
answers at the level of methodology (Klotz, 2008). By methodology I mean not the tools of 
gathering and processing data but rather the conceptual structure that organizes the practice of 
inquiry in Social Sciences (Jackson, 2011). In this chapter, I argue that IR theory has difficulty 
accounting for the dynamics of meaning in part because thus far it has not developed a clear 
understanding of the process of dialogue, the essential process that constitutes the relationship 
between actors. The reason for this limitation is the lack of methodological tools for studying 
the ideational relationship between political actors. In particular, this is due to the lack of 
inquiry into communication processes. What essentially happens is that the importance of 
communication as a venue for political interaction is acknowledged but barely any strategies 
to study it have been implemented. This methodological gap has resulted in a large empirical 
gap, with studies unable to provide comprehensive answers to the question of meaning in 
foreign policy, in particular of the states that are not deemed part of the ‘liberal world’. 
 
To highlight these conceptual and empirical gaps in IR literature this review is organized 
around the bodies of literature that in their own ways deal with ideational matters in the 
international and have recognized the field of communication as a legitimate object of inquiry. 
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Thus, it follows three lines of review. Section b critically engages with the existing studies on 
Soft Power. It argues that while this area of research has done a great job of popularising the 
realm of ideas as an object of emphasis in the discipline, its strategy to apply a rational lens to 
an essentially discursive practice has lead soft power inquiry into an epistemological deadlock. 
Section c looks at Soft Power’s neighboring body of literature, Public Diplomacy. While the 
importance of media has been pointed out by these scholars, the empirical research in this field 
has been fragmented, mainly due to methodological limitations that will be addressed in this 
chapter. Section d of this chapter engages with Constructivist research, the framework that 
pays particular attention to meaning in IR and has suggested potential methodological roads 
for future research, such as frame analysis. This has emerged as a result of a meta-quest for 
theoretical foundations but the field has found itself in an epistemological stalemate that 
prevents it from producing empirical studies that employ this analytical tool in practice. This 
section highlights the methodological gap, in particular within the constructivist norm research.  
 
Each section of this chapter concludes by showcasing how methodological limitations have 
resulted in the empirical gap. This is presented through the review of the literature on Russia’s 
foreign policy, in particular, the inability of each of the three bodies of research to provide 
systematic analysis of Kremlin’s, often conflicting, messages to the world. Ultimately, the 
chapter argues for the potential of frame analysis to advance the empirical research program 
by providing an analytical tool that will allow to answer the pressing questions raised by IR 
literature. 
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b. Soft Power 
The concept of power is central to the discipline of International Relations. However, with 
multiple approaches to the issue, IR theory lacks a common conception of power. Realists tend 
to perceive it as an entity determined by tangible resources, which suggests a strong link with 
what is traditionally defined as hard power (Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz, 1959). An alternative 
to traditional theorisations is a relatively new concept of soft power, which rests on ideas, 
norms, and culture. Although Joseph Nye, who coined the term, was not the first one to 
introduce an alternative to the dominant in IR coercive power,4 in recent years his notion has 
gained particular popularity across the field as well as in media discourse. Nye (2008) defines 
soft power as “the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction 
rather than coercion or payment” (Nye, 2008, p. 94). Although he acknowledges that the 
concept of soft power is rooted into what realist E.H. Carr called ‘power over opinion,’ his 
notion more readily fits into the liberal paradigm. In particular, it emphasises the role of 
institutions as non-coercive and non-violent elements of soft power. In his book Soft Power: 
the means to success in world politics Nye argues: 
“Soft power is a staple of daily democratic politics. The ability to establish preferences 
tends to be associated with intangible assets such as an attractive personality, culture, 
political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate of having moral 
authority. If a leader represents values that others want to follow, it will cost less to lead”  
(Nye, 2004). 
It particularly emphasises the role of well-developed democratic society as the imperative 
precondition within which soft power can be operationalised. As Nye maintains, “in 
democracy, the presence of dissent and self-criticism can be beneficial: it enhances the 
credibility of messages’ (Nye, 2011, p.109). This normative focus on democracy is apodictic 
within this paradigm to an extent that countries that are not deemed part of the liberal world 
are denied the right to hold soft power. For instance, in his rhetorical essay What Russia and 
Chine Don’t Get About Soft Power Nye delegitimises Russia’s and China’s attempts at soft 
                                                        
4  Steven Lukes, for example, suggests that power is a social phenomenon that is not necessarily based on 
tangible resources but works through preference creation (Lukes, 2005). And within post-modern 
approaches power is understood as a series of force relations produced through discourse (Foucault, 1977).    
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power by arguing that with the weak form of ‘civil society’ that is not ‘free and open’ prevents 
these countries to succeed in the world: 
“In today’s world, information is not scarce but attention is, and attention depends on 
credibility. Government propaganda is rarely credible. The best propaganda is not 
propaganda” 
(Nye, 2013). 
Thus for Nye, soft power is a morally superior mode of political interaction. Bearing in mind 
the implicitly negative connotation that the term propaganda invokes, the popularity of soft 
power as a rhetorical structure can be explained by its potential to give a rather positive spin to 
the same term.5 For example, Bilial Mattern (2005) argues that the reality of attractiveness 
which soft power rests upon is a ‘sociolinguistic construct’, “an interpretation that won out 
over many other possible interpretations” (Mattern, 2005, p. 585).  
On the theoretical front, despite its clear-cut and catchy definition, the conceptual and 
analytical value of soft power has been widely contested. The term bears a number of inner 
inconsistencies that are rooted in the imperfect conceptualisation. The issues begin to arise 
from the point at which Nye lays the notion’s foundation, attractiveness. It is simultaneously 
understood as a presupposed basis for activating the tool of influence and at the same time as 
an ultimate goal that is gained by exercising power. In other words, attraction is assumed as “a 
precondition for its own production” (Mattern, 2005, p. 596). Thus, the conceptualisation of 
resources of power, its instrumental arsenal, and the ultimate goal it is aimed at is insufficiently 
articulated. The critique that follows is that his notion is not a radical alternative to the 
traditional definition of international politics as a struggle for power but an extension of the 
realist concept into a non-material “struggle over ideas” (Kiseleva, 2015, p. 319). Hence the 
distinction between soft and hard power, both of which are rooted in coercion (which in the 
case of soft power is sociolinguistic), becomes impossible (Mattern, 2005). 
All the above-mentioned problems can be overarched by the integrally flawed epistemological 
basis. In particular, soft power is an approach that applies a rationalist lens to an essentially 
discursive practice. For example, much of the empirical and policy-oriented research is filled 
                                                        
5  Some scholars acknowledge that soft power is a new phrase for an old phenomenon. See, for example, 
Parmar and Cox (2010).  
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with attempts to measure soft power, despite the conceptual emphasis on the intangible 
resources.6 Strong positive trends in research lead to an over-emphasis on “ideal functions” 
rather than “real structures and relations”, limiting the possibility of understanding social 
practices (Pamment, 2014, p. 51). And while Nye acknowledges that soft power is a relational 
concept, it still lacks methodological arsenal for studying this relationship. Subsequently, these 
conceptual inconsistencies lead to a methodological stalemate. There is a missing theoretical 
path that would lead practical researchers from ontological and epistemological basis to 
methodology. And this missing link is research design. How do we link soft power to the 
empirical world?  Should we attempt to measure the intangible variables? What are the tools 
that are fit for answering these questions?  
As a result, there is confusion amongst researchers who choose to work within this paradigm 
over how to apply soft power conceptually. Some lean towards the instrumental element of 
Nye’s concept and understand it as a tool/means that can be operationalized within foreign 
policy strategies (Nye, 2004). From this point, however, the target/recipient issue arises that 
pushes scholars into a theoretical struggle whether soft power can be directly targeted at foreign 
populations or policy makers or neither of them (Layne, 2010). Other researchers draw their 
attention to the soft power ‘phenomenon’ (Hayden, 2012). Thus, it becomes an object of 
research which stays rather focused on public diplomacy efforts of various countries. While 
the studies that focus on the EU and USA as case studies provide relevant empirical material  
(Cross & Melissen, 2013; Hill, 2010; Krige, 2010), those who focus their research on non-
Western countries have faced conceptual difficulties (Suzuki, 2010). Here the problem lies 
within the theoretical limitation of soft power that is rooted in the ‘universal’ neo-liberal values 
that do not appear as natural and organic in different social and political contexts. 7 Hence 
analytical utility of the notion remains rather limited.  
 
                                                        
6  For example, an annual index is published by Portland Communications that measures outlined by Nye 
soft power resources by combining both ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ data (Portland & Facebook, 2016; 
Portland & USC Center on Public Diplomacy, 2017). 
 
7  This point is well articulated in neo-Gramscian critique that explains the inconsistency by suggesting 
that all theories are inherently linked to the social and political context of their authors (Cox, 1981). 
Although Nye acknowledges the influence of Gramscian theory on his work, he disregards hegemony, and 
in this respect, the aspect of power that can exist independently of hard power only through consent is an 
illusion, that ignores “social reality populated by intrinsic mechanisms of coercion” (Zahran & Ramos, 
2010, p. 24). 
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i. Russia’s Soft Power 
 
Despite its conceptual ambiguities, Nye’s concept has affected enormously the theory and 
practice of foreign policy in China and India (Kroenig, McAdam, Weber, 2014; Thussu, 2013; 
Cross and Melissen, 2013; Wang, 2011). Following the trend in the studies of western and 
Asian states, international scholars have been also looking at Russia’s soft power, its 
effectiveness as foreign policy strategy  (Dolinsky, 2013; Dougherty, 2013; Lukyanov, 2013; 
Saari, 2014), the way in which Russia is revisiting soft power by integrating it with hard power 
(Sergunin & Karabeshkin, 2015), or exposing the attractiveness of Russian conservative 
values to international publics (Kaczmarska & Keating, 2017).  
 
In Russia, the term ‘soft power’ has found its way into official speeches, widely used in media 
commentary and is often a topic of political discussions. In February 2013, the official Foreign 
Policy Concept included the concept of soft power into its strategy of developing ‘its own 
effective means of information influence on public opinion abroad” (The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2013). Soft power here was mainly understood as a tool of 
culture promotion within the strategies of political PR and Public Diplomacy. A more recent 
document introduced in 2016 still includes soft power with a rather vague definition of it: 
 
“In addition to traditional methods of diplomacy, "soft power" has become an integral 
part of efforts to achieve foreign policy objectives. This primarily includes the tools 
offered by civil society, as well as various methods and technologies – from 
information and communication, to humanitarian and other types”  
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016). 
A bourgeoning literature in the country, both academic and policy oriented, has been 
preoccupied with adopting the concept, either by equating it to ideology promotion or the so-
called ‘soft diplomacy’ (Naumov, 2015; Ponomareva, 2013). This has been looked at mainly 
within the framework of geopolitics, analysing soft power of states in terms of spheres of 
interest (Ponomareva, 2013). Other scholars in Russia have been looking at the necessity to 
utilise it for expanding influence in the world (Lebedeva & Kharkevich, 2014) or exploring 
the mechanisms of it within the western democracy promotion practices mainly in relation to 
the ‘coloured revolutions’ (Naumov, 2016). 
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As a whole, Russian scholarly works on soft power lie vaguely within the frameworks of 
Public Diplomacy and Political PR, which indicates the overall interest in the instrumental 
aspects of the notion rather than the appeal of it as a concept of power in IR. All the above 
resulted in a disintegrated understanding of the Nye’s normative concept within Russia. This 
phenomenon is mainly due to the Russian discipline of Social Sciences being predominantly 
influenced by either materialist or realist theoretical frameworks (inherited from the 
communist ideological structure). While the notion has entered the realm of common sense 
and became a reference point as a discursive element in the public, the fragmented 
interpretation of soft power if also due to the inability of the concept to endure outside the 
ideology of liberal democracy. 
By adopting Nye’s liberal model all the above-mentioned studies that evaluate Russia’s 
behavior on the international arena through the prism of soft power overlook the extent to 
which this concept is Western-centric, normative and rationalist. In fact, the conceptual flaws 
that are outlined in greater detail in the previous section of this chapter have led to the 
production of particularly inconsistent empirical analysis of the Russian case. The research has 
failed to adequately explore the nature of Russia’s attractiveness to foreign publics and there 
remains lack of consensus whether Russia has any soft power potential at all. In broad terms, 
the issue lies within the conflict of explanatory vs. interpretive approaches in IR. Soft power 
research is dominated by positivist research programs, while ignoring “complex structural and 
organizational concerns surrounding why and how PD activities are conducted, evaluated and 
justified” (Pamment, 2014, p. 51). Thus, positivist approaches fail to provide a full picture of 
the international interaction that is not based on tangible elements due to the lack of tools to 
study meaning. On another front, interpretive approaches that focus on meanings lack system 
and often emphasize strategy oversighting dynamics of interaction.     
Recently, for example, IR scholars in Russia have acknowledged the limitations of Nye’s 
western-specific concept, in particular focusing on the normative aspects of soft power and 
the lack of conceptual rigour of the theory (Pimenova, 2017). Some works, in a 
“constructivist/post-structuralist vein”, have looked at Russia’s soft power from the point of 
view of hegemonic discourse that soft power has ultimately become (Kiseleva, 2015). Russia, 
in this respect, is seen as adopting the discourse of the hegemon ‘in pursuit of power and 
status in international affairs’ (Kiseleva, 2015). While Kiseleva has taken an interpretivist 
approach to Russia’s soft power and managed to explore the reasons behind Kremlin’s 
 37 
‘superficial’ attitude to the concept, it still looks at Russia as a unitary state that is pursuing a 
grand strategy (Kiseleva, 2015). This fails to grasp apparently contradictory foreign policy 
outcomes that are often perceived as Kremlin’s ‘unpredictability’. This is due to the 
methodological choice of looking at official speeches while neglecting the dynamic media 
stage, the area that manifests volatility of context. And while the interpretivist approach does 
provide a deeper insight into Kremlin’s foreign policy, there is lack of systematic approach to 
the study of relationship, in particular, the discursive interaction between different states. 
Thus, the empirical gap remains with lack of studies that explore such controversies as, for 
example, why Russia’s public diplomacy often appeals to liberal norms and at the same time 
promotes its unique and authentic, if not the opposite to the democratic world, path. For 
example, she argues: 
“The Russian discourse on soft power situates itself in reference to its hegemonic 
counterpart, from which it takes some of its characteristics. But the target/recipient of 
Russian soft power is not only the West as hegemon, but also the West as Russia’s 
Other” 
 (Kiseleva, 2015, p. 317). 
And while Kiseleva states that her study adopted a ‘relational approach to power’, it remains 
unclear whether the method that has been employed has the analytical capacity to study the 
relationship in sufficient detail. In particular, Kiseleva looks at how policy makers have 
responded to the hegemonic discourse, but due to the lack of systematic method to look at the 
narratives and counter-narratives, the picture remains incomplete. 
Another emerging strand that is partly related to soft power research but is rather critical of 
Nye’s traditional framework is strategic narratives scholarship (Roselle, Miskimmon, & 
O’Loughlin, 2014b). Strategic narratives are understood as directly addressing “the formation, 
projection and diffusion, and reception of ideas in the international system. Finally, when we 
see how different states try to use narratives strategically to sway target audiences, we begin 
to see how contestation works, especially in a more complex media ecology” (Roselle, 
Miskimmon, & O’Loughlin, 2014a, p. 74). Proposed as an alternative way of looking at ‘soft’ 
as opposed to ‘hard’ influence, this framework particularly emphasises the need to look at 
audiences’ perceptions (Feklyunina, 2015). In particular, they study the reasons why some 
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narratives are accepted in the target audiences and others are not as successful in reaching their 
receivers. The scholarship on Russia, in this vein, is concerned with communicative “linkage” 
between the narratives and the audience. Szostek (2017), for example, looking at the limits of 
Russia’s strategic narratives in Ukraine argues that the acceptance of strategic narratives in the 
audience that “maintains personal and cultural connections to the foreign state through regular 
travel”, “media consumption”, etc. is more likely. At the same time, she acknowledges the 
limitations of this framework, emphasising that the “less strategic” messages and their 
reception lie beyond the scope of strategic narratives analysis. It is this other, tactical 
dimension of persuasive messages that my work will bring into focus.  
The strategic narratives framework has received some criticism from discourse analysis 
scholars. For example, Shepherd (2015) argues that Roselle, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin 
undermine the notion of co-constitutiveness of actors and subjects in the discourse by applying 
a rationalist lens to narratives. This criticism has been met with a response that the intentional 
efforts of actors, even if “actors’ subjectivities are constituted through discourse”, still deserve 
attention of scholars, in particular when we look at persuasive communication (Miskimmon et 
al., 2015). Indeed, the strategic nature of political communication, even within the 
understanding of the inability to assess this from the extra-discursive reality, is one of the gears 
that constitute meaning construction mechanisms in international politics. The scholarship on 
strategic narratives has brought us much closer to understanding the effects of soft power 
efforts in the near abroad. However, the mechanisms of strategic narratives that Russia 
promotes in the Western countries has received much less scrutiny.  
My work will, in fact, in large parts deal with strategic narratives but they will not be the sole 
focus of the research. These will rather be treated as elements of a larger and more complex 
meaning construction process. Moreover, I will expand my focus from narrative analysis to 
include a broader spectrum of genres of persuasive communication, for example the ones that 
are not structured as a coherent story. Thus, if we want to understand the mechanisms of 
meaning construction, it is my contention that we need to employ a more inclusive framework 
for analysing the multiplicity of discursive utterances. The framework that will be proposed in 
the next chapter will on the one hand look at the strategic and intentional dimension of the 
discourse. On the other hand, it will dig deeper into the tactical level of communication by 
investigating the relationship between competing discourses. Thus, my work will partly deal 
with the research agenda raised by a number of identity and soft power scholars, who have 
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pointed out that strategic communication targets the environment that is often ideationally 
fragmented and rarely ‘monolithic’ (Feklyunina, 2015; Hansen, 2006). For example, 
Feklyunina says: 
“even when the goals and values are shared not by the ‘state’, but only by some of the 
audiences within state B, they can — depending on their position within the society and 
their proximity to the locus of foreign policy decision-making — have a noticeable 
impact on the reinterpretation of the state’s interests in the official discourse. 
(Feklyunina, 2015, p. 780) 
Although my work will not deal with the audiences in the sense of the broader population, it 
will nevertheless look at how the rhetorical rival of RT affects the discourse of the channel at 
the tactical level. As Chapter 2 will illustrate, this research understands the relationship 
between RT and CNN as a co-constitutive process of constant frame exchange. Both of the 
channels are thus the recipients of the rival discourses. In this respect, the work will partially 
address the problem of strategic narratives reception, but will also add the tactical dimension 
to take a closer look at the dynamics that affect meaning construction. 
Overall, the theoretical basis of soft power insists that there is a complex interaction between 
practices of social communication but the methodological arsenal of such works could benefit 
from a more inclusive approach. The framing and counter framing analytical tools proposed in 
the dissertation aim at providing the means to broaden the methodological spectrum of 
interpretive approaches. By filling this methodological gap in the literature this study will also 
complement the empirical research on Russia’s foreign policy by providing the missing links 
in the understanding of norms and discursive practices, by focusing on messages of RT. At the 
same time, it will emphasize the importance of integrating media research in IR, an important 
methodological avenue that is as much discussed in theory as it is neglected in empirical 
research. 
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c. Public Diplomacy 
 
The trend on soft power in IR resulted in the burgeoning literature on public diplomacy 
adopting the concept’s framework. Thus, the studies that acknowledge an importance of 
international communication as an instrument of foreign policy also recognize it as a 
component of soft power (Hayden, 2012; Susman, 2010). The point at which these two 
movements in foreign policy research meet is their shared focus on the strategic influence that 
“suggests a strong link between public diplomacy and soft power” (Hayden, 2012).  
The term has entered the language of international relations in the mid-1960s, after Edmund 
Gullion, a former US Ambassador and Dean of the Edward R. Murrow Center of Pubic 
Diplomacy at Tufts University, introduced it. He referred to public diplomacy denoting a 
means of influence over public opinion that would have a potential to affect diplomatic 
relations. At the time, Gullion had been looking for an overarching term to define the kind of 
multilateral cultural programmes as well as international news broadcasting efforts aimed at 
foreign public employed by the US. As Nicholas Cull summarises:  
“Gullion's original sense of 'public diplomacy', as a more acceptable term for 
'propaganda', reflected the extreme circumstances of the Cold War. Since that moment 
of coining, the differences between the two concepts have become more evident and the 
two terms are not now seen as synonyms. Similar to propaganda, public diplomacy was 
about 'influence'; but unlike propaganda, that influence was not necessarily a one-way 
street from the speakers to their target. At its best, public diplomacy is a two-way street: 
a process of mutual influence, whereby a state (or other international player) facilitates 
engagement between publics or tunes its own policies to the map of foreign public 
opinion. In the ideal case, public diplomacy treats the foreign public as an active 
participant - not just as a flock of sheep waiting to be ideologically shorn” 
(Cull, 2010, p. 12). 
 
Today, public diplomacy is broadly defined as «an international actor’s attempts to manage 
the international environment through engagement with a foreign public» (Cull, 2010). IR 
scholars suggest that being an instrument of strategic influence, public diplomacy creates a 
favourable environment for conducting foreign policy (Kosachev, 2012). Nancy Snow (2009) 
suggests that public diplomacy, being a relatively dated term, has been practised by global 
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governments for a long time, while soft power represents a more precise concept of the 
phenomenon we are witnessing at the moment (Snow, 2009). However, these two terms are 
not deemed equivalents but are rather seen within a structure, with soft power being an 
overarching strategy and public diplomacy, one of the tools for gaining soft power (Hayden, 
2012; Nye, 2008). But despite the clear-cut definition of the phenomena, the theoretical 
dimension of this area of research remains rather unstructured. As it is often noted, public 
diplomacy research “has no consensus on its analytical boundaries” (Gregory, 2008). In the 
recent years, the studies on public diplomacy almost in every instance overlap with soft power 
or nation branding research, while the conceptual distinction between public diplomacy and 
soft power has been rather vaguely articulated by its proponents, with only a few scholars 
offering theoretical guidance (Gilboa, 2008). To illustrate the lack of systematic research 
agenda in this area, those who frame their research within the concept are called ‘soft power-
inspired programmes’ (Hayden, 2012, p.4). The definition points to the lack of theoretical 
rigour of such ‘programmes’ that often attempt at interdisciplinary analysis but lack efficient 
methodological strategies to deal with the research questions they pose. For example, Craig 
Hayden points to the importance of communication studies: 
 
“While the conclusions may be pertinent to enduring questions in international 
relations, the method and subject matter are grounded in communication studies” 
(Hayden, 2012, p. 4). 
 
However, his empirical analysis then neglects media and addresses the question by employing 
“rhetorical analysis of policy discourse” to highlight “the consequences of such texts as both 
functional knowledge and practice” (Hayden, 2012, p. 4). Thus, the epistemological focus on 
the communication does not fully translate into concrete research practice. The particular 
reasons for neglecting media analysis as a tool for solving the questions the answers to which 
can be found in the communicative environment remain unclear. Such inconsistencies are due 
to the lack of methodological means that would effectively provide the missing link between 
the conceptual and empirical dimensions of public diplomacy research.  
 
Overall, literature from the broad body of PD theory has failed to adequately address the issue 
around the function and dynamics of norms and frames within strategic narratives directed at 
foreign publics. Once the range of theoretical and empirical gaps have been fully revealed, the 
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work presented here suggests a way to correct this omission through showcasing the novel 
methodological and conceptual advancements.   
 
i. Russia’s Public Diplomacy 
 
In the recent decade Russia has been developing “its own effective means of information 
influence on public opinion abroad” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 
2016). Due to Putin’s government growing investment in Russia’s public diplomacy that 
manifests itself in the international news outlets, such as RIA Novosty news agency with RT 
international 24-hour news TV channel and Sputnik News online portal, in recent years great 
scholarly attention has been given to Russia’s strategies of influence on foreign publics, 
starting from the studies that look at the legacy of the compelling set of values and socio-
economical goals of the USSR’s ideology within current Russian concept to the works that are 
more focused on the newly developed strategies. Two major trends in this body of literature 
stand out: those who focus on ideology that Russia is promoting abroad (Just, 2016; Simons, 
2014) and the studies that look at tools and methods the country tends to utilize (Saari, 2014; 
Yablokov, 2015). Both of these approaches commonly link Russia’s public diplomacy with 
the concept of soft power.  
 
While RT readily fits into the framework of public diplomacy (being explicitly financed by the 
Russian government and aimed at promoting Russia’s point of view abroad (RT, 2017)), most 
of the studies that analyse it within this body of literature tend to approach it rather 
superficially, sustaining the empirical gap in the literature on Russia’s public diplomacy. For 
example, James Sherr (2013) provides a comprehensive overview of what are the roots and 
forms of Russian influence in the world but pays very little attention to the use of media (Sherr, 
2013).  In this vein, current Russia’s “message to the world” rests on two main aspects: its 
unique cultural difference from the West (Sherr, 2013) and the assumption that “there is a 
‘natural’ attraction of weak powers to the strong on a voluntary basis” (Simons et al., 2014). 
Based on this analysis a broad consensus amongst liberal scholars has emerged that Russia 
lacks significantly the values that would be potentially attractive to foreign publics (Avgerinos, 
2009; Simons et al., 2014). This criticism is explained by the fact that particularly the post-
Soviet states, which are the deemed the main targets of Russia’s PD, historically perceive 
Russia as a powerful “big brother” but also as an invader. Within this liberal paradigm, 
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transforming this image has been seen as tremendously challenging for the country’s foreign 
policy strategies. In particular, the challenge is understood in terms of transforming the 
traditional hard power approaches to more subtle and diffuse means of influence. Thus, the 
majority of studies that look at Russia’s PD strategies in the Commonwealth states and post-
Soviet states tend to conclude that Russia hasn’t managed to change the constructed image of 
an aggressor. For example, Jaroslav Cwiek-Karpowicz, describing Russian influence on the 
Eastern Partnership Countries, notes: 
 
“The manner in which Russia tries to promote its own history and culture often poses 
a serious threat to the national identity of other post-Soviet states” 
 (Cwiek-Karpowicz, 2011).  
This normative conclusion appears fragmented and even distorted. Firstly, there is lack of 
articulation of what the notion of attractiveness entails and secondly, the PD literature has 
failed to adequately elaborate on the reasons why some norms and values may be more 
attractive for foreign states than others. All the above drawbacks of public diplomacy literature 
are largely due to the imperfect methodological arsenal that the theory has at its disposal. The 
most important gap in public diplomacy literature on Russia is that all these studies either 
dismiss the role of media within it or overlook the countering efforts of RT and therefore fail 
to explain the reasons behind Russia’s often defensive rhetoric. 
There are number of more in-depth studies however, such as, for example, Yablokov’s (2015) 
analysis of conspiracy theories that are often presented on RT, which is a compelling study. 
While, in essence, it does focus on the countering efforts of the channel, looking at “how 
various conspiratorial notions in programmes broadcast by RT legitimise Russian domestic 
and foreign policies and, in turn, delegitimise policies of the American government” 
(Yablokov, 2015), it takes only a fragment rather than a system of tools that RT utilises as his 
object of focus and it lacks a structured methodological approach to the issue. Thus, the 
strategy to single out one of the RT’s element doesn’t manage to fill the gap in PD literature 
that would have provided a comprehensive explanation of Russian intentions and their roots. 
My study, on the other hand, employing a systematic approach of framing and counter framing 
that benefits from a symbiotic relationship between its conceptual and methodological aspects 
will attempt to close the apparent gap in the PD literature.  
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d. Constructivism 
 
As an alternative to rationalist positions in IR, constructivists have developed theoretical 
advancements of mutual constitution of structures and agents, where objects and subjects are 
mutually shaped by a series of practices that operate through creation and dynamics of rules 
and norms. While there remains lack of clarity over what constructivism is with several groups 
of closely related approaches, the theoretical assumption that they tend to share can be 
summarized into the below: 
 
“<…> the actions of states contribute to making the institutions and norms of 
international life, and these institutions and norms contribute to defining, socializing, 
and influencing states. Both the institutions and the actors can be redefined in the 
process”  
(Hurd, 2008, p. 304). 
 
Informed by the linguistic turn in Sociology and Philosophy8, constructivist research has 
broadened the understanding of international organizations and law, ideas and norms, as well 
as argument and persuasion in IR. The new avenue of inquiry has stretched the borders of what 
is considered as a “legitimate object of analysis in IR” (Hofferberth & Weber, 2015). Great 
emphasis by this school of thought has been given to meaning in world politics and to how 
these understandings of political reality shape actors’ behavior.  
 
“Constructivists argue that people strive not only to make sense out of their world and to 
act within it, but also to communicate their understandings to others” 
(Kowert, 1998).  
 
Thus, the meaning is viewed within the context of intersubjectivity, another overarching aspect 
of constructivist approaches in IR. Constructivism as a rather heterogeneous current of related 
approaches are split into modern and postmodern streams (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001; Price 
& Reus-Smit, 1998). The first camp clings to some of the epistemological assumptions of the 
“positivist orthodoxy”, while the poststructuralism-leaning constructivists refuse claims of 
                                                        
8  For example, Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, in particular, the idea that language is the linking 
force of social nature, as well as the works of Jurgen Habermas and  Anthony Giddens – to name a few – 
have largely inspired modern and postmodern constructivisms (Fierke & Jørgensen, 2001). 
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objective knowledge.  For example, in Wendt’s (1999) social reality actors do not communicate 
through language but rather through signals, or “conversation of gestures”, for post-positivist 
constructivists language is central (Kratochwil, 1989; Onuf, 1989). Another point of contention 
over constructivist and poststructuralist epistemological assumptions is the emphasis on either 
a priori rationality (Wendt, 1992) or a priori meaning (Campbell, 1998; Zehfuss, 2002).9  
 
Poststructuralists insist that intersubjectivity is a ‘dialogical relationship in so far as meaning 
and practices arise out of interaction’ and that casual explanations are unfit for an ontology of 
mutual constitution (Fierke, 2001, p. 107), however practically this group of researchers has 
not produced methodological advancements for the comprehensive study of this relationship. 
There are two reasons for this limitation. Firstly, discourse analysis as the method largely 
utilised by postructuralists, is primarily directed at monologic texts. Secondly, the lack of 
coherent conceptualization of dialogue is due to the neglect of reactive and responsive field of 
media communication. Moreover, the so-called ‘critical’ constructivist research has been rather 
actively engaged in empirical work, which main objective is not to explain casual mechanisms 
but rather to denaturalise prevailing social constructs. In this poststructuralist vein, this is not 
seen outside of the power relations in their research. These works provide, for example, insights 
into the meaning of historical milestones in international relations, such as Cuban missile crisis  
(Weldes, 1996) or the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Fierke, 1996). Others explore the role 
of discourse as a means of political and economic exploitation (Doty, 1996) or advance theory 
of speech, argument and persuasion as mechanisms of social construction (Crawford, 2002; 
Kratochwil, 1989). From Fierke’s perspective, the limitations of such approach is due to the 
lack of conceptual links between theory and practical research: 
 
“In fact, one can argue that the critical endeavour of the poststructuralists suffers 
precisely because their own, often very abstract, theoretical assumptions are not 
sufficiently related to the analysis of actual practices” 
(Fierke, 2001, p. 108).  
                                                        
9  For example, Wendt’s constructivism assumes that rational interest precedes any form of 
communicative action in social reality or intersubjective codes, such as language (Fierke, 2001). For 
postructuralists, meaning presupposes action (Campbell, 1998; Doty, 1996; Fierke, 2001; Zehfuss, 2002) 
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Thus, the conceptualisation of identity in their works leads to an exercise of research that is not 
entirely dissimilar to the positivist tradition, that is that their ontological assumptions 
presuppose and heavily influence the practice of poststructuralist research10.  
 
There are number of conceptual inconsistencies in the mainstream constructivist as well as 
poststructuralist views on research design and at the same time, several proposals to resolve 
these issues, such as, for example, the desire to develop an “explicitly constructivist criteria for 
constructing ‘better’ accounts of international politics”  has been raised (Fierke & Jørgensen, 
2001). The attempts to provide solutions for the problem can be categorized into three streams: 
proposals to continue testing hypotheses in a neopositivist vein, abandon criteria for assessing 
validity claims as such by adopting postructuralist epistemological stance, or find a middle 
ground that would allow to maintain a form of criteria but will not necessarily translate into 
hypotheses testing and falsification. However, these epistemological disputes in constructivist 
norm research have held it lagging behind from other strands in adapting the methods that are 
already effectively used across the field of Social Sciences and integrating them into a 
structured and operational research methodology.  
 
Indeed, while constructivists often advertise the strength of their theoretical arguments, in 
particular in the area of norms and interpretations (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001), they have 
received criticism for a number of conceptual inconsistencies that emerged from the internal 
epistemological conflict of explaining change in international relations. For example, 
Hofferberth and Weber (2015) contend that the main theoretical argument of constructivist 
norm research – that there is constant negotiation and re-negotiation of norms and meanings in 
social communication – has dissolved in the flawed research design: 
 
“We argue that the commitment to a methodological framework that posits a 
unidirectional causal relationships between independent and dependant variables has 
led the constructivist norm research to a categorical separation of norms and action and 
to a theorisation of their relation in a cultural-determinist way” 
 (Hofferberth & Weber, 2015). 
  
                                                        
10  See, for example, Hoy and McCarthy(1994), who note that poststructuralist discourse is essentially 
normative, that is heavily reliant on a strict list of ‘do’s’ and ‘don’ts’ for performing research.  
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This is largely due to conceptualisation of norms as variables that are held stable at the stage 
of empirical analysis. Defined as ‘standards of appropriate behaviour’, they are seen as 
structural elements that communicate clear-cut and unchanging instructions. Thus, norms are 
seen as having ‘regulative effects’ on the ‘behaviour’ of actors, and they are analytically treated 
as independent variables (Finnemore, 1996; Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999). This neopositivist 
framework with a “structuralist” bias (Jackson, 2003) appears rather static to be able to analyse 
interpretive change. In particular, such methodology offers little analytical power to look at 
discursive interaction in the international. Consequently, the promise to provide deeper insight 
into the process of international change and the relationship between norms and interpretations,  
in particular, has not been met and this gap in IR literature remains due to the missing 
methodological resource.  
 
Moreover, constructivist research on norm construction and persuasion suffers from strategic 
bias. While the constituting part of the constructivist ontology is compelling, they also perceive 
the states as ‘unitary actors to which we legitimately can attribute anthropomorphic qualities 
like identities, interests, and internationality’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 43). Thus, they give great 
emphasis to the links between strategic behavior and norms. Constructivists do not exclude the 
element of ‘self-interest’ that constitutes the social relationship in the international. This 
ontological basis explains why constructivists are mainly preoccupied with strategic behavior. 
This issue lies within the constructivism vs. rationalism dispute over state interests, and there 
is lack of clarity in the constructivists approaches around their treatment of strategic behavior. 
While they move away from rational interpretation of state behavior based on causality, they 
at the same time agree that “states act in pursuit of what they see as their interests, and they 
are as concerned with ‘power and interests’ as are realists (and liberals)” (Hurd, 2010). In 
this vein, discourse within constructivism is inherently linked to the strategic behavior, while 
the tactical elements are often omitted. The struggle over critical vs. empirical approaches has 
confused the researchers that attempt to find pragmatic answers to the concerns of international 
politics. As Fierke (2001) put it,  
 
“{T}he argument, which emerged during the Third Debate, that realists cannot adequately 
account for processes of change, is an act of disconfirmation. In this respect, to disconfirm 
is to raise questions about the validity or accuracy of a set of theoretical assumptions” 
(Fierke, 2001, p. 125).  
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Thus, stuck in a meta-theoretical quest for epistemological solutions of positivist vs. post-
positivist debate, constructivist norm research has largely ignored methodological tools of 
communication studies that are ready to be applied as analytical tools to provide the answers 
to the ideational questions concerning foreign policy. Although some point to the potential of 
framing (Klotz & Lynch, 2015), these methodologies have not been systematically applied in 
practice when looking at the relationship between norms and frames in foreign policy, which 
this research aims to bring into stark focus.  
 
 
i. Constructivist Research on Russia 
 
There has been a growing number of studies that analyse Russia’s behaviour on international 
arena through the prism of meaning. Within this segment, two trends stand out: security studies 
that are preoccupied with how state identity influences external security policy (Snetkov, 2012; 
Wilhelmsen, 2016), literature of status and its legitimacy (Hopf, 2005; Morozov, 2009; 
Neumann, 2015, 2016) and a group of works that evaluate Russia’s policy choices by bringing 
Kremlin’s interests into stark focus (Feklyunina, 2015; Roberts, 2014; Tsygankov, 2012, 2014, 
2016; White & Feklyunina, 2014). Many of these studies have presented rich analysis of 
Russian post-communist identity and the dominant discourses that inform its construction.  
 
The first strand of identity research on Russia suffers from a number of epistemological 
limitations: Within constructivist framework, actors are often assessed as rather unitary players 
in the field of international, which, in turn, produces works that emphasise the ideational 
frameworks that are driving Russian foreign policy such as the country’s “great power identity” 
(Hopf, 2005)  and “superiority complex” (Neumann, 2016)  but this does not further highlight 
the tactical communicative particularities that also influence the way relationship between 
countries work in the international. 
 
The second strand of this literature provides a more accurate account of the conflicting elite 
discourses that determine Russia’s self-recognition. For example, White and Feklyunina 
(2014), in their comprehensive work, present an insightful analysis of identity debates and 
explain what these mean for Russia through qualitative and quantitative analysis. By assessing 
the meaning of Europe in what constitutes it for post-communist countries, they show how the 
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official foreign policy discourse has evolved from “Russia as Europe” during the Gorbachev’s 
presidency to a more Eurasian orientation of the past decade. In contrast to liberal and realist 
accounts, these works emphasise the relational aspect of foreign policy. Russia is thus seen as 
seeking recognition from the West and redefining its own identity in relation to the ‘Other’ 
(Tsygankov, 2016). As Tsygankov puts it, “identity is therefore a system of meanings that 
expresses the self’s emotional, cognitive, and evaluative orientations towards the Other.” This 
notion suggests an explanation of Russia’s on the one hand constant strive for the opponent’s 
recognition but on the other hand the country’s shielding from it in order to construct its own 
distinctiveness. Drawing on the above-mentioned works, this defensive element of Russia’s 
foreign policy messages will be in stark focus of this research.  
 
Another important work that, located at the intersection between post-colonial, post-
structuralist and constructivist approaches in IR, looks at Russia as a ‘subaltern 
empire’(Morozov, 2015). Using this framework to draw ‘modest generalisations’ and some 
‘cross-national’ comparison Morozov points out that reason behind Russia’s ‘subversive’ 
discourse. He further emphasises Russia’s desire to “mimic” the West within the normative 
space of the hegemon. This theoretical insight will be particularly closely explored in this 
research by directing my attention to the discursive boundaries within which Russia operates. 
 
Unlike identity research, however, I will not look at Russia’s foreign policy as a systematic set 
of ideas based on elite discourses. Rather, this work opens up another dimension of it, the level 
of tactical interpretations. In other words, I will aim to understand the extent to which rival 
discourses of other countries may influence the meaning construction process. This work will 
aim to add to this second strand of knowledge on Russian identity by looking more closely at 
the exact relationship between norms and frames. Apart from focusing on the elite discourses, 
this work will look closer at the discursive interaction at the tactical level. This will, in turn, 
present a more accurate understanding of the current ideational setup in Russian foreign policy. 
It will also offer a more precise toolkit for reading Russian foreign policy messages, opening 
up the ‘between the lines’ dimension of the discourse. 
 
Thus, in this work I wish to distance the research from attributing agency to the elite groups in 
Russia and take a closer look at the more dynamic discursive space, the dialogic and 
intertextual processes that take place in the international communicative environment. In doing 
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so, this research will expand this narrow focus on strategy by advancing another, tactical level 
of states behavior, emphasizing the ad hoc justifications that surround messages emanating 
from public diplomacy outlets. It will do so by advancing the methodological arsenal of 
constructivism, such as framing and in particular counter framing. Framing provides 
methodological means for constructivist analysis, in particular for such approaches that work 
with epistemological claims that Zehfuss summarizes into the below: 
 
“As social problems do not have logically necessary solutions and social situations are 
necessarily indeterminate, analysis has to concentrate on how questions concerning 
validity claims are decided through discourse”  
(Zehfuss, 2002, p. 17). 
 
It is able to compliment the analysis that posits ‘reality’ as a significant point of reference, the 
existence of material world is not disputed. And framing can be applied within the ontology of 
the less ubiquitous nature of discourse (compared to, for example post-structuralist 
approaches), where rules and norms shape actors’ behavior but do not fully determine it  
(Kratochwil, 1989). Moreover, the research strategy that will be proposed in the following 
chapter can complement both approaches. It has the potential to expand on the insufficiently 
explored by constructivists role of language within the reality of intersubjectivity, in particular, 
the meaning and the mechanism that drive its creation. On the other hand, the tactical framing 
can be explored beyond agency. Thus, framing feeds in to both positive-leaning and 
fundamentally post-positive epistemological approaches. On the one hand, it can work with 
hypothesis that is proposed a priori, which can then be tested through empirical study. On the 
other hand, the ‘logic of discovery’ can presuppose any empirical research, making ‘one’s point 
of departure the meaningful practices of the actors themselves and how these led to the 
construction of one outcome rather than the other’ (Fierke, 2001, pp. 126–127) and fit well 
within the post-positivist epistemological positions.  
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e. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has reviewed three bodies of IR literature that deal with ideational factors in 
international politics and point to the importance of social communication. By critically 
engaging with these rather different approaches it highlighted the methodological limitations 
that have led to a state of research that is unable to provide comprehensive empirical accounts 
of the relations between competing narratives internationally. The problem of rational 
approaches is not only the reliance on ‘positivist orthodoxy’ that is incompatible with studying 
discursive practice but also the neglect of tools of analysis that would allow us to evaluate 
social reality in a relational manner. The similar pattern is observable within interpretive 
approaches that too often focus on analysing narratives in a unidirectional manner rather than 
looking at counter narratives in a co-constitutive way. 
 
This chapter suggests that the existing literature in a constructivist vein, broadly defined, has 
already provided us with good and insightful accounts of Russian identity and has advanced 
the knowledge on the country’s postcolonial hybridity and often conflicting foreign policy 
messages. This is where my work could add to the existing knowledge and provide a more 
detailed analysis of the particular meaning construction dynamics. This can be achieved by 
making several methodological steps. First, we need to carry forward the theoretical insights 
that social communication is important and include international media into the focus of our 
empirical research. Second, we need to pause the theoretical quest for epistemological 
foundations and attend to methodology by developing tools in a research design that allows to 
study the relationship in international relations.  
 
To solve the problems outlined in this chapter, this study will present a rather practical solution. 
By looking at the co-constitutive elements of framing and counter framing the next Chapter 2 
proposes a multi-level methodological model, where framing is understood not only as a 
strategic effort, but also as a mechanism, where frame sponsors, frames, subjects of framing, 
counter frames, all define each other in the process. These methodological developments of 
framing and counter framing will be seen as elements of a single analytical structure. Thus, 
this study develops an analytical framework that is ready to be applied across various research 
paradigms in IR. 
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Chapter 2. 
 
Conceptual Framework:  
A Multi-Level Frame Analysis Model 
 
 
“Poets are bound to the condition of achieving intellectual and aesthetic pleasure as well 
as certain emotional effects, and for that reason they cannot represent the stuff of reality 
unaltered, but are obliged to isolate fragment of it, dissolve obstructive connections, 
soften the whole and fill any gaps. These are the privileges of what is known as ‘poetic 
licence’. In addition, the can express only a small degree of interest in the origin and 
development of such mental states, which they describe as complete” 
(Freud, 2006, p. 241). 
 
 
 
a. Introduction 
The attempts to promote meanings in societies can be traced thousands of years back (Welch, 
2013). In fact, Ancient Greeks put plenty of effort into developing effective methods of public 
influence through art of rhetoric. Some of these systematic works, such as Xenophon’s 
Anabasis and Aristotle’s Rhetoric, laid down the foundations for the premodern as well as 
postmodern meaning construction strategies. Throughout the centuries these methods got 
engrained in public life, and the forms of public influence have been naturalised though 
systems of signs, linguistic and visual. Many contemporary sociologists today insist that 
individuals in the society need interpretive guidance in order to make sense of reality, as a form 
of existential mechanisms of human psyche (Goffman, 1975). Indeed, social life consists of a 
series of conversations; and conversation is something that the majority of us ted to perceive 
as natural. Postmodern critical thinkers across the field of Social Sciences have challenged this 
notion and have been engaged in deconstructive efforts to bring awareness to these patterns of 
influence, disturbing the conventions of societies.  
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In IR, the argument that “political analysis must be contextual and take account of the power 
practices actually manifested in the concrete political situation” allowed researchers to study 
power in an advanced way (Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950, p.94), or more precisely to move 
beyond power by, as Nicholas Onuf put it, painting a picture of “staggering complexity and 
constant change” within the interwoven patterns of overlapping social arrangement (Onuf, 
1989). States, balances of power, and hegemonies no longer remained the building blocks of 
the society but specific instances. This approach created an opportunity to look at the 
phenomenon at a more comprehensive level pushing researchers to understand power not as 
an exercise carried out by interested agents, but a discursive process through which agents and 
their interests are produced in the first place (Digeser, 1992). Thus, theories of discourse, 
semiotics, textuality and framing have streamed through the field, influencing the practice of 
research.  
 
This chapter’s aim is to distinguish between these approaches and provide a systematic 
conceptual framework that will organize this study. Section b, reviews the concepts of framing 
and counter-framing, highlighting how these are understood and applied in different fields of 
Social Science research, such as Communication, IR and Social Movements theory. This 
section highlights the conceptual and methodological drawbacks of these approaches and 
clarifies the conceptual distinctions between framing and frame analysis. Section c provides a 
systematic account of the key terms of discourse, narrative and frames that are operationalized 
in this study. In doing so, it presents a structural model that looks at discourse and narratives 
as situated at different levels of analysis. Section d presents the conceptual framework of this 
study, condensed in the multi-level frame analysis model. The section develops the concept of 
the dialogue and defines it as a key object of study, followed by the clarification of the 
methodological model as an analytical concept that can be applied across various paradigms 
in IR. Section e concludes this chapter.  
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b. Framing: A Theory or a Method? 
Framing has been widely popular across various fields of Social Sciences, earning a truly 
interdisciplinary fame. The value of framing is often explained by its potential to provide links 
between conceptual and methodological perspectives (Reese, 2007). In particular, those 
between Sociology and Psychology, Communication and Political studies. At the same time, 
its critics often point to the fragmented understanding of framing, its theoretical and 
methodological grounds; and the possibility of integrating the pluralistic approaches into a 
systematic theory has been deemed problematic if not impossible. Other studies favour a 
broader approach to defining it rather than proposing a lump concept of framing (D’Angelo, 
2002), pointing to the operational benefits of distinguishing between various types of frames 
(de Vreese., 2012).  
 
I find that it is imperative to distinguish between framing, frame analysis, and frames in order 
to avoid conceptual ambiguities. Framing, on the one hand, is as an object of research that can 
be understood as part of strategic practices for constructing meanings. A large number of media 
studies choose this direction of research, which essentially highlights framing implications for 
journalists by exposing narration techniques. However, the abovementioned studies rarely take 
it forward to explain broader picture. Many communication studies scholars have pointed to 
the issue of the “theoretical and empirical vagueness” (Scheufele, 1999, p. 103) of framing 
(D’Angelo & Kuypers, 2010; Entman, 1993), with efforts to organize various approaches by 
an overarching theory, for example, of bias and power (Entman, 2007). These works tend to 
refer to framing as theory. However, with multiple attempts to integrate approaches, the field 
of communication studies still lacks a rigorous conceptual strategy that would allow framing 
to exist as a stand-alone theory. On the other hand, framing can also be understood in terms of 
structured and systematic methodology, within which researchers choose to employ qualitative 
and quantitative content analysis. Studies that point towards methodological value of framing 
often label it as an approach (Pan & Kosicki, 1993) or a multiparadigmatic research programme 
(P. D’Angelo, 2002). Sharing the concerns over framing as a stand-alone theory, this study 
leans towards understanding framing as analytical tool that has the potential to be applied 
within different methodological choices with ontological and epistemological bearings. At the 
same time, in a constructivist vein, framing here is understood both as systematic efforts of 
actors to advance their strategies (where the agency is clearly defined) and as a co-constituted 
process, where actors and receivers mutually determine each other’s actions. Frame analysis is 
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therefore a particular research method that can be applied across various paradigms.  
 
In general terms, framing can be defined as a process of singling out elements of knowledge 
and packaging them in a set formula that conceptualizes the event and is aimed at sustaining 
or promoting this interpretation (Entman, 1993; Snow et. al, 1986; Tarrow, 1998). For 
sociologists we all actively engage in classification, interpretation, and organization practices 
to make sense of our life experiences by employing “schemata of interpretation”, or “frames” 
that enable us to “locate, perceive, identify, and label” (Goffman, 1975, p. 21). Within this 
paradigm, frames can be used both for introducing radically new ideas as well slightly shifting 
already accepted ones, or to maintain and stabilize deep-seated understandings in the society. 
In other words, frames serve as a reference point to the already accepted social context. 
Therefore, employing framing allows its advocates to create resonance in target audience. The 
phenomenon is closely linked to justifying behavior at a strategic and comprehensive level. 
When an issue is framed, its context is determined.  
 
Drawing largely on Goffman, social movements research has been focusing on framing as a 
central concept for highlighting participant mobilization strategies (Benford & Snow, 2000). 
In particular, framing here is applied as analytical tool with focus on ‘collective action frames’ 
to understand the character of social movement dynamics (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 613). 
This field of studies has significantly advanced the empirical application of frame analysis 
(McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996) by integrating framing methodology within social 
movements theory and by developing novel analytical tools, such as counter framing (Benford 
& Snow, 2000; Peña & Davies, 2016). 
 
Following the sociological turn in IR, there has been burgeoning literature on framing, 
predominantly within the constructivist research framework. While for sociologists the process 
of framing is linked to the process of any level of social interaction, much of media and political 
communications research have been primarily drawn to the utilitarian aspect of framing. In 
particular, such research often focuses on messages that shape interpretations and the way in 
which these techniques are being advanced by the advocates. Shortly put, these studies share 
understanding of frames as strategic devices that bring certain meaning and define significance 
of social events, and they provide recommendations on how to read events (Payne, 2001). 
Constructivist theorists distinguish between norms “as shared understandings that reflect 
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“legitimate social purpose'” and frames that are defined as devices that link intersubjective 
knowledge within the communicative acts. While framing is a social phenomenon, great 
emphasis has been given to communication, persuasion in particular (Payne, 2001; Chayes and 
Chayes, 1995).  The main reason for giving an important role to persuasion is that it is only 
when norm sponsors “persuade states to adopt” certain ideas, do these ideas transform into 
practice (Payne; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 893; Nadelman, 1990). As Finnemore and 
Sikkink put it, “persuasion is the process by which agent action becomes social structure, 
ideas become norms, and the subjective becomes the intersubjective” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 
1998: 914; Klotz, 1995: 29-33). This notion inherently links framing to the field of 
communication, the platform where frames can be tracked. A frame cannot be perceived as a 
legitimate social knowledge in itself, but rather a shared formula of interpreting political 
events: 
 
“The domain in which news discourse operates consists of shared beliefs about a society. 
These beliefs, despite the elusive nature of their content, are known and accepted by a 
majority of a society as common sense of conventional wisdom (e.g., “Equal 
opportunities are desirable”; “Opposing political candidates compete to win”; “Truth 
means something real”, etc.). They are pervasive and are often taken for granted. They 
set the parameters of a broad framework within which news discourse is constructed, 
transmitted, and developed”  
(Pan & Kosicki, 1993, p. 57). 
 
Most of the communication studies that work with framing make the theoretical link between 
framing and news/media discourse, which is defined as “the process by which individuals 
construct meaning” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). Thus framing can be understood “as a 
strategy of constructing and processing news discourse or as a characteristic of the discourse 
itself” (Pan & Kosicki, 1993, p.57). While this important theoretical link has been pointed out, 
the distinction between discourse and frames remains rather vague. This problem has 
manifested itself in the way frame analysis is performed and has been particularly problematic 
for international relations, where the notion of discourse bears multiple theoretical facets.  
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For example, constructivists tend to understand discourses as strategic tools: 
 
“The habitual actions that emanate from these interpretations are often referred to as 
“practices” and the combination of language and techniques employed to maintain them 
as ‘discourses’”   
(Klotz and Lynch, 2015, p. 8-9). 
  
Thus, the key idea behind framing both in communication studies and international relations 
is strategic efforts to interpret social realities (Benford & Snow, 2000; C. de Vreese, 2004; 
Entman, 2007; Gerhards & Rucht, 1992; Hänggli & Kriesi, 2012). While some of the 
approaches point to the problematique of agency in framing research, none of the studies look 
at the levels of framing from the point of view of strategic vs. tactical dimensions. While 
strategic part is important, it is the tactical dimension in which the change manifests itself.  
 
Recently scholars have started looking at the dynamics of frames, but it looked within the 
dimension of effects (Chong & Druckman, 2007a; C. de Vreese, 2004; Matthes, 2012). Little 
has been done to look at how counter frames may challenge the existing frames to transform 
or evolve. For example, Chong and Druckman (2007b) analyse which frames are stronger and 
more successful in promoting a strategic interpretation of frame sponsors. However, there are 
hardly any studies that take it forward and look at the relations between competing narratives 
internationally and how these relations are influenced by frames and counter frames. Unlike 
the dominant understanding of framing as a strategic effort to promote interests I maintain that 
it is imperative to also look at framing as a process. And although it is often referred to as a 
process, this has not been applied conceptually. This work looks at the co-constitutive elements 
of framing process. Thus, framing here is understood not only as a strategic effort, but also as 
a mechanism, where frame sponsors, frames, subjects of framing, counter frames, all define 
each other in the process. 
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c. Defining the Key Terms: Discourse, Framing, Narrative 
 
Following the growth of disappointment over the established and mainstream positivist 
approaches in IR the emergence of poststructuralism, hermeneutics, and critical theory has led 
to the so-called ‘linguistic turn’ in the broad field of Social Sciences (Dallmayr & McCarthy, 
1977; Derrida, 1978; Foucault, 1981; Rabinow & Sullivan, 1979). Subsequently, there has 
been an explosion of interest in discourse analysis, the leading methodology of the 
interpretivist approaches in IR. Studies that employ discourse analysis have enriched the field, 
allowing to theorize on the variables that had not been recognized as legitimate objects of study 
in IR for a long time, uncovering deep-seated social conflicts internationally.  
 
Discourse has a variety of meanings and connotations, from a narrow understanding of it as 
simply conversation between two people, to an ontological interpretation that discourse is an 
entire system that is ubiquitous in social reality11. The definitions of discourse start from the 
linguistic conceptualization of it as ‘language in use’ (Cameron, 2013). In this respect, 
discourse refers to the linguistic supra-structures and the focus of discourse analysis is 
therefore directed at ‘talk and text in context’ (van Dijk, n.d.). Thus, discourse analysis is 
focused on structure beyond the sentence. An area of linguistic research, pragmatics, pioneered 
research that was not only preoccupied with meaning in abstract terms, but also looked at the 
‘meaning in use’ (Thomas, 1995, p. 21). In particular, linguists started looking at meaning in 
context rather than abstract meaning, the specificity of which cannot be identified without 
looking at the larger structure of meaning. Linguists who work in pragmatist vein thus treat 
discourse as ‘meaning in interaction’: 
 
“Making meaning is a dynamic process, involving the negotiation of meaning between 
speaker and hearer, the context of utterance (physical, social and linguistic) and the 
meaning potential of an utterance” 
(Thomas, 1995, p. 22). 
  
                                                        
11 This notion in poststructuralist IR has been informed by the works of such thinkers as Michel Foucault, 
Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan and Jean Baudrillard to name a few.  
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This led to the notion of discourse as a space for the dynamics of meaning creation. Foucault 
(1972, 1979) took the notion of discourse forward and proposed a series of conclusions about 
the relationship between power, knowledge, and subjectivity which ultimately lead to the idea 
of constituting reality. Scholars who adopted this notion began treating discourses as ‘practices 
that systematically form the objects of which we speak’ (Foucault, 1972). In this understanding, 
the key feature of the discourse is the intersubjectivity of meaning that manifests itself in the 
realm of social communication. This ontological contention has informed the theory of IR, in 
particular the poststructuralist subfield. Thus, the purpose of poststructuralist discourse 
analysis is to denaturalise the long standing truths in social reality (Der Derian & Shapiro, 
1989). 
 
“The legitimacy of tradition is undermined, the unifying belief in progress fragments, 
and conventional wisdom is refused to one of many competing rituals of power used to 
shore up a shaky (international) society” 
 (Der Derian & Shapiro, 1989, p. x). 
 
This denaturalisation is inherently linked to discourse. In particular, practitioners aim at 
investigating how ‘subject-matter’ and ‘subject-actor’ are co-constituted in the texts of 
international politics. Thus, poststructuralist maintain that there is no “extra- or non-discursive 
realm of explanations from which one might construct competing explanations” (Hansen, 
2006).  
 
However, thus far there is no consensus in the field of International Relations over the exact 
definition of discourse, nor is there a consensus over “what are the best ways to study 
discourse” (Milliken, 1999, p. 226). This is partly due to postsructuralist research being 
somehow marginalised in IR, or as Ashley and Walker(1990) put it, due to the ‘dissident’ 
nature of discourse theory (George, 1994; Milliken, 1999). Another limitation of postruturalist 
research is that although discourses are often understood as both relational and dynamic, there 
is a principal focus on monologue that is studied one by one. By this I mean that discourses 
are rarely studied in relation to counter discourses. For example, 
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“What a deconstructive analysis leaves in place is a confirmation that the “meaning” of 
a term or concept comes into being only relative to at least one other term. However, 
while meaning is utterly dependent on the presence of at least one other signifier, that 
second or third term by which we can know the meaning of the first is not given by nature. 
<…> Meaning is then a dynamic process, much more like an interaction between 
particles – a spark, a field of conductivity, the play of signifiers – than a steady light 
emitted from a solitary beacon”  
(Gregory, 1989). 
 
Thus, within this approach, the analysis looks at how different terms of the discourse are 
conceived in relation to each other. For example, when researchers focus on the Us vs. Them 
dichotomy, their goal is to identify which of the two aspects is preferential within the discourse. 
But this is rarely taken forward to look at how these internal discursive dynamics are influenced 
by counter discourses, the methodological limitation that this study will address. 
 
There are a number of more recent developments in constructivist and post-structuralist 
research broadly defined that propose a research design that is more inclusive of various text 
analysis methods. For example, Hansen (2006) in her analysis of the Bosnian war proposes a 
methodology in which intertextual analysis is key for understanding the roots of the discourses 
in foreign policy. In her words, 
 
“Official discourse should, however, be situated inside a larger intertextual web that 
traces intertextual references to other texts, thereby bringing in sources that are 
constructed either as supporting influences or as texts in need of repudiation.” 
 (Hansen, 2006, p. 60) 
 
This suggest a way to include a wider number of communicative genres into the focus. 
Moreover, within this methodology, she argues for the analytical value of studying oppositional 
discourses. In the empirical example of the Bosnian context, Hansen shows, in depth, how the 
various discourses of the ‘self’ and ‘other’ intertextually construct national identity that 
ultimately affects foreign policy choice. Drawing on Kristeva (1980), this methodology allows 
Hansen to establish the extra and intra-discursive links that are invisible for traditional 
discourse analysts. A number of analysist have continued working in a similar vein, looking 
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at, for example, how post-9/11 discourse has been influenced by prior historical contexts of 
American foreign policy (Dunmire, 2009). In large part related to this approach, the following 
section of this chapter will take a further look into the epistemological roots of intertextuality, 
Bakhtin’s dialogism, and expand the dialogic nature of discourse.  
 
Another point which is often disputed in IR is whether it is possible to find casual patterns 
through discourse analysis (Banta, 2013; Kurki, 2008) or not (Campbell, 1998; Hansen, 2006). 
For example,  
 
“Within PDT12 it is contended that to study discourse one must avoid any pretence to 
claims of having found some relatively vital causal relationship within a phenomenon, 
or any meaningful role for extra-discursive ‘reality’. It is this aspect of PDT that I wish 
to challenge, with the hope of opening up the study of discourse to scholars not willing 
to adopt a discourse perspective on the social world. To do so I propose a foundation, 
and some tools, for which discourse might be studied as but one causal thing among 
myriad possible others” 
(Banta, 2013). 
 
I agree with the understanding of discourse as the reality that researcher cannot find themselves 
outside of. However, it is indeed true that there is the possibility to find some casual mechanism 
when we interpret ideational phenomena. In this respect, we could understand causal in 
narrower terms as “something that is important for bringing about an outcome” (Jackson, 2011, 
p. 232; Kurki, 2008). My contention is that while it is inaccurate to attempt to study influence 
merely in discursive terms, it is possible to interpret narratives13 (Table 2.1).  
 
The above-mentioned limitations may be partly due to the definition of discourse that is rather 
broad and therefore difficult to employ in a systematic manner. For example, discourse is often 
defined as both “an interrelated set of texts” and “the practices of their production, 
dissemination, and reception, which brings object into being” (Parker 1992). Within this broad 
conceptualisation it is seen as both, a process and an object of research, which results from the 
multiple attempts to create the practice of discourse research based on the ontological 
                                                        
12 “poststructuralist discourse theory” (Banta, 2013) 
13  For an elaboration of this point see the next section of this chapter. 
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advancements proposed by Foucault. Indeed, his treatment of discourse is rather broad and all-
encompassing, the very point that he admits in the following statement: 
 
“Instead of gradually reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of the word ‘discourse’, I 
believe I have in fact added to its meanings: treating it sometimes as the general domain 
of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes 
as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements” 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 80). 
 
No doubt, this treatment has allowed to take the linguistic notion of discourse forward by 
opening up discourse research to critical social inquiry, but this bulky definition also created a 
state of research where discourse as a term is complicated and often difficult to operationalise. 
For example, Sara Mill problematizes: 
 
“What makes the process of defining discourse even more complex is that most theorists 
when using the term do not specify which of these particular meanings they are using”  
(Mills, 2004, p. 7). 
 
To address this problem, here I propose to disentangle this all-encompassing concept by taking 
a step back and narrow the definition of discourse to a more operational concept. Thus, in this 
research I treat discourse as a set of interrelated narratives, both textual and visual. The 
elements of discourse thus work together in order to convey a particular meaning by 
constructing actors and interpreting their actions. In this respect, discourse can be understood 
a set of assumptions that frame particular interpretations. For example Norman Fairclough 
defines discourse as: “the language used in representing a given social practice from a 
particular point of view” (Fairclough, 1995, p. 56). I adopt this definition but, in this research, 
I would extend Fairclough’s use of the word ‘language’ in this definition to the notion of ‘the 
text’. In particular, text here is understood in broader terms than language and is treated as 
“any coherent complex of signs” (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 103), so that the purely textual can be 
extended into the realms of audio-visual, or in fact anything that can be “read” for meaning. 
Drawing on Hartley’s (1982) wok on news discourse, this study points to the importance of 
inclusion of both linguistic and visual codes as the constitutive elements of interpretations 
within discourse. Thus, in this study discourse is understood as a larger system of either 
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cohesive, but also often contradictory “ideas, concepts, and categorizations” (Epstein, 2008). 
Thus, if discourse analysis is focused on language in use or includes any or all facets of 
semiotic activity that is meaningful (e.g. film, music, painting, performance art, visual art), a 
text can also be understood in terms of an “objectified unit of discourse” (Gal 2006: 178). As 
Adam Hodges comprehensively summarises: 
 
“In this way, fragments of discourse from one setting seemingly take on a life of their 
own as they are turned into texts (entextualized) and enter into social ‘circulation’” 
(Hodges, 2015, p. 43). 
 
Discourse is therefore an umbrella term that embraces all these facets of signs that convey 
meaning. Thus, the important distinction of this definition from the dominant understanding 
of discourse in IR is the focus on broader semiotics rather than treating only linguistic forms 
of text as the key component for analysis. As mentioned in the review of the discourse research 
above, there is often an ambiguity around whether to treat discourse as dynamic or a static 
entity. As Foucauldian approach insightfully proposes, the discourse carries both of the 
features within itself. However, in order to understand better the dynamics and statics of the 
discourse, I propose to separate the analysis in two levels. Thus, the static characteristic of 
discourse is best understood at the macro-level, that condenses the multiplicity of 
interpretations under an umbrella structure (See Table 1).  The lower level, micro-level is the 
space where the dynamic manifests themselves 14.  
 
 
Level of 
Abstraction 
Macro-Level Discourse Meta-frames 
Micro-Level 
The Multiplicity of 
Communicative Genres 
(e.g. narrative) 
Sub-frames 
 
Table 2.1. The Levels of Framing 
                                                        
14  For an elaboration of this point, see the following section of this chapter. 
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Thus, this study understands discourse not as a process of constructing meaning but rather as 
a stream of meaning that conveys interpretations. In this respect, discourse is indeed 
monologic, a fixed structure. In order to study discourse at this level, I thus propose applying 
the structural frame analysis to identify the meta-frames, the methodological model of which 
will be proposed in the following section of this chapter and will be practically applied to the 
case studies in Chapters 5 and 6. The various communicative genres, such as, for example, 
narratives are smaller structures that are found at a micro-level of the discursive stream. These 
necessarily entail telling a story with a certain plot. For example, Klotz and Lynch provide the 
following clear-cut definition: 
 
“Narratives highlight the agency of particular individuals or groups by telling a story 
with a plot and main characters”  
(Klotz & Lynch, 2015, p. 44). 
 
In other words, it can be understood as a “storyline” with a beginning and an end. These end 
points are important characteristics of stories. Unlike discourse that does not have an ending, 
genres of communication, such as stories necessarily have a preface and closing (Jefferson, 
1978). As Fairclough puts it: 
 
“Genres can be described in terms of their organizational properties” 
(Fairclough, 1995, p. 56). 
 
In fact, Fairclough distinguishes between discourse as an “abstract noun” and discourse(s) as 
a count noun. Discourses and genres are thus the elements of a broader network, the “order of 
discourse”.  In my interpretation for the conceptual purposes of this study, the discourses are 
more concrete representations of social phenomena correlates to what in my study is defined 
as sub-frames, which will be unpacked in the following section of this chapter. 
 
Thus, frame analysis “attempts to disentangle this complex relationship between actors, goals, 
and behavior by concentrating on the production of meaning as a type of influence” (Klotz & 
Lynch, 2015, p. 48). However, this is not say that by doing framing analysis we can study the 
influence. Rather, it is possible to interpret how the meaning is created and what underpins this 
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strategy from the ideational perspective. Thus, in a way it does provide causal explanation and 
answers to the questions, such as why an agent made this particular discursive choice and not 
the other. Discourse and frame analysis both belong to the group of interpretive approaches 
that study social interaction that manifests itself through constructing meaning (Lindekilde, 
2014). However, the two approaches are not exactly identical. Although there are different 
variants of discourse analysis, here I would refer to an overarching feature of critical 
approaches to discourse that is the focus on emancipatory potential of such studies that are 
mainly preoccupied with influence construction. Framing, as often seen as a “sub-variant” of 
discourse analysis assumes a higher degree of agentic rationality (Lindekilde, 2014). However, 
here I proposed a more structured approach to frame analysis that can be applied at the macro-
level, while textual and visual analyses are used to find textual patterns to identify frames and 
counter frames.  
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d. The Concept of Dialogue and the Multi-Level Frame Analysis Model 
 
As opposed to the monologic approach to discourse that analyses the way in which strategic 
representations are constructed, I chose to focus on its dialogic orientation. This aspect is best 
understood in terms of the notion of dialogism that was coined by a prominent Russian literary 
theorist and philosopher Michail Bakhtin, who recognized that the different communicative 
genres contain a multiplicity of dialogic nuances. By dialogic he does not mean the 
manifestations of discourse that are externally structured as dialogue but rather the “internal 
dialogism” that constitutes even those manifestations of discourse that are externally structured 
as monologue (Bakhtin, 1981, 1986). In fact, Bakhtin argues that the “dialogic orientation of 
discourse” is natural to any form of discourse. This notion derives from an abstract 
understanding of discourse as a phenomenon that results from a relationship with other 
discourses. As Bakhtin put it: 
 
“On all its various routes toward the object, in all its directions, the word encounters an 
alien word and cannot help encountering it in a living, tension-filled interaction. Only 
the mythical Adam, who approached a virginal and as yet verbally unqualified world 
with the first word, could really have escaped from start to finish this dialogic inter-
orientation with the alien word that occurs in the object. Concrete historical human 
discourse does not have this privilege: it can deviate from such inter-orientation only on 
a conditional basis and only to a certain degree” 
(Bakhtin, 1981, p. 279). 
 
Bakhtin then goes further to propose a research goal to look deeper into the internal structure 
of meaning that constitute the word. In this Bakhtinian vein, any form of creative work exists 
within the environment of prior instances of discourse. Therefore, meanings that are produced 
through discourse are never created in isolation but are rather a result of complex ideational 
relationship, both with the prior texts and with the anticipation of the responses from the future 
discourses (Bakhtin, 1981; Hodges, 2015; Tannen, 2007). In other words, the receiver of a 
monologue and their response are often taken into account in the everyday conversation, but 
any other type of discourse is in fact oriented “toward an understanding that is “responsive”” 
(Bakhtin, 1981). This constitutes the internal juxtaposition, resistance or support that saturates 
the discourse. As Bakhtin put it:  
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“Understanding comes to fruition only in the response. Understanding and response are 
dialectically merged and mutually condition each other; one is impossible without the 
other” 
(Bakhtin, 1981, p. 282). 
 
It is this responsive aspect of discourse and the focus on the internal relationship that constitutes 
meaning that has informed the conceptual framework of this research. In fact, this notion has 
been applied to media discourse. For example, Fairclough (1992, 1995) illuminates this notion 
through presenting the phenomenon of “conversationalization” of news programs, where 
official speeches are often packaged together with less formal, private conversations 
(Fairclough, 1992). Fairclough expands this by showcasing how the other hybrid genres are 
born on television. However, my research is focused on the mere relationship between the 
discourses that is seen within the space of the dialogue. And framing and in particular counter-
framing, in this respect, are the methodological tools that are particularly helpful for 
understanding this relationship. 
 
While scholars commonly refer to culture (Entman, 1993) or the context as frame pools, I insist 
that at the dialogue between various news channels that can be seen as another dimension of 
framing. I propose the notion of the dialogue which, in this study, is not equal to the public 
discourse. Although many scholars embrace the idea that media discourse is a good 
representation of the public discourse (Gamson, 1992; Klandermans and Goslinga, 1996), in 
this study this understanding of the linear relationship between the media and the public would 
have been problematic. It would bring in the problems of the normative dimensions of media 
functioning. Media discourse here is considered a ‘tip of the iceberg’ and the representation of 
the ‘dominant discourse’ on the one hand. On the other hand, moving beyond an understanding 
of the media as an exemplification of the social agenda, this study looks at the media discourse 
and public discourse as mutually constituted.  
 
In this sense, the international dialogue can be understood as a separate structure that 
determines its participants’ narratives and, at the same time, is being subject to the frame 
sponsors’ interpretations. In this respect, the dialogue is an environment in which counter 
frames operate. This framework is informed by Risse’s ‘logic of arguing’ in political 
communication, who emphasized that  
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“<…> argumentative rationality appears to be crucially linked to the constitutive rather 
than the regulative role of norms and identities by providing actors with a mode of 
interaction that enables them to mutually challenge and explore the validity claims of 
those norms and identities”  
(Risse, 2000). 
 
While Risse(2000) goes as far as arguing that the actors are ready to shift their ‘view of the 
world’ and even their ‘identities’, I would predominantly focus on the readiness of the actors 
to be subject to ideational challenges and the shift in tactical interpretations. Thus, the space 
of the dialogue becomes the manifestation of the social process that explains framing. Within 
this environment, communicative ‘distortions’ affect frame sponsors behavior in the way that 
determines which context they mobilize while covering a particular event. The distortions in 
this research refer to the several aspects of the dialogue. An example of such a distortion would 
be an appearance of a particular context in one channel’s discourse that in turn forces the rival 
channel to engage with the same context that had been initially enacted by their discursive 
opponent. As soon as this is intertextually traced, these virtual responses are seen as countering 
efforts. In fact, these distortions are the existential elements of the dialogue in the sense that 
they enrich the narratives of the discourse by suggesting the ideational data that can be readily 
enacted. In other words, the dialogue can be understood as a shared pool of contexts that 
various TV channels resort to in order to stay tuned to each other.   
 
Foucault argued that we must imagine the world of knowledge as ‘a multiplicity of discursive 
elements that come into play in various strategies’ (Foucault & Hurley, 1979). In 
anthropological and sociological studies, there were attempts to confirm empirically that 
communicative elements cannot be recognized without a reference to a “metamessage”. For 
example, we cannot identify an element of the game without having been briefed on the rules 
of this game (Tannen, 1993). These rules thus organize the meta-structure within which we 
temporarily agree to exist. In other words, interpretations are crucial elements of 
communication that organize social reality by constructing the overarching structures of 
discourse that organize communicative practices. 
 
Drawing upon this conception I propose to expand the presented in section c of this chapter 
model of discourse and add the two levels of framing to it, strategic and tactical (see Table 2.2). 
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The distinction of strategy and tactics, although drawn from military terminology, here is used 
rather figuratively. In military theory, tactics and strategy bear a hierarchical relationship with 
a clear distinction between the later referring to the overall objectives: 
 
“If tactics solve immediate problems and strategy pursues goals defined by the political 
leadership, then operational art governs tactical creativity and links together tactical 
actions into a campaign to achieve the strategic goal. ‘We call an operation an act of 
war if the efforts of the troops are directed towards the achievement of a certain 
intermediary goal in a certain theater of military operations without any interruptions” 
(Olsen & Van Creveld, 2011, p. 66). 
 
Tactics thus refers mainly to the particular methods of achieving the strategic goals. As such, 
tactical elements are more flexible and thus dynamic in nature. In this respect, tactics are 
organised around combinations and structures of moves that may that may be aimed at hiding 
the strategic intentions of actors. In relation to meaning construction and persuasive practices, 
this notion can be expanded to represent the discursive space when interpretations 
communicated through frames are dynamic and reactive. 
 
Macro-Level Strategic Framing 
 
Micro-Level Tactical Framing 
 
 
Table 2. 2. The Levels of Framing. Expanded 
 
While the importance of strategic discourse has been in focus of constructivist research, the 
tactical facet has been overlooked. I argue that it is imperative to look at the tactical level due 
to its dynamic nature. Thus, tactical framing operates at the micro-level of framing. This is 
where the discussed above dialogue manifests itself and can be thus studied through applying 
textual, visual and intertextual analysis in order to trace the travel path of the various contexts 
and understand how these sub-frames relate to the stable structure of the discourse.  
Meta-Frame 
Sub-frame Sub-frame 
Sub-frame Sub-frame 
 70 
Strategic framing, on the other hand, is as an effort to construct an overarching formula for the 
discourse within which actors are central for the construction of these formulas. At this macro-
level discourse are constructed through ‘meta-frames’- “the overarching frames of a higher 
level of generality” that “can be operationalized as normative aspects of issue frames”  
(Dombos et al., 2009). These meta-frames, in turn, are held by the structural pillars, or 
‘metaphors’ (these are indicated as M in Table 2.3) at the macro-level. Other researchers refer 
to these structural pillars of frames as ‘archetypes’. For example, Van Gorp notes: 
 
“Specifically, a number of archetypes may function as a frame. If the archetype of the 
villain is used, then poverty can be viewed as the result of certain individuals who make 
use of, or abuse, the social welfare system to which they do not financially contribute. 
The poor lack the will to work and that is why they live in poor conditions. A more positive 
usage of this frame results in a stereotypical portrayal of the jolly vagabond who feels 
very strongly about complete freedom and opts for voluntary poverty”  
(Van Gorp, 2010, p. 86). 
Thus, while framing and counter-framing, at a tactical level, is a set of dynamic contexts and 
metaphors, the structural building blocks of the meta-frame, at the macro-level, remain fairly 
stable, regardless of the multiplicity of communicative distortions that may target them. The 
two levels, however, are not separate realms but are rather closely intertwined. Thus, the micro-
level interpretations, although reactive and tactical, are nevertheless continuously aimed at 
constructing the actors within the overarching meta-formula of discourse (see Table 2.3). 
 
 
 
Table 2.3. Meta-frames and Sub-frames  
Meta-Frame 
Sub-frame Sub-frame 
Sub-frame Sub-frame 
M a M b M c M d 
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Unlike strategic framing, counter-framing, at a tactical level, may appear as a more diffuse 
process but requires a closer look at its elements that need to be traces intertextually. In other 
words, counter frames are never stable elements of the discourse but rather come across as 
purpose-serving blocks that contribute to the construction of an overarching frame. Moreover, 
a frame seizes to exist as a unit of discourse when it has lost even a single of its elements, the 
structural metaphors(M) of its formula. In other words, when these contexts are not applied 
together they maintain to exist as unsystematic topics rather than a treatment to action which 
frames ultimately are. This skeleton that is a defining property of frames is therefore so central 
to understanding the statics of framing. Thus, each meta-frame of the discourse contains the 
structural blocks, or metaphors (M) that organize the representations at the strategic level. For 
example, in order to construct an image of an enemy (M a), frame sponsors may enact various 
sub-frames at a tactical level, some of which would be original contexts, other may be 
references to the prior contexts of the discursive rivals. This mechanism will be unpacked in 
greater detail in the Chapters 5, 6, and 7 of this dissertation. 
 
To integrate framing and counter-framing within the levels of discourse discussed above,  
I propose the multi-level frame analysis model (see Figure 2.1).  
 
 
Figure 2.1.  Multi-Level Frame Analysis Model 
 
Within this model, strategic and tactical framing are mutually constituted processes that work 
in synergy but differ from the structural perspective. Applying this concept to the analysis of 
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opposing discourses will allow me to track both, the strategic and monologic persuasive efforts 
by looking at structurally stable pillars that constitute meta-frames, and, at the same time, will 
open up the analysis to the more dynamic and responsive process of counter-framing at the 
tactical level.  
 
In other words, at a tactical level framing is always a subject and an object of change. 
Dynamics, in this respect, refer to the way in which interpretations originate in discourse. 
Unlike the static framing, when a frame is determined by sponsor’s preconceptions and/or 
rhetorical aims, counter frames are always a response to opponents’ narratives.  Therefore, the 
process is not stable in its nature but is constantly subject to change or transformation, 
depending on the volatile context. Therefore, focusing on the dynamics of the context, at the 
same time, reveals exactly how stable are the elements of the overarching frames. 
 
Hence the traditional definitions of frames such as that “frames define what is meant by certain 
social events and how significant we consider them to be, and they provide guidelines on how 
to interpret events” (Lepistö-Johansson, 2012, p. 404) , within the proposed above framework 
refers to the macro-level of the discourse. In this respect, strategic framing can also be defined 
as a process of singling out elements of knowledge and packaging them in a set formula that 
conceptualizes the event and is aimed at sustaining or promoting this interpretation (Benford 
& Snow, 2000; Entman, 1993). Thus, meta-frames can be used both for introducing radically 
new ideas as well slightly shifting already accepted ones, or to maintain and stabilize deep-
seated understandings in the society. Sub-frames, at the micro-level of discourse, serve as the 
reference points to the already accepted social contexts. Therefore, employing tactical framing 
allows its advocates to instantly create resonance in target audience. These tactical efforts are 
closely linked to the so-called ‘ad-hoc’ justifications that will be further explored in the 
following chapters.  
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e. Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented a review of literature on framing across the various disciplines of Social 
Sciences. It argued that framing has traditionally been considered in terms of strategic and 
conscious efforts to construct meanings. However, this research makes case for expanding this 
limited focus on strategy to include the tactical dimension of framing. Communication space 
is therefore the most legitimate space to look at ‘what’ and ‘how’ of framing with a particular 
focus on dynamics of interpretations that can be traced by studying the dialogue between the 
rival discourses. This research focuses on how messages of framing shape understandings in a 
communicative environment. However, it argues that the content of framing, or the social 
knowledge, which underpins it, are less relevant than the way framing formulas are used in 
order to achieve tactical outcomes. 
 
This chapter also clarified the key terms of this study, in particular it highlighted the differences 
between the process of framing as an object of study and frame analysis as a methodological 
tool of analysis; it clarified the conceptual approach of this study towards discourse that is 
understood in more narrow terms than the all-encompassing but difficult to operationalize 
definition that dominates the discipline of IR and towards narrative that is seen as a structural 
element of discourse that constitutes frames. Most importantly, this chapter presented the 
concept of the communicative dialogue that is for the first time recognized as the realm where 
counter-framing operates, followed by proposing the systematic multi-level frame analysis 
model. This chapter argued that framing and counter framing if applied within the proposed 
model provide methodological means for studying the discourse within the ontology the 
complex theory of truth and falsity of cases’ that is relative to a framework of meaning (or 
paradigm) within which problems are identified and analyzed.  
 
The following Chapter 3 will further discuss how the proposed here conceptual framework can 
be applied in practice. It will thus present the methods of analysis that can penetrate the 
discourse at both levels and thus allow both to understand the dynamics and the statics of 
discourse.  
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Chapter 3. 
 
Case Selection and Methodology 
 
 
 
 
“The shot, considered as material for the purpose of composition, more resistant than 
granite. This resistance is specific to it. The shot's tendency toward complete factual 
immutability is rooted in its nature. This resistance has largely determined the richness 
and variety of montage forms and styles – for montage becomes the mightiest means for 
a really important creative remolding of nature”  
(Eisenstein, 1977, p. 5). 
 
 
 
a. Introduction 
 
The dynamic nature of media stage has been gaining greater attention among IR scholars in 
recent years than in the previous decades. This is, in part, due to the burgeoning cross-
disciplinary literature on Political Communication (Semetko & Scammell, 2012). Indeed, 
media is an inherent element of the international political realm not least because it informs 
people of what political actors wish to say. In fact, several empirical studies have argued that 
media is the primary supplier of political knowledge in societies (Everland & Scheufele, 2000; 
Robinson & Davis, 1990). As argued in this dissertation previously, neglecting media discourse 
means neglecting a ubiquitous phenomenon that constitutes societies in the international. Thus, 
the previous sections of this dissertation have argued for the value of discursive media studies 
for the IR discipline; in particular, for the ability of such research to grasp often contradictory 
foreign policy messages that can be theorized by looking at the dynamic media stage and the 
volatility of context.   
 
By delving into the processes of framing and counter-framing, the particular types of meanings 
with which specific events have been constructed can be exposed and opened up to discussion 
and analysis. In order to assess such processes, this study focused on the analysis of news 
interpretations that are conveyed via the audio-visual media. To apply my analytical framework 
of framing and counter-framing, I scrutinized the content of news interpretations promoted by 
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RT, which, as I argue in this chapter, is an amplified voice of Kremlin. Unlike other studies on 
Russia that interpret the country’s identity promotion from a strategic point of view, my work 
was focused on the tactical meanings that allowed me to expose the reasons behind Russia’s 
defensive rhetoric. This, in turn, allowed me to further theorize on the nature of the countering 
techniques that are used in political communication. 
 
The previous chapters looked at the theoretical aspects that underpin this study and provided 
the conceptual framework that organizes this study. Here I will tackle more precisely the logic 
behind the methodological choices applied to cases of theoretical interest. This chapter is 
divided into two parts. Section b explains the rationale behind the case selection by taking the 
reader through the process, explaining the context and the methodological underpinnings. The 
second part c is concerned with the applied methods of analysis and argues that it is imperative 
to look at the content intertextually within one analytical framework to be able to extract sub-
frames and identify meta-frames. Thus, section c will present a step-by-step breakdown of the 
practical methods, such as visual analysis, linguistic and textual analysis respectively, followed 
by section d that outlines the data collection and coding strategies employed in this study. 
Section e introduces the secondary data collection method that was performed in order to gain 
background interviews and discusses its limitations. Section f concludes this chapter. 
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b. Case Selection 
 
The purpose of designing research around case studies is usually twofold: on the one hand, the 
approach allows to provide descriptive and contextual information; on the other hand, it 
suggests theoretical relevance that ‘facilitates the emergence of concepts that can shape 
theory’” (Mills, Durepos, & Wiebe, 2010, p. 771). This approach is therefore in big part 
concerned with theory generation. In particular, the focus is on revelatory nature of the cases 
that expose a relationship or mechanism that cannot be studied by other means. Thus, such 
cases provide a ‘crucial experiment’ in which certain variables of interest happen to be present 
in a special way” (Halperin & Heath, 2017). The premise from which such inquiry starts is that 
the act of research is inseparable from the social reality and thus analysts and their evidence 
are in most cases coming from the shared ideational environment. As Gerring insightfully notes 
in his work:  
 
“Usually, a hypothesis arises from an open-ended conversation between a researcher 
and her evidence. Indeed, one may have only a rough idea of an argument until one has 
carried out considerable research. Social scientific study is often motivated by a 
suspicion; the researcher’s qualified hunch that something funny is going on here or 
there. Puzzles are good points of departure. Even so, issues of research design cannot be 
fully addressed until that initial hunch is formulated as a specific hypothesis” 
 
(Gerring, 1962, p. 72). 
 
Thus researchers take advantage of the resemblances and disparities they come across in the 
real world and look whether the arrangement of the observed multiplicities of reality are 
consistent with the abstract patterns (Eckstein, 1975; Halperin & Heath, 2017).  
 
The purpose of the study, however, was not to analyse the actual events that took place during 
the chosen case periods but to investigate how these events were interpreted. As I outlined in 
the first parts of this dissertation, the primary focus of my research was on the discourse that 
Russia promoted through its official channel of international communication, RT.  
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Since its launch in 2005, RT has been explicit about its Kremlin funding and the intentions to 
promote Russian take on international current affairs. For example, the official About RT page 
on the channel’s website states: 
 
“RT covers stories overlooked by the mainstream media, provides alternative perspectives 
on current affairs, and acquaints international audiences with a Russian viewpoint on 
major global events” 
(RT, 2017). 
 
Moreover, RT is often included into the official Kremlin’s foreign policy strategies that often 
view the channel as part of Russia’s soft power. And while the Russian government recognises 
soft power as becoming an ‘indispensable component of modern international relations”, the 
purpose of RT is often understood in terms of challenging the Western exercises of public 
diplomacy that are often labelled aggressive and are perceived as a threat:  
 
“<…> increasing global competition and the growing crisis potential sometimes 
creates a risk of destructive and unlawful use of “soft power” and human rights 
concepts to exert political pressure on sovereign states, interfere in their internal 
affairs, destabilise their political situation, manipulate public opinion, including under 
the pretext of financing cultural and human rights projects abroad” 
 
(The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2013). 
 
The paradox that triggered this investigation was that despite Russia’s outspoken desire for 
other countries to consider it a superpower (Kiseleva, 2015), it often utilises defensive rhetoric, 
being more focused on protecting itself from Western policies, rather than promoting its own 
unique ideology. Bearing this paradox in mind, the preliminary investigation, in turn, 
unravelled that the ‘defensive rhetoric’ goes beyond the meaning of protecting or shielding 
from the opponents’ rhetoric. The observations led me to theorize that ‘defensiveness’ can be 
taken to a higher level of abstraction by understanding it in terms of continuous efforts of one 
discourse to delegitimize the discursive rival. At that point, I decided to approach the 
phenomenon from a counter-framing perspective, which allows me to theorize the concept of 
‘dialogue’ between different discourses. In my particular case, the mechanisms of framing 
cannot be fully separated from counter-framing. Therefore, it seemed crucial for the study to 
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utilize comparative methods in order to understand where meanings originate and how 
understandings are shaped.  
 
As often noted by scholars who study framing effects, framing as a method of political 
influence is specifically challenging to deploy towards the audience that is subject to another 
agent’s framing (Scheufele, 1999). Unlike similar studies, which look at objectivity and bias 
in media framing, this research focused on how opposing discourses create new meanings by 
deconstructing opponents’ rhetoric. In this respect, I noticed that RT indeed often chooses 
Western styles of reporting. As the channel’s editor in chief, Margarita Simonyan (2012), 
confessed, RT’s output strategies were designed to outweigh CNN and BBC. Thus, despite 
the lack of examples of such studies in existing literature on framing, I made the 
methodological choice to parallelly analyse both, the primary discourse and the response to it. 
The decision to look at CNN’s coverage of the same events was therefore not based on the 
mere assumption that these channels are similar in several respects but it was rather rooted in 
the instrumental need dictated by counter-framing methodology. 
 
My particular research design has not been conceived in an abstract realm but rather was a 
result of continuous exposure to a highly contextualised ideational environment. From that 
point onwards, the logic of empirical inquiry was applied. Thus, the selection of the case is 
informed by the Most Similar Systems Design’s (MSSD) logic to choose a minimum of two 
cases that share many important characteristics but differ in one or two crucial respects related 
to the key outcome of interest (Gerring, 1962). As mentioned above, my research looked at 
RT’s and CNN’s coverage of the alleged chemical attack in Ghouta in 2013 as the first case 
study (Case I) and analysed the channels’ coverage of the 30 days preceding the Annexation 
of Crimea in summer 2014 as the second case study (Case II). These two conflicts are similar 
in many contextually structural respects (see Table 3.1).  
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Case I 
Syrian Crisis 2013 
Case II 
Crimean Crisis 2014 
 
A A 
Overall Similarities B 
C 
B 
C 
X Not X 
Crucial Differences 
Not Y Y 
 
A – a matter of international law; B – revolutionary events; C – Russia, USA, and the UN discursive involvement; 
X – Meta-frame I; Y – Meta-frame 2. 
 
Table 3.1. Most-Similar Case Design 
 
First, these two political conflicts triggered an international law debate. For example, Case I 
represents the situation when several Western members of the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC), including the United States put forward an argument for humanitarian intervention 
into Syria against the country’s government forces. Russia spoke in strong opposition to this 
policy, pointing to the illegitimacy of such move. Case II also characterized by heated debates 
over the legitimacy of Crimean Referendum (A), when the United States were strongly opposed 
to the Russian involvement in Ukraine (C). Both cases also happened against the backdrop of 
revolutionary events (Syrian Revolution in the Case I and Euromaidan Revolution in the Case 
II) (B). However, the two cases mirror each other when it comes to the way in which the events 
were framed.  Thus, RT used the intrinsic superpower World Police meta-frame when referring 
to Russia’s protective role for the piece in international community (X), while CNN used such 
framing to interpret the events of the Case II (Y).15 
 
While the choice of the cases for this study has been reasoned by the MSSD, it does not aim to 
make robust generalisations, especially those based on the sample of just two cases. Thus, the 
purpose of this work is rather to theory generation than theory testing. In particular, the 
inductive method of inquiry allowed me to look at the structure of the discourse and generate 
the model that can further be applied to different cases. Thus, this work’s approach to causality 
differs from the dominant in Comparative Politics empiricist style of conducting research based 
                                                        
15  For an elaboration of this point see case study Chapters 5 & 6 and the discussion Chapter 7 of this 
dissertation. 
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on positivist methods.16 In other words, it follows the argument that ‘conceptual meanings’ are 
not set in an abstract realm, but are rather inseparable from their context (Schaffer, 1998). 
Within this approach, the mechanisms by which meanings are constructed are tightly linked to 
the unique instances and experiences that are specific to time, space and culture. Thus, my 
study represents an instance in which meanings mattered and offers a methodological tool for 
looking at other instances of such kind that may emerge in different contexts. The value of such 
research therefore does not lie in the generalisability of the case studies’ internal validity but 
rather in shedding light on theoretical particularities that have not been studied before and 
therefore opens up a new layer for future inquiry (Gerring, 1962). 
 
With its interpretivist approach, my research does not aim at explaining causal mechanisms in 
a positivist sense but focuses on interpreting the meaning that is produced through discourse. 
Thus, it is not aimed at explaining, for example, why Russian government annexed Crimea but 
rather provides insights into what this act meant and why they invoked the particular contexts 
to justify their behaviour. Although this approach does not seek to make causal claims in its 
traditional sense, certain causal elements can be identified. This concerns constitutive claims 
that this study generates. For example, foreign policies may ‘constitute’ meanings by 
prescribing particular interpretations of the events. These meanings further narrow the scope 
of likely options. Thus, meanings, in a sense, make certain options more likely than other 
choices, which is, in essence, a ‘causal’ role (Klotz, 2008). The arguments proposed within 
such framework are not formulated as strictly causal claims but are nevertheless not entirely 
explanation-free. In this respect, both case studies are the examples of an international conflict, 
where Russia and USA declared to have national interest. The main goal was thus to focus on 
countering techniques and explain the reasons behind Russia’s defensive rhetoric.  
                                                        
16  In fact, case study derives its meaning from the Chicago School approach that structured its analysis 
around the human to be performed inductively. The logic behind such approach is to understand multiple 
social realities that characterize the setting and its “actors” (Mills, Durepos, & Wiebe, 2010). In this vein, 
case study is the primal form of a qualitative interpretive research method. The period of “single-site” case 
studies has come to decline as qualitative analysts faced the pressure of Gary King, Robert Keohane, and 
Sidney Verba's 1994 Designing Social Inquiry publication’s argument for the large “n” studies. Thus, 
contemporary IR case study research is rather heavily dominated by the logic of quantitative inquiry (Yin, 
2009). 
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c. Methods of Analysis 
 
“We are <…> produced by the environment of signification that we have 
collectively produced. Part of that environment comprises the constant stream of 
‘secretions’ that emanate from the small screen. However, we cannot merely 
‘ingest’ those secretions, any more than we can merely ingest food. Just as our 
metabolic processes transform what we eat into material that can be assimilated, 
so our culturally learnt codes and conventions transform what we watch from 
mere external stimuli into actual communication, where the message is not only 
received but also decoded, understood and responded to”  
(Fiske and Hartley, 1978, p. XYZ). 
 
Fiske and Hartley’s thought-provoking metaphor suggests that the relationship between the 
language in the broad sense and actors of communication is co-constitutive. In this respect, the 
process of broadcasting analysis puts the researcher at a distance from the actual television 
realm, but at the same time the analysist cannot fully escape television experience. Hence doing 
frame analysis of international news conveyed in audio-visual format researchers find 
themselves in the situation when they essentially combine their analytical and news consumer 
roles. Framing analysts quite commonly work with a number of assumptions that presuppose 
the analysis but at the same time, as Reese (2010, p. 28) put it in his recollection of framing 
analysis process,  “a striking pattern or result emerges that can spur the imagination for a larger 
analysis”. In this respect, despite the overarching desire to frame studies in this way, the 
process of research is hardly a weighed choice between the inductive vs. deductive method, 
but it rather is a subjective and dynamic inquiry into the content that is subject to tactical 
distortions at the performative stage of research. But this type of investigation can be 
particularly fruitful from the analytical point of view because it allows to combine the abstract 
analysis with a more immersive experience. 
 
Using television news as the source material, it may not be always possible to separate between 
the textual and the visual information flows in a straightforward way. However, for the 
purposes of this research it seemed crucial to identify how the visuals and linguistic structures 
collaborate in order to create specific interpretations. A 24-hour broadcaster is a rather specific 
format of conveying information. Unlike domestic TV channels, these networks need to fill 
every minute of their broadcast with the journalistic content on current affairs that are of 
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interest to the international audience. This mission, however, is often challenged by the reality 
of news gathering process. For example, unlike radio, print, or online news, television is highly 
dependent on the images at the disposal of journalists. The visuals, in fact, are the starting point 
of a TV package.17 In other words, writing scripts for television news differs from any other 
form of writing. For example, broadcast journalists have a limited number of shots that they 
receive from the news agencies. Based on the number of elements that they have, reporters 
need to build a sequence of these shots together to convey a story, visually. Once the visuals 
are packaged together, a journalist writes the text that speaks with the pre-edited sequence of 
shots. Of course, television is not limited to the news packages as an ultimate way of conveying 
news with plenty of new formats, including studio programmes, live transmissions, etc., filling 
the broadcast schedule, but the central role of images remains the focal point of the TV news 
production. In this respect, there is a dominant intersubjective conception of television news 
that the images that we see on TV represent the reality. However, as often noted by critical 
media analysts: 
  
“Television is one kind of reality, and the culture to which we belong is another. But we 
perceive both of them in a similar way, and as a result they interact with each other” 
 (Fiske & Hartley, 1978, pp. 66–67). 
 
In other words, television uses the conventions of reality in order to convey the effect of the 
real experience. In this sense, it is a highly subjective medium of communication. Images are 
thus the documents of actual events, and in its pristine form they are, in fact, message-free. It 
is the arrangement of these visuals into a constructed sequence of shots that creates an 
interpretation of the facts. This happens through the process of video editing. 
 
Narrowly put, video editing is the strategy for condensing the lengthy raw footage into a shorter 
and coherent sequence of shots. Traditionally, editing is often understood as the process that 
is entirely determined by the script’s narrative. Starting from D. W. Griffith, the Hollywood’s 
pioneer of the filmmaking techniques, the film editing that is structured around the space and 
time continuum is commonly referred to as continuity editing (Bordwell & Thompson, 2015; 
                                                        
17  Television package, in the broadcast journalism jargon, refers to a “complete self-contained report” with 
the edited together visuals (moving and/or static), sound (natural or/and the voiceover), interviews, 
computer graphics (such as charts or maps), etc. In other words, it usually takes form of a story that has a 
pre-written script and is told by the journalist who wrote it.  
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Fabe, 2004). This differs entirely from the principles of montage developed by the Soviet 
filmmakers and theorists of the 1920s, the concept that emphasises the association between the 
shots (Maclean, 2012). Thus, for Eisenstein, 
  
“{M}ontage is an idea that arises from the collision of independent shots - shots even 
opposite to one another: the ‘dramatic’ principle” 
(Eisenstein, 1977, p. 49). 
 
It is best understood in terms of the conflict between the two concrete elements (“a denotation”) 
that produce an abstract concept, much like in the Chinese and Japanese languages: “where a 
material ideogram can indicate a transcendental (conceptual) result” (Eisenstein, 1977, p. 50). 
Eisenstein theorized his concept of intellectual montage within the Marxist framework. Thus, 
the collision of the montage elements is understood as a dialectic between hypothesis and 
antithesis that yields a synthesis, that of ideological density. Montage may still include the 
elements of continuity editing, such as narration, for example, but it is not determined by the 
space or time. Rather, the driving force of this type of visual arrangement is the very meaning 
that the author aims at conveying. In practice, this may include the parallel montage of various 
actors in different locations that are not logically linked together in the script. These indexical 
images create new meanings of collectivism of action that in the Soviet filmmaking, for 
example, was ideologically charged.  
 
These concepts have influences the theory and practice of film across the world. In turn, 
television, being the medium that was fostered by the film industry, has not escaped the formats 
of montage. In fact, the way in which the information is conveyed visually in broadcast news, 
primarily relies on the principle of association between the shots. However, this ability of the 
TV video editing to produce meaning is largely overlooked both in communication studies and 
in IR.  
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i. Visual Framing 
In IR word is often privileged over image as objects of analysis. This linguistic bias is 
challenged by some of the Cultural Studies intellectuals who argue that images and words are 
‘co-texts’ that do not need to directly connect to each other but work in synergy to translate 
meaning (Bal, 1991; Emmerson, 2012). In fact, images and written text have little difference 
if they are both looked at as forms of ‘graphic signification’ (Olson, 2003). Images have been 
one of the key objects of propaganda studies (Welch, 2013), and in the recent decade media 
framing research has been pointing towards the value of visual research (Coleman, 2010; 
Graber, 1990; Rodriguez & Dimitrova, 2011). In fact, Entman acknowledges that fames are 
constituted by various devices: 
“News frames are constructed from and embodied in the key words, metaphors, concepts, 
symbols, and visual images emphasized in a news narrative. Since the narrative finally 
consists of nothing more than words and pictures, frames can be detected by probing for 
particular words and visual images that consistently appear in a narrative and convey 
thematically consonant meaning across media and time” 
(Entman, 1993, pp. 6–7). 
Visuals densify textual information and construct narratives by adding another dimension to 
the storytelling processes. In particular, they evoke levels of association that complement 
linguistic structures. It has been acknowledged, for example, that in media images play a role 
in constructing stereotypes which has a significant impact on communicating identity and 
forming representations (Rodgers & Thorson, 2000). Similar to linguistic structures, visual 
structures suggest particular understanding of events by conveying interpretations; and the way 
in which things are communicated visually is thus meaningful (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006). 
As Rodriguez and Dimitrova argue in their review of visual frame analysis,  
“Images are powerful framing tools because they are less intrusive than words and as 
such require less cognitive load. Therefore, peripheral rather than central processing 
may be activated and audiences may be more likely to accept the visual frame without 
question”  
(Rodriguez & Dimitrova, 2011, p. 50). 
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In other words, images construct meaning with iconic (figurative) rather than symbolic 
(contextual) signs (Emmerson, 2012). Although visuals work within a different system of 
signification, similarly to textual framing, images evoke metaphors that further translate into 
frames. In this sense, the codes conveyed through visual information channel facilitate the 
contextual density of the messages, in particular in the audio-visual genre. Visual frames follow 
several scenarios in media narration: they either correlate with the linguistic frames with the 
help of contextual cues or they are juxtaposed with the textual frames in order to counter frame 
the initial interpretation.18 
Unlike other framing studies that look either at textual framing or visual frames, in this study 
I would emphasise the importance of combining both approaches into one analytical 
framework. The basic premise from which this analysis starts is that the choices of news 
producers—including the camera work, selection of images, and postproduction such as 
graphics—create visual codes that transmit social meaning (Fiske & Hartley, 1978; Tuchman, 
1978). In the audio-visual realm of television, images and text constantly work in tandem to 
convey a story. Thus, in order to deconstruct this semiotic narrative, researchers need to study 
both of them in a systematic qualitative analysis. As Coleman argues, 
“<…> too often visual framing research neglects theory building. In addition to 
complementing textual studies, visual framing studies can add unique theoretical 
statements to framing analysis”  
(Coleman, 2010, p. 242). 
Within the analysis of media there have been number of studies that focus on both linguistic 
and visual aspects of news stories (Fiske & Hartley, 1978; Griffin, 2004; Grimes & Drechsel, 
1996; Hartley, 1982; Tuchman, 1978). My study draws heavily on the methodological 
advancements developed by the semioticians such as, for example, the attention to visual codes. 
Unlike semiotic analysis, however, which is predominantly concerned with visual material that 
is ideologically charged and looks at layers of symbolic meaning from a cultural perspective 
(Barthes, 1973) (Barthes, Edgar Wind, Erwin Panofsky and Meyer Schapiro), the analysis of 
current events reporting from the framing perspective does not necessarily require a detailed 
examination of archetypes and the symbolic density of images, but the focus is rather on the 
internal dialogism between the image and the text. My choice of this method was determined 
                                                        
18  For an elaboration of this point with practical examples see Chapters 5 & 6 of this dissertation. 
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by the specifics of news content that often deals with a limited number of moving and static 
images due to the pace of international live news reporting.  
Based on the classification of visual framing analysis approaches proposed by Rodriguez and 
Dimitrova (2011), this study will adopt two levels of visual analysis, the denotative systems 
approach and connotative visual analysis. The first approach draws from Barthes’s (1973, 
1977) concept of “denotation” that refers to the primary meaning in the analysis of visuals. The 
main focus of this analysis is on “who and what’ of the events in its literal meaning. An 
important element of this analysis is the concern with the prominence that is given to actors of 
the news and which visual mechanisms have been applied in order to achieve this 
representation. Thus, pictorial styles are important elements of analysis, such as, for example, 
the difference between a close-up and a general shot in relation to the meaning that the choice 
of photographic frame conveys. It also looks at the visual intertextuality by identifying the 
images that were used by the channel’s discursive opponents in the past or by identifying visual 
quotations from in the discursive dialogue between the news broadcasters. The data gained at 
this level, however, does not yet allow to determine the sub-frames. 
The second-level analysis employs the connotative method of studying visuals and looks 
beyond the literal meaning that images convey to extract a more deep-seated imagery of the 
visual messages: 
“At this level, persons and objects shown in the visual not only denote a particular 
individual, thing or place, but also the ideas or concepts attached to them. In this content-
driven tier, news visuals are analyzed as signs, and their relationships with other signs 
within the sign system are assessed (i.e., Schapiro, 1996)”  
(Rodriguez & Dimitrova, 2011, p. 56). 
This level takes into account video editing of the news and how meaning is created as a result 
of analytical efforts of journalists or directors (Belyaev, 1982). Due to the focus on moving 
images rather than static photography, the visual analysis of television news needs to take into 
account the principles of screen motion. Television is the space that is especially well-equipped 
for generalising specific “iconic signs” like a photograph or a still shot from another channel 
into a “broader sign”. This process is particularly important to deconstruct in order to 
understand how signs are being re-interpreted or re-framed and thus gives a new level of 
contextual meaning. The exact same image will convey different interpretation, depending on 
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the way in which it is packed with other signs, both visual and textual. As this study will focus 
in particular on the processes of counter-framing, visual information will not be dismissed 
during the practical analysis. The juxtaposition of captions on screen with the exact images, 
the use of graphics and stills in relation to the ‘voice-over’, will be the elements of study.  
In particular, the sequences of video will be looked at as signifying units that translate meaning. 
Sequence is like a sentence that constructs the so-called visual text. Thus, the process of video 
editing or montage has a lot of similarities with the process of linguistic narrative construction 
(Henderson, 2012), with the only difference that it works with a different system of signs. For 
example, the way in which shots are put together in a coherent signifying structure to convey 
a story can be analysed as unit of visual meaning. 
 
“Sequences are shots grouped together to form meaning based on 
the relationship between the shots. The whole sequence, then, becomes something 
greater than the sum of its parts” 
 (Henderson, 2012, p. 69). 
 
Video editors select shots and frames to create these short visual stories. In relation to linguistic 
sentences, sequences are shorter messages but may consist of more signs. Juxtaposing 
seemingly unrelated images, for example, can create a certain meaningful effect and contribute 
to sub-frames. Thus, only about ten percent of the filmed reality is usually included in a 
television piece. The movement of the author's thought causes the appearance on the screen of 
visual and sound compositions created by the intra-frame movement and movement arising 
during the installation: from the letters-frames words-plans are formed, from words-sentences 
(editing phrases), then paragraphs-episodes and, finally, composition. The rhythmic and 
melodic patterns of assembly constructions determine the origin of space-time structures. The 
movements in time and space, conditioned by the semantic essence of the work, allow us to 
consider various forms of editing.  
 
Thus, the focus of analysis in this study will be on visual signs and the way in which these 
signs correlate with the textual interpretations. Images, within this approach, are analysed in 
relation to the textual cues. All that will be looked at within the system of framing coding sheet 
to be combined with the textual sub-frames and then counter-framing analysis.   
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The distinctiveness of looking at images in news broadcasting is that, unlike fiction writers, 
storytellers of current affairs have grand claims on factuality and objectivity of the events’ 
interpretations they convey. However, the narrative techniques that are used to communicate 
reality to the masses are borrowed from those of fiction genres. It is this rationalisation 
strategies that this study will focus on deconstructing. 
 
 
ii. Textual Analysis 
As I have indicated in Chapter 2, this study adopts a multifunctional understanding of text that 
is seen not only as a combination of linguistic elements bound together in a coherent structure 
but as “any coherent complex of signs” (Bakhtin, 1986). Although this broad definition can be 
extended into the fields of any form of “creative work that can be ‘read’ for meaning” (Hodges, 
2015, p. 43), the focus in this study is on visual and language signs. The analysis of these 
elements includes the following methods: linguistic, visual and intertextual analysis that work 
at different levels. Textual and visual methods are applied at a denotative level to describe what 
is seen and how it is portrayed by the news outlets. Unlike linguistic and visual analyses that 
are rather explanatory in nature, intertextual study is more focused on the interpretive aspect 
of evaluation. As Fairclough puts it, 
 
“The linguistic analysis is, in an obvious sense, closer to what is ‘there’ on paper or the 
audio- or video-tape, whereas the intertextual analysis is at one remove in abstraction 
from it” 
(Fairclough, 1995, p. 61). 
 
Thus, a researcher that employs intertextual analysis is drawn heavier to social and cultural 
interpretations that are conveyed in the text. This method of analysis began with the works of 
Russian literary theorist and philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin’s on dialogism. He emphasized that 
even monologic flows of language are, in fact, filled with other people’s words, speech, 
assertions, interpretations and opinions that are either reported, recalled or re-interpreted. From 
this perspective, no text can be truly brand new, but is rather a result of direct and explicit or 
implicit dialogic relationship with another text. As Bakhtin put it, 
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“Our speech, that is, all our utterances (including creative works), is filled with other’ 
words, varying degrees of otherness or varying degrees of ‘our-own-ness’, varying 
degrees of awareness and detachment” 
(Bakhtin, 1986, p. 89). 
 
Julia Kristeva, who introduced Bakhtinian concepts to French academia, metaphorically refers 
to text as a “mosaic of quotations” (Kristeva, 1980, p. 66) . In this vein, intertextuality is an 
arrangement of messages by a number of prior contexts. Thus, intertextual analysis is 
especially important for understanding counter-framing. In particular, it looks at quotes, both 
visual and verbal and the way in which they are interpreted or reinterpreted to produce 
meaning. 
 
There are two types of intertextuality that scholars identify in slightly different words. Kristeva 
(1980) differentiates between horizontal and vertical intertextuality, the classification that 
Fairclough (1995) denotes as manifest vs. constitutive/interdiscursive intertextuality. 
Horizontal or manifest characterize the type of intertextuality when the relationships between 
the text take a form of specific references from one text to another. In other words, it can be 
seen as a direct response from one actor to another actor within the dialogue. These direct cues 
include specific marks, such as citations both in written or oral texts, or visual quotations that 
may be edited into a sequence with the help of graphic effects—for example, when RT channel 
explicitly shows images from CNN’s broadcasting and gives them a new interpretation.  
 
On the other hand, these allusions do not always appear in texts, but intertextuality often 
happens “in the space between texts” (Fiske, 1987, p. 108), or what is called vertical and 
constitutive intertextuality. This type is characterized by integrating prior texts into news 
pieces without cuing them directly in the new text. This notion is often taken to another level 
of abstraction to reveal a broader cultural context. In this vein, intertextuality refers to the 
complex webs of texts in culture that are inescapable (Barthes, 1974). Although informed by 
this figurative notion, my study will rather focus on the more practical manifestation of 
constitutive intertextuality in the news—for example, the instances when RT responds to CNN 
without directly citing them. Intertextual analysis will thus allow me to uncover the relational 
tactical moves within the dialogue between the channels by highlighting how these responses 
are “textually enacted” (Fairclough, 1992). Thus, intertextual analysis unravels texts that are 
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articulated together in a discourse and highlights the process of counter-framing. In order to 
identify these intertextual links, I will closely study written, oral and visual manifestations of 
text in a systematic manner.  
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d. Data Collection and Coding 
The starting point of any interpretive study is with what is actually there on paper, or in my 
particular case, on the screen. I collected data by selected news monitoring over the defined in 
this chapter case study periods. The data collection was organized around the news points, an 
important methodological choice that allowed me to apply intertextual analysis by utilizing a 
more precise analytical lens. This entailed identifying signifying news events that were 
reported on within the case study period followed by monitoring the output on these dates on 
both channels, excluding the topic-impertinent content of the news bulletins. This almost 
parallel news watching allowed me to track the dialogue between the news channels.  
 
The study was performed in two stages, first denotative (i.) and connotative (ii.) stages. Data 
collection and the manual qualitative coding were part of the first stage, the further analysis 
included interpretation to unearth nuances and intertextual links that provide cues for 
identifying sub-frames that construct the overarching meta-frames. 
 
i. Denotative Stage 
In order to apply the framing and counter-framing analytical framework outlined in Chapter 2 
to the chosen case studies, I combined and readjusted some of the coding methods used by 
framing scholars, in particular those who favor a systematic approach. I draw on the Gamson 
and Modigliani’s (1989) approach to perform research by identifying framing devices, which 
refer to the discursive structures, such as metaphors and catchphrases that construct frames. 
These served as the focal points for classifying sub-frames.  
 
In this respect, adopting this method allowed me to track precisely every component of 
information flow, which served a useful record form for further interpretation of the discourse. 
The list of signifying structures for analysis needed to be accommodated to fit my study. Thus, 
the extraction of the framing devices from the news stream included the following structures: 
headlines, keywords, visuals and conclusions19 (see Table 3.2 for an example form of analysis).  
                                                        
19  This refers to conclusions of the news packages. For example, each television narration follows a 
structure that necessarily contains a concluding element. This is particularly important for analysing 
framing as these sections often contain clues for sub-frames.  
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Headlines Keywords/ 
Key 
phrases 
Intra-
frame 
Signs 
Extra-Frame 
Sequences & 
Min 
Conclusions Sub-
Frames 
RT 
22 June 2014 
(12:00MSK) 
 
“Double 
Standards: 
The UN calls for 
an investigation 
in Ukraine.” 
 
 
     
CNN 
22 June 
2014(12:00NYC) 
 
“Ukraine at 
crossroad: 
Ousted Pres. 
Yanukovich 
accused.” 
 
     
 
Table 3.2. Example Record Form for Data Collection  
 
 
At this stage, pertinent linguistic and visual data is extracted from the news flow and recorded 
in the form. Although this stage could be referred to as descriptive, it is important to note that 
a form of selection is presupposing this method of data collection. Thus, an element of analysis 
is already embedded into the data collection stage. In particular, here researchers subjectify 
themselves to the news stream in order to cue signifying elements of discourse. Therefore, the 
structures of the news flow that land in the record form are never objective but rather intuitively 
extracted by the researcher.  
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ii. Connotative Stage 
The approach outlined above allowed to collect evidence that could be interpreted using both 
quantitative and qualitative analyses. I argue that the study of discourse can benefit from a 
quantitative method to unravel different trends, dynamics as well as to identify the salience of 
certain structures over others that ultimately provide clues for studying meaning construction. 
Although this type of analysis is not interpretive in its nature, it can nevertheless facilitate the 
further interpretive inquiry by providing the background basis for it. Moreover, integrating 
visual and linguistic data helps a researcher to see a wider picture of the framing process. Thus, 
quantitative elements of analysis include counting the frequency of frames as well as analysing 
what the amount of time devoted to each topic can tell about the discursive mechanisms.  
 
As I mentioned in the previous sections, connotative stage of this study included intertextual 
analysis. This is also the point at which sub-frames as elements of broader meta-frame are 
identifies and interpreted. The record form (Figure 4) allowed to track how sub-frames migrate 
from one discourse to another and unraveled the links between these texts. In addition, it helped 
to identify not only explicit dialogism between the narratives of the two channels but also to 
look at the implicit conversation, the point that will be explained in greater detail in the 
following chapters. 
Unlike scholars, who draw their frame identification and analysis from Jungian archetypes 
(Shaw, 2010), I see framing as a process which operates with a set of dynamic contexts and 
metaphors. In other words, the same metaphors are often used to create opposite meanings, 
which makes it irrelevant to analyze the roots of imageries in order to understand framing 
mechanisms. Therefore, my study does not require a deep analysis of the imageries and 
metaphors which are used for the construction of meanings, but rather an analysis of how they 
are used. Thus, the aim of this study is to deconstruct how the issues are organised in such a 
way that they create certain meanings in the society by looking at the structural aspects of 
framing.  
 
  
 94 
e. Qualitative Interviews 
 
Apart from the interpretive text analysis, this thesis uses some background data obtained with 
the help of qualitative interviews. This was performed in order to collect the relevant 
background information on the particularities of RT’s function as a network and its role in 
Russia’s public diplomacy. Thus, the data that will be presented in the following chapter merely 
serves as a context to the empirical analysis presented in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
Unlike structured interviews and survey methods, in-depth qualitative interviews allow the 
researcher a certain degree of flexibility and adaptability to the environment in which the 
interview is taking place. In other words, “interviewed is more a participant in meaning making 
than a conduit from which information is retrieved” (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006, p. 
314). In this respect, qualitative researcher rarely takes the answers at a face value. Rather, the 
post-interview analysis entails an interpretation of the meanings derived during the questioning 
process. This important limitation of the method is worth reflexing upon, especially in relation 
to the particularities of this research. Interviewing elite practitioners of a rather controversial 
news production network has a particular bearing both on the process of collecting data as well 
as on evaluating these materials post-factum. In other words, researchers cannot find 
themselves outside the broader context in which they were gathered. Thus, for example, when 
I was asking the employees of RT whether there is any form of censorship coming from the 
management, I was bearing in mind that the responses I would get could potentially 
be  “unreliable, impressionistic, and not objective” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000, p. 12).  
 
Moreover, it is important to discuss the phenomenon of self-censorship in relation to their 
journalistic practice. A number of studies that look at the influences of social discourses 
on the journalistic performance have identified the tendency for self-censorship. This is 
contingent on both the structural position of an employee vis-à-vis the management as 
well as the broader normative boundaries in the society. “The reason to self-censor is 
always fear, though this fear can be provoked by many different factors” (Mintcheva, 
2016, p. 208) Thus, it could either be the interiorised anxiety of government intervention 
or the simple worry of job security. I reflexively acknowledge this limitation of the 
qualitative interview method and the claims that the following chapter makes are therefore 
arrived at as a result of an interpretive exercise.  
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f. Conclusion 
 
In presenting the logic behind the case selection, this chapter revealed the object of the study 
and the practical ways in which the study was approached within the conceptual framework of 
this research. In particular, I argued how the multifaceted methodological approach that 
employs textual, visual and intertextual methods of analysis can illuminate the process of 
framing, both strategic and tactical. Correlating the application of this methods with the levels 
of discourse thus opens up the possibilities for understanding both the static elements of 
discourse and its dynamic nature. In highlighting how this approach is different to the 
traditional frame analysis, I argued the way in which methodological questions are posed 
heavily influences the nature of overall findings of the research.  
Thus, the following Chapter 4 will present the detailed description of the object of analysis, the 
RT channel, followed by the Chapters 5 and 6 that will showcase how these methods of analysis 
were applied to the source material by presenting the two case studies.  
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Chapter 4. 
 
RT Today and its Soviet Roots: 
Context and Historical Links 
 
 
 
 
“Every attempt to contain or counteract the Russian state-backed media’s influence 
simply validated it. Churkin, the ambassador, acknowledged as much at RT’s U.N. 
ceremony. As he stood to speak, he seemed to be almost bouncing on the soles of his feet, 
delighted at RT’s newfound prominence. ‘Everybody watches them,’ he said. ‘Diplomats 
do it, ambassadors do it, foreign ministers do it, heads of state and government do it.’ In 
an oblique allusion to the recent American intelligence report, he noted that some people 
had been criticizing the network, but perhaps this was not such a bad thing. Grinning, he 
said: ‘They sound as if they are P.R. representatives of RT” 
(Rutenberg, 2017). 
 
 
 
a. Introduction 
 
On 13 November 2017, the United States Department of Justice officially ordered RT America 
to register as a “foreign agent”. Under this law, the Russian network is required to disclose all 
the financial information. RT’s response to the move followed quickly, with the headlines, 
such as “Meet ‘foreign agent’: Americans in America covering American news for 
Americans”, sarcastically mocking the hype around the network (RT, 2017b). Meanwhile in 
Moscow, Western accusations are presented to the domestic public as little victories if not as 
the tangible examples of the channel’s effective operations in the US.  
 
All the above happened amidst the hacking scandal of the alleged interference of Kremlin that 
disrupted the course of the elections in America (Baraniuk, 2016), but the concern over the 
Russian ‘propaganda’ threat to the stability in Western democracies has been dominating the 
discourse since the Syrian crisis in 2013. Several Western broadcasting corporations 
continuously raised concerns over the tools and methods that RT uses, criticizing that the 
liberal media are unable to contain this machine (Bidder, 2013; Halliday, 2014). For example, 
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The New York Times labelled RT “the most powerful information weapon of the 21st century” 
(Rutenberg, 2017). It is this kind of public diplomacy arms race on ideational level that 
informed this research.  
 
This chapter will thus engage with such questions as what informs the practice of this highly 
controversial institution that is increasingly being vilified? Where do its methods come from 
historically and what is the context of its ‘mission’ today? And perhaps most importantly, can 
analysing the work of RT help us understand Russian foreign policy? The chapter suggests that 
in order to deconstruct this antagonism and thus understand Russia’s defensive rhetoric it is 
necessary to look at the elements of the Soviet propaganda school in contemporary framing 
practices of RT. This approach, in fact, will allow to shift the focus away from the dominant in 
IR focus on strategy, which is often informed by the ideological emphasis, towards the tactical 
elements of influence that manifest themselves through the mechanisms of communication.  
 
This chapter continues as follows: section b presents a historical overview of the Russian 
broadcasting abroad and tells the story behind the creation of RT. Section c shows today’s 
organizational structure of RT and where it evolved from. Section d traces the elements of 
Soviet broadcasting style and presents these parallels within the framework of 
kontrpropaganda20. Section e concludes this chapter. 
 
  
                                               
20  Russian: counterpropaganda 
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b. The Soviet Roots and the Creation of RT 
 
International news broadcasting is not a new phenomenon for Russia. It started from the the 
October Revolution in 1917 with the first attempts of Bolsheviks to inform the working classes 
in Europe about the affairs in the Soviet country via telegraph. In fact, Russia was the first 
country in history to start broadcasting in foreign languages. In the 1930s, Radio Moscow 
would target not only communists in the West, but also anti-fascists, workers and other layers 
of the European society (Buyanova, 2011). During WWII, the reach of Soviet propaganda 
considerably increased, raising hope for the USSR’s elite that the state ideology would help 
the country on the military front. Driven by the need to counter the enemy, USSR launched the 
war-time propaganda agency Sovinformburo21, which was followed by a more systematic 
approach to spreading communist ideology during the second half of the 20th century, network 
APN. Much like the Western international broadcasters of the time, the Soviet inoveshanie22 
involved radio broadcasting in 78 world languages to 150 countries with program output of 
more than 200 hours a day (Gurevich & Ruzjnikov, 1976; Silina, 2011). The programs were 
aimed at promoting and countering ‘capitalist’ and anti-Soviet propaganda of the rivals, such 
as The Voice of America, for example (Fantalov, 1974).  
 
During the Cold War, the success of US propaganda incentivized other states to keep up with 
the obvious leader on the informational front. But the problem that Soviet broadcasters faced 
in the US was that they reached very few Americans. Compared to the Voice of America’s 23 
percent reach in the Soviet Union in early 1970s, only about 2 percent of the US population 
were listening to Radio Moscow (Winek, 2009). Some researchers have even found that “the 
USSR was spending more on jamming23 than on broadcasting its own programs” (Roth-Ey, 
2011, p. 131). Moreover, Radio Moscow’s broadcasting effectiveness at the time was 
significantly affected by the poor quality of the shortwave broadcasting technology (Winek, 
2009). Nevertheless, it is often argued that Soviet propaganda worked effectively enough on 
the audience that it reached (Smith, 1970). Thus, in the very midst of the Cold War, Soviet 
                                               
21  “Soviet Information Bureau”. The network existed from 1941 until 1961 (Rossiya Segodnya, 2017). 
 
22  A literal translation from Russian is “international broadcasting”. 
 
23  Jamming refers to communication technology strategies to disrupt the signal of another radio station, 
such as, for example, broadcasting on the frequency that is already in use by another network. The idea 
behind these efforts was to prevent the ‘voices of the West’ to be heard in the USSR (Winek, 2009).  
 99 
broadcasting targeting audiences abroad became an area of great concern for the West. The 
British government, for example, was receiving reports on the content and strategies of 
Moscow’s information services from its official ‘propaganda watch’, the BBC News 
Monitoring.24 Some studies performed by American scholars in the 1970s discovered that 
USSR’s Radio Moscow listeners in the USA were more likely to favor the Soviets than the 
control group (Smith, 1970). At the time, the study did not claim that these public opinion study 
results were due to the ingenious communication strategies of Radio Moscow. On the contrary, 
it rather pointed to the low quality of its content compared to the American broadcasters. 
Despite the weakness of Radio Moscow’s journalistic offering, the Soviet broadcaster was 
found to help the American audience, in their own words, to “see the other side of the story” 
and “provide a broader perspective of international events” (Smith, 1970, p. 540). The essential 
point that the survey argued was that viewers’ perceptions were mainly affected by the degree 
of opinion differences that were broadcast on local American media, compared to those 
promoted by Radio Moscow. As one of the respondents put it: 
 
“When they {Radio Moscow} say something that is different from what you read in 
American newspapers you begin comparing, and sometimes what they say makes more 
sense”  
(Smith, 1970, p. 545). 
 
Thus, although the viewers were aware of the fact that the information they were receiving 
from the Soviet broadcaster was propaganda-based, they nevertheless found it valuable, not 
least because it opened up the other side of the story better than the domestic media. This 
important finding is notably pertinent to the aims and objectives of the contemporary Russian 
international broadcasting, the point that will be gradually unfolded through the course of this 
chapter.   
 
The Perestroika period was not free of international broadcasting either. In 1993, Russia 
launched a state radio channel The Voice of Russia that broadcasted in 32 world languages. 
                                               
24  The service was formed in 1939 to report information on foreign media agenda and propaganda to the 
British Government. The researcher at BBC Monitoring translate news in 100 languages from 150 
countries.  See book at home. (“MPs raise fears over BBC Monitoring,” 2016). 
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However, after the dissolution of the USSR, Russia seemed to be losing its influence abroad, 
which some experts in Russia claim was due to the lack of resources (Roth-Ey, 2011). Notably 
in the early 2000s in Russia, it was the narrative of ‘Western hegemony’ or ‘neocolonialism’ 
that led to the decision to launch an international 24-hour broadcaster. In particular, the 
dominant positions of CNN, BBC, Euronews and Sky News on the international news 
landscape was perceived by Russia and some other countries25 as cultural imperialism, aimed 
at propagating the Western interpretation of current affairs. Hence, the creation of RT in itself 
was an act of countering the West.   
 
RT was conceived in 2005 in the midst of an unprecedented economic growth period of the 
country due to the strong oil price (World Bank, 2017). Thus, Kremlin’s press apparatus, 
headed by Alexei Gromov, secured the state funding to launch the first 24-hour news network 
in the country. To manage and set the agenda for the new media enterprise, the network hired 
a 25-year old broadcast journalist with some experience in international news reporting, 
Margarita Simonyan.26 As she recollects: 
 
“When we were launching {the channel}, we were mainly broadcasting news about 
Russia. But we rather soon realized that this is a path to nowhere, because there are not 
that many English-speaking people, who would be interested in watching Russia-related 
news on a daily basis. There may be ten thousand of such people in the world, maybe 
fifty, or even hundred. But this is still not enough for the {Russian} government to spend 
such money on this” 27  
(Simonyan, 2012). 
 
The early RT’s journalists, although informed by the network’s aim to promote Russia’s point 
of view, had rather optimistic views on their role as journalists. They were able to run stories 
that would be somewhat critical of domestic policies of the government at the time. One of the 
main tasks of the early-career ‘defensive’ journalists was to monitor the output of CNN and 
                                               
25  For example, Qatar also launched its Al Jazeera to counter this misbalance (Figenschou, 2017).  
 
27  This is the author's translation of the original text in Russian below: 
 «Когда мы запускались, то делали только новости о России. Но очень рано поняли, что это путь 
в никуда. Потому что англоязычных людей, которым интересно было бы в ежедневном режиме 
смотреть новости о России, немного. Таких людей в мире ну десять тысяч, ну пятьдесят, ну 
пусть даже сто. Это количество не стоит того, чтобы государство тратило такие деньги.»  
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the BBC (Interview 1), to take notes on the broadcasting style and strategies that would soon 
be borrowed and re-directed back at the rival channels. Most of the journalists were dreaming 
to be recognised in the West and truly strived for creating a high-quality international TV 
network that, in terms of the quality of the journalistic output it produced, could compete with 
the BBC and the CNN (Interview 2). Those Western channels were, at the time, very difficult 
to compete with due to the substantially greater funding that the big world corporations were 
receiving. As some of the network’s employees at the time recall, there was very little funding 
and the salaries were low (Interview 3). The period of Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency in 
general revived the kind of Perestroika spirit in the Russian media field. RIA Novosty and RT 
were hiring Western journalists to work for the country’s broadcasting abroad with an explicit 
disclaimer that the kind of coverage that would be expected from them should not be, in any 
way, assumed to be Russian propaganda.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
At the time, Moscow required from 
their journalists to ensure the best quality journalistic output. Thus, according to the employees, 
there was no direct editorial control from Moscow, at least not to the extent such outlets were 
controlled during the Soviet period. As Simonyan disclosed when she was asked if she ever 
receives calls from Kremlin: 
 
“You, in Kommersant29, are apparently way more interesting for the {Kremlin} 
administration than we are. We do not broadcast in Russian, and therefore we are not 
viewed by that many people who could potentially ‘call’ us. And if they do watch {us},  
  
                                               
   
 
29  A leading Russian newspaper.  
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they do so seldom. During the six years {that I work here}, I have never received a single 
call with a request to take something down from the air or with the ‘why did you show 
something like that’ kind of remarks”30  
(Simonyan, 2012). 
 
Following the Russo-Georgian War in August 2008, the channel changed its marketing strategy 
and hired an American PR firm McCann31 (Rutenberg, 2017). The result of this contract was 
twofold: on the one hand, the channel was rebranded from Russia Today to RT; on the other 
hand, it substantially revisited its news selection strategies. The reason why the network’s name 
was changed into an abbreviation was to prevent the viewers from perceiving the network as 
strictly Russian, thus aiming to be recognized as a rather independent and international news 
broadcaster. As Vladimir Putin admits in his conversation with the editorial board of RT: 
 
“I would like to emphasize, it is very important: we were never guided by the premise 
that this {RT} would be an information service or a channel that would engage in 
apologetics of Russian politics. We wanted to give the {global} media stage an absolutely 
independent news channel”32 
(Putin, 2013). 
However, unlike BBC and Al-Jazeera which despite their financial links with the British and 
the Qatar governments respectively managed to brand the networks as the international role-
models of independent journalism, RT to date is predominantly perceived in the West as 
Russian ‘propaganda’. This paradox can be explained by the high degree of inconsistency 
between Kremlin’s statements, claims of RT’s editors, and the journalistic output of the 
channel. For example, Putin’s statement, cited above, uncovers Kremlin’s desire to legitimise 
                                               
30  This is the author's translation of the original text in Russian below:  
«Вы в «Коммерсанте», видимо, гораздо интереснее звонящим, чем мы. Нас, поскольку мы не 
вещаем на русском, судя по всему, мало кто смотрит из тех, кто мог бы звонить. А если смотрят, 
то редко. У меня за шесть лет ни разу не было истории, чтобы был звонок с просьбой снять 
сюжет с эфира или зачем вы какую-то фигню показали». 
 
31  A US-based international advertising agency (https://www.mccann.com).  
 
32 This is the author's translation of the original text in Russian below: 
«И хотелось бы сразу подчеркнуть, это самое главное: мы никогда не исходили из того, что это 
будет информслужба или канал, который будет заниматься апологетикой российской политики. 
Нам хотелось, чтобы на информационной арене появился абсолютно независимый 
информационный канал.» 
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its authority on the global discursive environment. With this strategy in mind, McCann gave 
RT its slogan “Question More” that urges the audience to develop a critical eye on Western 
mainstream media and to seek alternative news sources. Thus, the channel was created to 
outbalance the mainstream dominance of the Western broadcasters by countering their 
established agenda-setting strategies. What the creators of RT particularly criticized was the 
24-hour broadcasters’ highly consistent with each other and predictable news stories selection. 
For example, BBC’s and CNN’s choice to give substantially more prominence in their 
broadcasting stream to certain events, while dismissing other stories, that are, from the Russian 
perspective, equally relevant for the global community: 
 
“When CNN and the BBC see a NATO drone crash in Libya, and this story is headlining 
their bulletin all day, we {RT} see that 13 people from one family died the same day in 
Libya, six of which were children. We cannot compete with the BBC and CNN on the 
ground. In any case, they will have more foreign correspondent bureaus there, and their 
cameras will be more expensive. Why would the audience choose to watch us {RT} with 
our smaller studios and cheaper cameras? Only in the case we show them something that 
CNN will never show”33 
(Simonyan, 2012). 
 
Thus, RT insist that they prioritize the topics that do not fit into the agenda of the mainstream 
‘liberal’ media. In this respect, RT admits that it is guided by the normative ideal of pluralism 
of opinions and the strive to provide an anti-hegemonic take on the world affairs. The stories 
on RT’s agenda are thus critical of US foreign and domestic policies, they cover different 
angles of the conflicts in the Middle East, and pay particular attention to the topics of financial 
crisis, violence, social and environmental problems of the Western countries. Moreover, RT 
explicitly counters the preoccupation with objectivity that is dominant in the Anglo-Saxon 
journalistic community. RT’s editorial board unambiguously denies this ethical norm when it 
comes to conducting journalistic work by claiming that “objectivity does not exist” in the real 
                                               
33  This is the author's translation of the original text in Russian below: 
«Когда CNN и BBC видят, что в Ливии разбился беспилотник НАТО, и весь день у них это главная 
новость, мы видим, что в этот же день в Ливии погибли 13 человек из одной семьи, среди них 
шестеро детей. Мы не можем с СNN и BBС конкурировать на одной поляне. У них все равно будет 
корпунктов больше, и камеры будут дороже, и ведущие будут сидеть в более просторных студиях. 
Зачем же людям смотреть нас, где студии поменьше и камеры похуже? Только если мы покажем 
то, что CNN никогда не покажет.»  
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world and therefore reporters who strive for it are simply deluding themselves if not 
compromising the quality of their work (Simonyan, 2012). A good 24-hour news network, in 
RT’s understanding, should not try to present a balanced reporting based on the logic of 
objectivity but should rather be transparent on their political views. Within this policy, Kremlin 
has never suppressed the funding sources of RT. As Putin notes: 
 
“Of course, it {RT} is funded by the government and it will more or less reflect the 
position of Russian officials on domestic and international affairs. But I would 
nevertheless like to emphasize again that we did not conceive the idea of this channel’s 
editorial policy as a way to justify Russian policies, both domestic and international”34  
(Putin, 2013). 
 
However this is inconsistent with the official documents of the presidential administration that 
often refer to international broadcasting as a tool of soft power (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Russian Federation, 2016). Moreover, the state’s spending on this rather high-maintenance 
enterprise is often justified by the country’s need to have a strong weapon of mass information. 
As the channel’s editor in chief argues when asked why taxpayers need to support the network: 
 
“Well, {the country needs it} for the same reason as it needs The Ministry of Defence. 
That is why you, as a taxpayer, need it”35 
(Simonyan, 2012). 
 
 
The narrative that informs this editorial agenda is that of Russia losing the ideational battle that 
took place during the Georgian War in 2008 (Simonyan, 2013). Thus, perceiving the global 
media stage as a battlefield of information war RT, as an enterprise, is not entirely organized 
around the logic of commerce. In fact, the strive for broadening the audience is informed by 
the need to influence and change public opinion abroad rather than by the ethical norm to ‘hold 
                                               
34 This is the author's translation of the original text in Russian below:  
«Конечно, он финансируется государством, и так или иначе не может не отражать позицию 
российских официальных властей на то, что происходит в нашей стране и за рубежом. 
Но всё-таки я хочу это подчеркнуть ещё раз: мы не задумывали этот канал – RT – как какую-то 
апологетику российской политики – и внешней, и внутренней.» 
 
35 This is the author's translation of the original text in Russian below: 
“ — Ну, примерно затем же, зачем стране нужно Министерство обороны. Вот зачем оно вам как 
налогоплательщику?» 
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power to account’.36 In fact, the channel’s target audience, as the editors admit, is not the broad 
public in the countries where RT broadcasts. The network has a more targeted approach that 
appeals to the so-called opinion-generating elite in the West who could potentially trigger the 
policy change towards Russia (Interview 3). RT also targets the younger audience, which 
explains its media convergence strategy with strong social media presence, receiving around 
one million views a day (Simonyan, 2013). In fact, the network’s YouTube.com channel is 
often ahead of of the main international news outlets, including CNN International, Fox News, 
Sky News, Al Jazeera (PwC UK, 2016). Thus, its audience spectrum is the people, who are 
“tired of mainstream”, the so-called “lefties” and other “fighters of the system” (Simonyan, 
2013). Notably, this pattern is fairly consistent with the targets of the Soviet broadcasting 
abroad at the time of the Cold War, the parallel that will be explored in greater detail in the 
following sections of this chapter.  
  
                                               
36  Holding power to account is one of the dominant ethical norms that organizes Anglo-Saxon journalistic 
practice (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). 
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c. The Contemporary Organizational Structure of RT 
 
Russia considers the use of international broadcasters a part of the country’s soft power strategy 
that operates within the structure of public diplomacy. Thus, this section will explore the way 
in which this structure is organized. In fact, the confusion around the exact aims and objectives 
of RT can be also clarified through tracing the organizational change and reforms that surround 
the network. As briefly mentioned above, the current system of Russian international 
broadcasting has evolved from Soviet international broadcasting. I will provide a brief timeline 
of this re-organization below: 
 
In 1961, Sovinformburo is restructured into the Agency for Press “Novosty”, APN. The agency 
was predominantly focused on printed press, publishing more than 4,3 copies as issue of 60 
newspapers and magazines in 45 world languages. 
 
In 1990, the USSR created an Information Agency “Novosty”, IAN. The work of the agency 
now included not only spreading printed press abroad but also international broadcasting, both 
TV and radio. The agency also researched public opinion abroad, mainly in relation to the 
USSR’s domestic and foreign policy. 
 
In 1991, the Inoveschanie network was reformed to become “International Moscow Radio” 
that was soon rebranded again into “The Voice of Russia” (VoR). 
 
1991 also marked the year when based on IAN structure, the country launched Russian 
Information Agency “Novosty”, RIA Novosty. 
 
In 2005, RIA Novosty launches RT. 
 
In 2013, President Putin’s administration orders the merger of the Russian Information Agency 
“Novosty”, RIA Novosty, and The Voice of Russia Radio under an umbrella organization, 
International Information Agency “Russia Today”37 (Rossiya Segodnya, 2017). 
  
                                               
37  Not to be confused with RT, the TV network. 
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It becomes evident from the timeline presented above that the contemporary system of Russian 
public diplomacy was, in large part, built on the developments of Soviet media abroad. 
Moreover, a large number of the editorial staff of RIA Novosty and subsequently Rossiya 
Segodnya were groomed for the Soviet communication services. A notable example is the head 
of Rossiya Segodnya, Dmitriy Kiselyov. He began his career in 1975 as an APN clerk. He also 
worked for Inoveschanie before continuing his career in television (Rossiya Segodnya, 2017). 
Today, Kiselyov is the host of one of the most influential news analysis programmes on 
Russian TV and the head of Rossiya Segodnya, which makes him the key figure of Kremlin’s 
media apparatus. He is often referred to by the Western media as Putin’s propagandist in chief, 
who sets the tone for the country’s international broadcasters aimed at foreign publics 
(“Russia’s Chief Propagandist,” 2013). Rossiya Segonya has six services under its umbrella: 
1. The news agency RIA Novosty, which primarily targets the Russian-speaking 
audience and focuses on the news of domestic interest. 
2. R-Sport, the leading agency in the country that delivers international and Russian 
sports news to the audience. 
3. RIA Nedvizjimost’, an information and analysis service about the real estate 
market in Russia and internationally. 
4. The financial news agency Praim. 
5. The online project Ino SMI, specialising on translation of the foreign media 
publications into Russia.  
6. The online multimedia platform Sputnik, which is primarily specialised in radio 
broadcasting in over 30 world languages.  
Although RIA Novosty founded the Autonomous Non-profit Organization “TV-Novosty”, 
Russia Today (later, RT), the channel’s affiliation with the agency remains unclear. Although 
officially these are separate organizations, the connections between the two are difficult to deny 
(Surganova, 2014). Before RIA Novosty and the Voice of Russia linked-up, RT’s headquarters 
in Moscow were sharing the roof with RIA Novosty. And soon after the merger, Margarita 
Simonyan became the editor in chief of Rossiya Segodnya, while remaining in her chair at RT. 
In fact, due to her experience with running an international broadcaster, Simonyan was 
appointed to oversee the rebranding of The Voice of Russia radio that from 2013 is called 
Sputnik News. The choice of ‘sputnik’ as a brand name is another point that showcases how 
contemporary media is influenced by the Soviet legacy. For example, from the 1960s, the 
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Soviets were producing a weekly magazine in English language, Sputnik Junior, which was 
targeted at younger audience abroad. The aim of the publication was to promote Lenin’s ideas 
among children (Mitrokhin, 1985). The editors of the network disclosed in an interview 
conducted as part of this research that the choice of the brand name was guided by the notion 
that ‘sputnik’ is one of the few Russian words that is understood in many foreign languages 
with a positive overtone (Interview 4). Moreover, it is the word that carries the meaning of 
national pride as part of the country’s Soviet legacy.  
The editorial correlation between the output of Sputnik and RT enterprises is very strong. The 
broadcasting policy, as manifested by the board, is to focus on the local news of a target country 
and to promote Russia’s interpretations when it comes to foreign affairs (Surganova, 2014). As 
Kiselyov presented during his keynote speech at the launch of Sputnik News, the audience in 
the world is exhausted from the exposure to US ‘propaganda’ promoting hegemonic narratives 
of ‘unipolarity’, and seeks out for alternative sources of information that would challenge this 
misbalance (Kiselyov, 2014). Thus, Rossiya Segodnya and RT are not exactly siblings but are 
the two autonomous networks that share one editor in chief and, subsequently, the editorial 
policies. For example, after the merger, RT launched a Russian version of RT, which is not a 
full version of the channel but contains selected translated news from RT English. This website 
launched a section called Ino TV, which is essentially a twin of the already existing RIA 
Novosty’s project Ino SMI. As the former editor in chief of Ino SMI said in an interview to 
Forbes Russia: 
“It is practically the only source of information about the outside world for the 
government of the country, a way more effective {source} that the monitoring service of 
MID38”39 
(Surganova, 2014, p. 2). 
This service is also a revived Soviet ideological tool. For example, during the Cold War the 
Department for Ideology the Central Committee of the CPSU had a monitoring service for 
analysis of foreign press. The aim of this unit was not only collecting and translating the news 
                                               
38  The Ministry for International Affairs. 
 
39 This is the author's translation of the original text in Russian below:  
«Это практически единственный источник информации о внешнем мире для руководства страны, 
гораздо более эффективный, чем служба мониторинга того же МИДа», — считает Ковалев.» 
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as they are broadcast in the West but also to prepare special memos with propositions on how 
to counter foreign messages (Silina, 2011). A very important characteristic of Soviet 
international propaganda was its targeted character, its focus not only on political organizations 
and state structures, but also on various social, sociocultural, religious and sex-age groups 
(Solodkova & Nesterova, 2018). Bearing this strategy in mind, throughout the years, RT has 
expanded its network of TV channels by launching new and more country and sociocultural-
specific outlets. Below is the timeline of this transformation 40:   
Launched in 2005, the flagship TV channel, initially called “Russia Today”, is RT 
International. This version is the most internationally oriented in their news broadcast and 
covers the wider English-speaking community. The headquarters are based in Moscow, but it 
uses the content produced by RT’s bureaus in other world cities, such as London, New York, 
New Delhi, Paris, Baghdad, etc. The first case study of this dissertation was performed using 
the audio-visual output of this channel. 
Rusiya Al-Yaum, روﺳﯿﺎ اﻟﯿﻮم , is the version of RT in Arabic language that broadcasts 
programmes 24/7 with the focus on the audience in the countries of the Middle East. It was 
the second channel to start broadcasting in 2007, following the launch of Russia Today (RT, 
2017a). 
RT en español was launched two years later, in 2009, to cover the Spanish-speaking audience. 
With the channel’s headquarters based in Moscow, the version does have its own 
programming and journalists but it also offers its viewers the selected translated content of 
RT in English. Its operations are located in Los Angeles, Buenos Aires, Miami and Havana 
(RT en español, 2017). 
 
In 2010, the network extended its Washington bureau into a targeted RT America channel. It 
provides its viewers in the USA with an exclusive content from 4pm to 12am on the days of 
the week, and re-broadcasts RT International at all other times on air (RT, 2017a). 
 
In 2014, the London bureau of the network announced the launch of the UK version of the 
channel. Similar to RT America, RT UK provides its audience with the UK-specific news 
                                               
40  It is important to point out that throughout the course of my research, the internal organization of the 
network changed, with new versions of the channel emerging. Also, the access to the channel’s content 
changed, which is further unpacked in the presented timeline. 
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offering from 6pm to 10pm, Monday through Thursday, with a 10pm Friday bulletin, and 
turns into RT International at all other times on air (RT UK, 2017). This channel’s content 
was used to collect data for the second case study of this research, due to the inaccessibility 
of RT International’s online archive that was used while conducting the Case Study I. 
 
Since 2011, the network has the channel specializing solely in the 24-hour documentary 
broadcasting, RT Doc that predominantly airs long format films on Russia-specific topics and 
offers live online streaming (RT Doc, 2017). 
 
Although RT announced the launch of the two more country and language-specific channel 
versions in French and German, the economic crisis in the country forced the network to 
suspend these plans (Shuster, 2015). 
 
RT also has the three other language online versions of the channel: RT на русском41, RT 
Français42, RT Deutsch43, and all the the cable network channels also have their YouTube 
channels (RT, 2017a).  
 
RT’s news distribution is operated by its news agency Ruptly. In terms of its programming, 
the separation between the channels listed above is not strict, with the main programmes 
appearing on all channels. However, the news bulletin structure can vary. For example, RT 
UK and RT America will prioritize the news that are important to the British and American 
viewers respectively, while some of the stories that appeal to the Spanish-speaking or Arabic-
speaking audience will get side-lined.  
  
                                               
41  “in Russian” 
 
42  “French” 
 
43  “German” 
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d. The Roots of RT’s Countering Techniques: The Concept of Kontrpropaganda 
As the previous chapters argued, in order to understand Russia’s defensive rhetoric, it is 
important to delve into the mechanism of the country’s persuasive communication and to 
analyse what underpins its contemporary strategies. As I have portrayed above, the influence 
of Soviet propaganda school can be traced through looking at the organization of the 
contemporary public diplomacy system. In this section, I will present the operational 
particularities of contemporary strategies. 
The term kontrpropaganda originated in the practice of military propaganda (Nozjin, 1984). 
The measures of political propaganda would be used to neutralise if not completely eliminate 
the effects of the enemy’s information and psychological operations (PSYOP). In the 1960s 
and 1970s, due to the ideological battle between the USSR and the USA, kontrpropaganda 
changed its targets, developed new technologies and acquired new meanings and connotations. 
In the Soviet Union, kontrpopaganda was thought of as an integral part of ideological affairs. 
Thus, the military and intelligence services, journalists and diplomats were working together 
to contribute to the development of methods for countering the PSYOPs of the enemy. The 
starting point for such strategies was collecting and analysing anti-Soviet messages promoted 
by the US through science and education sectors, art and entertainment, the activities of foreign 
missionaries and distribution of anonymous leaflets (Silina, 2011).  
All these data were carefully collected and systematised in the propaganda and agitation section 
of the CPSU Central Committee to address the issue of concrete counterpropaganda actions. 
Operational information in the Central Committee of the CPSU was provided primarily by the 
State Security Committee in the form of internal memos. For example, one of the recently 
declassified KGB memos of the time states that there is a necessity to create an operational 
body that would "instruct systematic observation of the plans and practical actions of the United 
States in the field of psychological warfare and ideological sabotage in various regions of the 
world and prepare proposals for organizing our counterpropaganda" (RGANI. F. 5. Op. 55. D. 
56. L.).44. Since the second half of the 1970s, the Department of Propaganda of the Central 
Committee of the CPSU began receiving information prepared by independent sociological 
services. Thus, the strategy of countering can be defined as “carefully prepared answers to false 
propaganda with the purpose of refuting the disinformation and undermining the propagandist” 
                                               
44  As cited in (Silina, 2011, p. 54). 
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(Romerstein, 2008, p. 137) . Notably, some American analysts note that in the mid-20th century 
the USA was lagging behind the USSR on the counterpropaganda front. As Romerstein states: 
“Although the Cold War provided an excellent laboratory to study, develop and refine 
techniques of counterpropaganda, the U.S. started to lose its knowledge, and the practice 
of it, in the late 1960’s and 1970’s. By the 1980’s it was possible, by examining the 
experiences of the past, to develop an effective counterpropaganda campaign against the 
Soviets’ strategic propaganda offensives. In a repetition of history, however, this ability 
atrophied in the 1990’s after decision-makers saw no more need to retain the knowledge 
or ability” 
(Romerstein, 2008, p. 138). 
Indeed, since 2013 RT’s countering techniques have regained its status of the great public 
concern for the USA. Thus, for example, the Chairman of House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
Eliot Engel, invoking war-time rhetoric, alarmed the public that Russian propaganda “may be 
more dangerous than any military, because no artillery can stop their lies from spreading and 
undermining US security interests in Europe” and that this state of affairs requires “a robust 
response from us”, prompting the deployment of counterpropaganda techniques (Royce, 2015). 
The members of Russian media apparatus, in turn, make explicit references to the Soviet 
propaganda techniques, comparing the current state of affairs in the information sphere to the 
battleground of messages. For example, one of the former APN and RIA Novosti editors points 
to the “necessity of constructing a positive image of our country. Otherwise we will not be able 
to win the information war” (Maksimov, 2016). The usage of military metaphors indicates how 
readily the two countries have fallen into the familiar pattern of the Cold War discourse. In 
fact, the pre-soft power discursive frame of public influence abroad was structured around the 
concept of psychological warfare, which, as the number of KGB documents indicate, was 
conceptualized by the US strategist shorty before and during Kennedy’s presidency (RGANI. 
F. 5. Op. 55. D. 56. L. 118).45 According to this concept, the "behaviour" of foreign states can 
be effectively influenced by strategic measures to directly or indirectly influence the 
interpretations of the situation of statesmen of this country from afar or on the foreign soil. 
Thus, the overall intention of the Soviet kontrpropaganda techniques was to prevent any form 
of Western influence on the public opinion in the USSR. Notably, similar to the way in which 
                                               
45  As cited in (Silina, 2011, p. 54). 
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USA strategists raised concern over the ineffectiveness of American counterpropaganda 
compared to the Soviet effort, Russian analysts today point to the failure of the ideological 
apparatus to formulate a consistent strategy to counter USA’s PSYOPs, which was, in large 
part, due to the overemphasis on the Marxist-Leninist ideology that structured such practices 
(Silina, 2011). However, as this research will demonstrate in the following chapters, the 
overarching ideological strategy may not be as pertinent to analysing the discourse as the 
tactical mechanisms. In particular, looking at the structural aspects of discursive mechanisms 
allows to track a number of similarities that are otherwise overlooked.   
 
Much like the ideological justifications proposed by the contemporary Russian 
‘propagandists’, as showcased in the above sections of this chapter, the basis for Soviet 
counterpropaganda was the notion of American hegemony and cultural imperialism (Silina, 
2011). Thus, one of the main tools for delegitimizing the enemy was to criticise, discredit 
foreign journalists (Fateev, 1999). One of the unique countering techniques that was developed 
then was the explicit countering of the Western press.46 Thus, foreign journalists would be 
satirically referred to as ‘slanderers’ which could be backed by directly citing their ‘untrue’ 
quotes to then deconstruct and ridicule such statements (“Klevetniki,” 1947). The every-day 
reality of Soviet journalists working abroad was structured around this approach. For example, 
Baygushev, who worked for APN at the time recollects one of the usual working days: 
"... locked up in my office, I would begin the day with a fresh ‘specperehvat’ 47, that is all 
these Freedoms and Voice of Americas. And then a thick pack of the so-called ‘white 
TASS’ – with quite detailed and exceptionally fresh reviews of the ‘sharp’ foreign press. 
And only then would I go on reading all the anti-Soviet émigré newspapers and 
magazines – solid Russkaya Misl’, Russkoe Slovo, Russian-speaking pro-European 
Novoe Russkoe Slovo, Noviy Zjurnal, Posev, Kontinent, Chasovoy 48, etc., etc., etc. We 
had everything! And only as a desert, exhausted, would I read the mainstream foreign 
                                               
46  The detailed example of the usage of such technique on RT will be presented in the following chapter. 
  
47  Russian: “special interception” (author’s translation). 
 
48  Russian: "Russian thought", "Russian word", "New Russian word", "New magazine", "Sowing", 
"Continent "," Sentinel ". 
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newspapers... "49 
(Baygushev, 2005, p. 61). 
The routine depicted above is very similar to the day of an RT employee. For example, one of 
the programme editors at RT describes her day at work: 
“We read all the foreign newspapers and watch the TV output of the CNN, the BBC, SKY 
news, etc. When we organize talk shows, we seek for the guest speakers on the basis of 
their political views. In particular, we look for those who explicitly show their anti-
Western positions and/or are somewhat supportive of Russian foreign policy. <…> When 
we prepare {TV} packages, we know that it would be more effective if we show what kind 
of inconsistencies are there in the Western reporting, because our aim, as journalists, is 
to be critical” 
(Interview 1). 
 
The result is thus the news coverage that discusses world events in the way that challenges the 
Western, American, in particular, legitimacy over the international affairs. The overall output 
character of RT, if compared to the Soviet broadcasting abroad, is very similar. The following 
bit of USSR’s radio broadcasting from 1985 is an explicit example of this phenomenon: 
“… the hourly newscast was followed by ‘The Way We See It’ A Look at the Soviet Union 
and the World Today, devoted to contrasting U.S. missile deployment with Soviet policy 
50. Later commentaries dealt with supervisors of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima visiting 
Moscow and thanking the government, ‘for their tremendous efforts to ease world 
tensions’ and the denunciation of the United States’ negative attitude toward arms 
                                               
49 This is the author's translation of the original text in Russian below: 
«...запершись в кабинете, начинал свой рабочий день с чтения свежего “спецперехвата”, то есть 
всех этих “Свобод” и “Голосов Америки”. А затем толстой пачки так называемого “белого 
ТАСС” – с довольно подробными и исключительно свежими обзорами всей “острой” зарубежной 
прессы. А уж только потом переходил к чте- нию всех антисоветских эмигрантских газет и 
журналов – солидных “Русской мысли”, “Русского слова”, русскоязычного проевропей- ского 
“Нового русского слова”, “Нового журнала”, “Посева”, “Кон- тинента”, “Часового” и т. п., и т. 
д. Мы имели все! И только уже на закуску, выдохнувшись, читали наиболее авторитетные 
зарубежные газеты...» 
50  Ebon, The Soviet Propaganda Machine, 273-274. 
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negotiations by a British labour union”  
(Winek, 2009, p. 107). 
This framing of the Soviet Union as the ‘peacekeeper’ in the international with an emphasis on 
the US ‘aggressive’ policies is notably similar to the way in which the Syrian crisis was framed 
by RT, the point that will be further unpacked in the following Chapter 5. Today, the editor in 
chief of RT is confident that Russian television needs to focus closely on the American TV 
channels, where the anchors are not balanced ‘referees in a football match’ but are rather 
heavily promoting their point of view. In fact, RT today “effectively” (Rutenberg, 2017) turns 
the accusations from the Western media, such as the Economist, for example, into their own 
advantage, which essentially helps the channel to sustain its image of the “fighter with the 
establishment” (Simonyan, 2013). 
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e. Conclusion 
 
This chapter depicted the controversial role that RT is ascribed to in the Western context and 
problematized the difficulty of analytically grasping the role of RT within the country’s public 
diplomacy structure. In turn, it engaged with the intentions of the network’s founders, as 
communicated by the officials, which was in turn juxtaposed with the strategies to develop a 
distinct Russian voice against the dominance of Western mainstream media. Hence the key 
argument that this chapter made is that RT developed out of a distinct Soviet tradition of 
counter-propaganda. This analysis was based on secondary literature as well as semi-structured 
interviews with former journalist working for RT. Bearing in mind this distinct present and 
history of RT, with its origins and contemporary setup, the next chapters will apply the 
understanding of counter-framing developed in Chapter 2 to the case studies. Thus, Chapter 5 
focuses on the way the flagship channel RT International framed the Syrian crisis, in particular 
focusing on the responsive elements of counter-framing through the intertextual tracing of the 
discursive dialogue between RT and CNN.  
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Chapter 5. 
 
Case Study I: Framing Syrian Crisis 
 
 
 
“{T}he coverage of the Syria story in the last five years has shed doubts on 
the relation between reality, truthfulness and news in remarkable ways” 
(Al-Ghazzi, 2017, p. 12). 
 
 
 
a. Introduction 
On the 21 August 2013, two areas near Damascus were struck by at least a dozen rockets, 
containing one of the deadliest chemicals, sarin gas. This most devastating event in the history 
of the Syrian conflict51 killed, according to different sources, from 281 to 1729 people, causing 
an international furor over who was responsible for the attack. By coincidence, the strike 
happened a week after the UN investigators arrived in Syria to inquire into allegations about 
the previous chemical attacks in the area. Upon Syrian government’s permission granted to the 
UN several days after the attack, the inspectors headed to the Ghouta site and confirmed that 
the attack had indeed taken place. However, it remained a mystery which side of the conflict 
was to be held accountable.  
From the very start, the White House communications claimed in ‘high confidence’ that the 
Syrian government was responsible for the chemical strike, making the case for an intervention 
in Syria. Kremlin, a historically loyal friend of Assad, stood opposed to the US pro-retaliation 
calls, pointing to the likeliness of the rebels themselves carrying out the massacre. This head-
to-head of the two stubborn powers was ultimately resolved by the UN-brokered plan to 
dismantle Syria’s chemical weapons. However, it remained controversial who the perpetrator 
of the sarin gas attacks was, with dozens of opposing interpretations continuing to emanate 
from different media outlets. While several bloggers and citizen-journalism initiatives, such as 
                                                 
51 The wave of the 2011 Arab Spring protests against the Al-Assad family who had been in power since 
1971 put a start to the ongoing humanitarian crisis, displacing about a half of the country’s population (Al-
Ghazzi, 2017). For an account of the pretext to the Arab Spring, see (Hollis, 2012) 
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Bellingcat, attempted to conduct independent investigations of what actually happened in the 
conflict zone, based on the open-access photo and video-sources that became available through 
social media, the majority of the international broadcasters, including RT and CNN, preferred 
to maintain distance to the war-zone and focus instead on the blame game between the US and 
Russia. 
This chapter scrutinizes this conversation between the two channels by applying the analytical 
lens of framing and counter-framing.  It will detail the mechanisms of framing and counter-
framing that entails constant referencing to the original narratives that took place in the 
dialogue between the channels. By applying textual, visual and intertextual analysis to the 
Syria-related news in the broadcast of RT and CNN, I was able to trace the way in which frames 
are produced, re-produced, countered or borrowed by different channels on the tactical level to 
then contribute to the construction of the overarching meta-frame of the discourse.   
 
The chapter proceeds as follows: section b presents the overview on the conducted case study, 
followed by section c on RT’s and CNN’s strategic level framing by studying the meta-frames 
that the channels promoted in their coverage of the Syrian crisis. Section d addresses the 
tactical level and showcases how the two channels interacted with each other through the use 
of sub-frames. This section presents a detailed analysis of the textual and visual material. 
Section e concludes this chapter.  
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b. Case Study Overview 
This case study examines RT’s rhetorical response to CNN’s coverage of the Ghouta attack 
and the international events that took place shortly after the deadly incident. As outlined in 
Chapter 2, this study treats framing and counter-framing as operating at different levels of 
discourse. In this respect, the aim of the Syrian crisis analysis was to identify the meta-frame 
of the discourse by extracting sub-frames from the coverage of RT and CNN. Sub-frames are 
seen to operate at the tactical level and are often very responsive and rather targeted units of 
meaning. Thus, unlike scholars who draw their frame identification and analysis from Jungian 
archetypes (Shaw, 2010), I see framing as a process which operates with a set of dynamic 
contexts and metaphors. In other words, the same metaphors are often used to create opposite 
meanings, which makes it irrelevant to analyse the roots of imageries in order to understand 
framing mechanisms. Therefore, my study does not require semiotic analysis of culture, but 
rather focuses on the structural aspects of discourse (see Table 5.1).  
 
 
  Method of 
Analysis 
Methodology 
    
Denotative 
Stage 
Connotative 
Stage 
Object 
of 
Analysis 
Macro-
Level 
RT’s Discourse 
CNN’s 
Discourse 
Meta-frames  
 
Micro-
Level 
RT’s and CNN’s 
Communicative 
Genres (e.g. 
narrative) 
Sub-frames 
Textual Frame 
Analysis 
 
Visual Frame 
Analysis 
 
Intertextual 
Frame 
Analysis 
 
 
Table 5.1. Discourse and Frame Analysis 
 
 
The aim of this study is to deconstruct how the issues were organised within the discourse in 
such a way that they created certain meanings by analysing the structural aspects of framing. 
As some scholars of communication studies have noted, in journalistic practice, frames are 
known to also guide journalists who often construct their narratives based on ‘common sense’, 
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without thoroughly questioning where this ‘commonality’ originates. The argument is that the 
frame-building process is often a result of constant communicative exchange between 
journalists and elites (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Hänggli & Kriesi, 2012; Tuchman, 1978). 
In other words, the work of frame promoters, that is journalists, is influenced by a number of 
internal and external factors that include the day-to-day editorial policies, informed by the 
culture within which reporters function, as well as the procedural factors such as the search 
for the news content that can be broadcasted (Scheufele, 1999). In particular, getting access to 
political speeches often requires less journalistic effort than getting access to the site of a 
military attack. Informed by this notion, frame analysis allowed me to demystify the deep-
seated character of political narratives transmitted through media, with its multiple 
rationalising components at the tactical level of discourse (see Table 5.1). The performed Case 
Study I allowed me to uncover these structural elements of the frame-building process by 
showing the way in which the coverage of the crisis was structured by RT and CNN.  
 
The time-frame for this Case Study I analysis was from 22 August to 29 September 2013. On 
the one hand, I scrutinized 39 half hour news bulletins on RT, which could be accessed through 
the network’s online archive52. To attain the relevant source material, I applied sampling 
methodology and selected rotating 12:00 and 17:00 bulletins every second day. On the other 
hand, I examined 27 one-hour news bulletins on CNN, excluding weekend news, rotating 
morning and afternoon issues, which could be accessed via the British Library’s Multimedia 
Archive. Overall, my analysis comprises 46,5 hours of video material. This approach was 
applied to the Syria-related packages only.  
 
I collected data using the list of frames method53 that allowed me to track precisely every 
component of the discourse, creating a useful record form for further analysis. In other words, 
the textual and visual methods entailed extraction of the framing devices from the information 
flow. These framing devices are not only linguistic structures, such as metaphors and 
catchphrases, but also visuals, which communicate frames: headlines, keywords, captions, 
conclusions, and sources.54 Such an approach allowed me to unveil different trends, dynamics 
                                                 
52  RT limited public access to its access shortly after I finished the data collection. 
 
53  See Chapter 3 of this dissertation for the details on this method of data collection.  
 
54  For the example of the record form see Chapter 3. 
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that contributed to the construction of the meta-frames. The combination of the textual, visual 
and intertextual frame analysis allowed me to expose the similarities in the ways in which RT 
and CNN framed the issue.  
 
In summary, 99 per cent of the bulletins aired on RT and CNN throughout the chosen 
timeframe included at least one Syria-related package. However, the prominence given to the 
topic fluctuated considerably. I determined the general pattern (see Chart 5.1). For example, 
RT has not developed a model of framing the issue in the beginning of their coverage. 
Therefore, the number of devices as well as the time dedicated to broadcasting the Syrian crisis 
was limited. On 27 August, the first peak point happened when the length of the Syrian crisis 
coverage hit 16 minutes of the airtime, which is more than a half of the whole news bulletin, 
a notable and unusually long reportage in television broadcasting.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Duration of Syria-related News on RT  
 
 
Due to the limit of archived footage of CNN’s coverage (only weekdays were available), there 
are gaps in the data. It was, nevertheless, possible to determine the general pattern of CNN’s 
coverage duration, as Chart 5.1 highlights. Notably, the peak points of Syrian coverage on RT 
and CNN often overlap. This analysis suggests that the two channels chose to give the same 
level of prominence to their coverage of the Syrian crisis, indicating the similarity in their 
0
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agenda-setting strategies. Moreover, both channels would broadcast Syria-related stories in 
the beginning of the news bulletin, which allows to interpret this editorial choice as the 
example of the channels chiming in with the rhetoric of the elite. In particular, President 
Obama’s and President Putin’s words were the most frequently cited source materials for both 
channels.  
 
In traditional journalistic practice, reporters tend to follow the unspoken rule of presenting 
sources in such an order that the most prominent speaker appears on air first. Bearing this 
communication strategy in mind, I was expecting RT to introduce the Russian official side 
first, followed by the point of view of the rivals, the US in this particular case. However, RT 
consistently refrained from employing this technique. In fact, the channel’s coverage was 
predominantly structured around the narratives of the Western officials (see Table 5.2). For 
example, in their coverage of the Syrian crisis, RT often starts the news by delivering US 
official statements followed by independent commentators and reports from the ground. The 
number of Russian sources was surprisingly small (23 per cent), while American and those 
who supported their position on intervening in Syria appeared live or were cited in the news 
packages 36 times (30 per cent). The largest prominence was given to independent sources 
which supported the Russian non-intervention position on the chemical crisis in Syria (35 per 
cent). In only 11 per cent of the broadcasts, Syrian officials and citizens were mentioned. The 
amount of time dedicated to broadcasting opposing points of view, thus, was notably higher 
than the direct promotion of Russian stance on the issue. This quantitative comparison 
highlights that RT’s coverage strategy is primarily organised around counter-framing Western 
interpretations, sustaining the notion of Russia’s defensive rhetoric. CNN, on the other hand, 
utilised a more traditional style of direct communication (see Table 5.2). For instance, 
President Obama and members of his administration were cited or appeared live in 60 per cent 
of the broadcasts, while spokespeople of the UN or other independent sources were only 
present in the 30 per cent of the broadcasts. 
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RT Framing Sources CNN 
23% Russian Sources 15% 
30% Experts from USA 60% 
11% Syrian Government and 
Pro-Assad Groups 
1% 
35% Independent Sources 30% 
 
Table 5.2. The Proportion of Sources Appearance on RT and CNN 
 
In practice, the commentators on RT usually appeared in the middle or towards the end of a 
news package and often deconstruct US frames. As I briefly mentioned in Chapter 5, RT is 
the international broadcaster that explicitly represents ‘Russia’s point of view’ on international 
affairs. In fact, the network’s employees confess that their invitations to participate in the 
programmes are often refused by experts in the West (Interview 2). Hence, the channel often 
tries to prove its credibility in the eyes of Western viewer. For example, RT makes a clear 
emphasis on “independent guest speakers”, mostly English-speaking pundits. RT’s guest 
producers deliberately select commentators according to their anti-Western political position 
(Interview 1). Aiming at the Western audience, RT thus picks speakers who are relatively 
close to the public environment, which makes them a more trustworthy source for delivering 
the meanings than representatives of the Russian government. CNN, as a well-established 
international news outlet, mostly relies on its own correspondents’ reports rather than guest 
speakers or even original sources. Moreover, they often (7 times throughout the case study) 
introduce their reporters in Syria as “the only Western correspondent on the ground”. It is 
possible to interpret this phrasing as implicitly suggesting to the audience that non-Western 
media are less reliable sources of information than the liberal media. 
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c. Meta-Level Framing 
 
Overall, both channels structured their coverage around a similar framing formula, which, 
within the conceptual framework of this research, is the structural level of discourse. Thus, 
meta-frame contains a number of structural elements that organize the discourse within it. For 
example, RT and CNN structured their interpretation of the situation in Syria and the 
international conflict around it through assigning four dichotomous metaphors, 
peacemaker/mediator, aggressor(rival), victim, and enemy, to the actors that were involved in 
the conflict: Russia, USA, Syrian Government and Pro-Assad Groups, Rebel Groups (see 
Table 5.3). Thus, within RT’s interpretation, Russia appeared as protecting the Syrian nation 
from the aggressive American invasion. Within this discourse, Syrian Government and the 
supporters of the Al-Assad family are treated as victims of the potential strike by the US. The 
rebel groups fighting the regime are thus labelled terrorists and are put on the discursive side 
of the enemy. 
 
RT Framing Subjects CNN 
Mediator Russia Rival 
Aggressor USA Peacemaker 
Victim Syrian Government and 
Pro-Assad Groups 
Enemy 
Enemy Rebel Groups Victim 
 
Table 5. 3. Meta-level Framing.  Case Study I 
  
CNN, on the other hand, vilified Assad by consistently suggesting that his administration 
should be held responsible for the chemical attack, which put him at the enemy spectrum of 
the discourse. The rebel groups, within this framing, are portrayed as the victims of the 
unending regime. By discursive legitimization of the humanitarian intervention, CNN 
constructed the USA as the world’s ‘policeman’. Thus, Russia appeared to be a rival that, 
pursuing its own interests, which are not aggression-free, is doing all in its power to prevent 
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the White House’s benevolent activities. In other words, both channels framed their Syria-
related stories, albeit a small minority, around the world security crisis, the meta-level framing.  
 
These dichotomous categories, or the pillars that metaphorically hold together meta-frames, 
were crystallized as a result of connotative analysis.55 These are, of course, the result of my 
‘subjective’ interpretation of the discourse. However, the employed methodology that 
followed several stages of analysis, including data collection, coding as well as the connotative 
stage, allow me to present these as rather stable structures of discourse. The detailed 
intertextual examination of RT’s and CNN’s discourse that will follow in the next sections of 
this chapter will present the linguistic and visual evidence to support my identification of the 
meta-frames.  
 
Examining RT’s output during the chosen period crystallised the following sub-frames, all of 
which contributed to the construction of the meta-frame that organized the channel’s coverage 
of the Syrian crisis. These sub-frames are the dynamic units of meaning that in practice imply 
that the channels invoked certain contexts to construct particular tactical interpretations of the 
events, either to frame or counter-frame the rival discourse. Some of these contexts were thus 
appealed to by RT only, other sub-frames also appeared on the CNN:  
 
❖ Humanitarian 
❖ Legitimacy 
❖ Chemical Controversy 
❖ Threat 
❖ Diplomacy 
❖ War as Business 
❖ Historical Mistakes 
❖ Terrorism 
❖ Multiculturalism 
 
The coverage of the Syrian chemical crisis was notably dense in sub-frames, which is clearly 
an indication of the level of evaluation that was given to the issue of Syria. However, in this 
analysis, I am not interested in these nine sub-frames per se, but rather how they are used to 
                                                 
55 For the details on methodology see Chapter 3 of this dissertation.  
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construct the overall meaning of the events – in other words, how these frames work in 
delivering the general message of RT. Examining CNN’s coverage of the same issue allowed 
me to identify the following sub-frames: 
 
❖ Humanitarian 
❖ Legitimacy 
❖ Chemical Controversy 
❖ Responsibility 
❖ National Security 
❖ War as Business 
❖ Credibility 
 
These sub-frames work as the discursive anchors that implicitly link the particular events to 
the contexts desired by the frame sponsors. The following Tables 5.4 and 5.5 demonstrate 
which particular sub-frames worked to construct separate elements of the meta-frame. In 
particular, these building blocks allowed the frame sponsors of RT and CNN to define abstract 
challenges as more concrete ones by attributing the metaphors of protector, victim, enemy and 
aggressor/rival to the actors involved in the conflict. For example, RT would consistently 
invoke the context of US involvement in Libya and Iraq, labelling these as the historical 
mistakes of the superpower, downplaying the White House’s argument for the humanitarian 
intervention in the country. By utilizing this frame, RT thus evokes the metaphor of an 
aggressive power that is pursuing its own political interests in the region. This is further 
enhanced by pointing to the corporations in America that could potentially benefit from such 
an involvement by supplying arms to help the rebel groups fight against Assad, invoking the 
war as business frame 56.  
 
Table 5.4 demonstrates that RT mainly focused on the creation of the protector component of 
the meta-frame. This was also the dominant focus of CNN’s coverage that used the same 
number of sub-frames to construct the positive image of the US that perceives the situation in 
terms of national security and thus promoted the pro-intervention frame. CNN seemed to be 
less concerned with the victim imaging, while emphasising that Russia’s stance on Syria as 
                                                 
56  More examples will be discussed in the following sections of this chapter. 
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well as the UN are obstacles on the way to ensuring peace for the world, the sub-frames that 
contributed to attributing the rival metaphor to Russia (see Table 5.5). 
 
 
Meta-
Frame Mediator Victim Enemy Aggressor 
Sub-
Frames 
Diplomacy Humanitarian Humanitarian Threat 
Legitimacy Terrorism  Chemical Controversy 
Historical 
Mistakes 
 Multiculturalism Terrorism War as Business 
   Chemical 
Controversy 
 
Table 5. 4. Meta and Sub-frames relationship in RT’s coverage of the Case Study I 
 
 
Meta-
Frame Protector Victim Enemy Rival 
Sub-
Frames 
National Security Humanitarian Humanitarian Credibility 
International Law Terrorism / Enemy  Chemical Controversy Obstacle 
Pro-Intervention  Terrorism / Enemy 
War as 
Business 
Responsibility   Chemical 
Controversy 
 
Table 5. 5.  Meta and Sub-frames relationship in CNN’s coverage of the Case Study I 
 
 
The following sections of this chapter will further unpack how these contexts were not only 
used to directly promote the interpretations desired by the frame sponsors but were also 
invoked in order to counter the rival narratives at the tactical level of the discourse.  
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d. Tactical Level Framing 
As I outlined in the Chapters 2 and 3, the linguistic and visual frame analysis make it possible 
to extract frames from the discourse. This section applies the structural framing lens to unpack 
the tactical level of framing. In particular, it shows the tactical mechanisms of counter-framing 
through the intertextual analysis of the visual and textual data to track the contexts of the sub-
frames discussed in the previous sections of this chapter that form the meta-frame. Within this 
framework, the mechanisms of framing cannot be fully separated from counter-framing. 
Therefore, it is crucial for the study to trace framing devices within the two discourses as part 
of the dialogue. In particular, I applied intertextual analysis to identify the contextual 
responses of RT’s narratives to CNN’s narratives by looking at how these contexts were 
textually and visually enacted. 
 
i. Textual Framing and Counter-Framing 
Counter-framing is traditionally understood in IR and Communication Studies as the process 
of deconstructing opponents’ ‘frames’ by “shining new light on the events” (Squires, 2011, p. 
33). In other words, journalists or officials explicitly identify initial frames of the opponents, 
make audiences aware of them and invite the public to question their understandings of the 
events. Counter-frame sponsors do it through applying a number of new frames and therefore 
shifting the understandings. 
 
I approached the initial stage of my empirical research with the above definition in mind. 
However, I quickly noticed that the process of counter-framing can also take very different 
shapes. In particular, by tracing the links between the contexts that RT and CNN appeal to, it 
became evident that conceptualizing counter-framing as a linear process substantially limits 
our understanding of the process in practice. The trend that crystallized was that counter-
framing does not necessarily include substituting the initial frame with a radically new one, 
but is rather often practiced in the following ways: At the meta-level of the discourse, counter-
framing can be understood as the practice of one channel to employ the same meta-frame that 
is used by its discursive rival, but to reattribute the structural metaphors within the formula to 
the different actors of the conflict. 57 
                                                 
57  See Section c of this chapter for more details on the meta-level framing.  
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At the tactical level of discourse, counter-framing can entail explicitly identifying frame 
sponsors’ countering intentions by employing specific references to the initial frame. Within 
the intertextual methodology, this type of countering is defined as the vertical intertextuality 
(Fairclough, 1995).58 RT, for instance, uses this technique rather explicitly, making it a useful 
example for the analysis. In particular, the channel often directly quoted US officials’ 
statements followed by a response of the channel’s anchor. For example, the following extracts 
from RT’s coverage show how the channel’s journalist directly engaged with the proposal 
made by US Secretary of State John Kerry to intervene in Syria: 
 
US Officials RT 
 
“According to Kerry,  extremists 
would not benefit  from the strike .”  
 
 
“Reports on the ground and the great 
many experts suggest the opposite .”  
 
“There is no other way but to bomb 
Syria and Russia blocked the 
condemnation of the chemical 
attack.”  
 
 
“In fact,  Russia blocked only  those 
resolutions that att ributed the blame 
to Assad without c lear evidence.”  
 
 (RT, 4 September 2013). 
 
Thus, RT directly responds to Kerry’s statement, suggesting that there is a potential attempt 
to deceiving the public and suppressing the real situation on the ground. At the same time, RT 
denies the White House’s allegations that Russia is deliberately blocking US attempts to solve 
the situation. Employing similar discursive techniques, CNN, giving their own interpretation 
of the events, also often tends to deconstruct Russia’s countering:   
 
“The counter-narrative that Russia has been propagating is <…> while this report will 
potentially undermine this argument” 
(CNN, 5 September 2013). 
 
With this statement, CNN essentially claims to counter RT’s counter-frame. Consequently, the 
virtual dialogue between the discourses becomes almost explicit. For example, in order to 
downplay and counter the official Russian perspective on the situation in Syria, CNN uses the 
                                                 
58  See Chapter 3 for the elaboration on the methodological approach to this study. 
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following tactic: An anchor in CNN’s studios brings in the Russian arguments by virtually 
asking questions with an implicit request to their colleague on the ground to disconfirm these 
statements:  
 
CNN’s Anchor in Studio CNN’s Foreign Correspondent 
 
“How do we know that the evidence 
is so strong if it hasn’t been shared 
with the public?” 
 
 
“Many members of congress, many of those who 
wanted to vote ‘no’ said that they are actually 
‘comfortable’ with the evidence, which was presented 
to them about the fact that Al-Assad is responsible for 
the attack, considering that many are weary after the 
Iraq war.” 
 
 
“Why would Assad do this?” 
 
 
“Here people are convinced that Assad is a tyrant, so 
no one is surprised.” 
 
“There is a frustration that many don’t support the US.” 
 
 
 (CNN, 2 September 2013). 
 
Thus, the presenter in the studio gives room for the Russian framing by structuring the 
interview around the main points that were raised by Kremlin. For example, the correspondent 
invokes the Iraq war context that within the case study period had initially been brought up by 
RT reporters. In other words, the extracts cited above showcase how the historical mistakes 
sub-frame was countered by CNN. However, instead of explicitly introducing these topics as 
the Russian official point of view, CNN chose to suppress the source of information. In fact, 
such countering tactic was only possible to track intertextually. Thus, drawing on the 
classifications of Kristeva (1980) and Fairclough (1995), I identify this type of counter-framing 
as constitutive, or inter-discursive.59 Although both types of counter-framing were employed 
by CNN and RT, the latter inclines toward direct countering. This is, perhaps, the most 
distinctive feature of its broadcasting style. Thus, for example, at the tactical level, RT counter-
framed CNN by bringing in the direct quotation of Obama (the same extract was also broadcast 
on the CNN) and explicitly deconstructed in on air by pointing to the rhetorical nature of his 
statement: 
 
                                                 
59  See Chapter 3 for the review of intertextual method of analysis and Chapter 7 for the comparative 
discussion on how these two kinds of counter-framing were employed in practice.  
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US Officials  RT  
 
Barack Obama:  
 
“I believe that the US has 
responsibility  to engage in 
affairs  of other sta tes”  
 
 
RT’s correspondent:  
 
“But it  doesn’t guarantee that the US  
will  act responsib ly .”  
 
Eric  Draitser ,  an “independent 
geopolitical analyst”:  
 
“Obama uses this rhetoric  to put 
himself above everyone, above Putin,  
above China….”  
 
 
 
 (RT, 28 September 2013). 
 
As shown in the above extract, RT engages with the initial frame that was initially promoted 
by the US political elite and then adopted by CNN. In turn, RT deconstructs it, making the 
audience aware of the underpinnings of the American rhetoric. Hence, RT delegitimizes the 
authority of the US president by pointing to his rhetorical agenda to promote an interventionist 
narrative that is interpreted by RT as an attempt to forward America’s hegemony in the world. 
At a meta-level, this sub-frame process contributes to a shift in the reconstruction of the USA 
from a benevolent peace protector to an aggressive “warmonger” (see section b of this 
chapter).  
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As I argued in Chapter 1, the value of focusing the research on the tactical elements of discourse 
lies within its ability to expose the dynamics of interaction. In other words, this work sees 
counter-framing as a strictly relational process, which emerges as a response to opponents’ 
framing. In this respect, tracking sub-frames as the contexts that migrate from one narrative to 
another allows us to also see the evolution of the tactical approaches of the frame sponsors. By 
analysing the sub-frames, I noticed that the channels often changed their tactical approach as 
part of the reaction to the sub-frames appeared on the rival channels. For instance, the question 
of responsibility for the chemical attack in Ghouta was the main point of contention between 
the discourses of RT and CNN. Within CNN’s coverage, the chemical controversy frame 
evolves over time. In the beginning, there is scepticism of whether the evidence of the ‘alleged 
chemical attack’ is relevant at all, suggesting that the truth will never be unveiled and therefore 
this fact should be dismissed. In all of his speeches, President Obama was strongly pushing for 
an immediate intervention. According to the White House, the UN investigation could slow 
down the process: 
 
“[Waiting for] UN findings may not be an option for the military planner as they might 
take weeks” 
  (CNN, 27 September 
2013). 
 
Another relevant argument CNN was sponsoring was that “a lot of evidence could be 
destroyed,” suggesting that “loyal to Assad forces” could be responsible for the attack, “some 
of which operate very independently” (CNN, 29 September 2013). This argument evokes a 
demarcation between the US as stable, predictable force and Assad’s government as the enemy, 
or in this particular case, an authority, which lacks legitimacy and control over their own 
military forces.  
 
This type of framing was mainly used in the first part of the case study (from 22 August to 15 
September). On 16 September, when the UN was ready to announce the investigation results, 
CNN shifted its rhetoric. Rather than opposing the UN investigation, CNN, following the US’s 
official narrative, used the news as a confirmation of Assad’s blame, undermining the 
credibility of Russia’s statements. Hence both channels engaged into the discursive ‘blame 
game’, which upon comparison, took shape of the following cross-talk: 
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RT 
 
CNN 
 
“US have been quick to blame 
Assad”  
 
“US blame game over UN Syria 
chemical attack report”  
 
“Chemical war crime 
controversy” 
 
(RT, 17 September  2013).  
 
“Russia’s evidence is not being 
taken into account”  
 
(RT, 18 September  2013).  
 
“…The rebels might be responsible ,  how 
embarrassed Russia wil l  feel?”  
 
(CNN, 16 September  2013).  
 
“Russians strongly  reject any 
suggestion that the Syrian government 
was responsible  for the chemical 
weapons attack in Damascus,  but this 
isn’ t how other world powers see it”  
 
(CNN, 17 September  2013).  
 
“Some of the Russian anger wi ll  be  
tempered by the fact that the UN 
investigators are going back in”  
 
(CNN, 18 September  2013).  
 
 
 
The extracts cited above show how CNN changed its initial approach to covering the 
responsibility for the Ghouta attack. In particular, the channel first chimes in with the official 
discourse of the White House and argues that the attempts to investigate the attack will delay 
the US’s rapid retaliation. Then, CNN adopts the approach originated on RT to the issue, the 
chemical controversy sub-frame. This discursive tactic started from CNN subtly suggesting 
that Assad’s regime might have benefitted from the attack to treating the Syrian government’s 
responsibility for the attack as a common place.  
 
These interdiscursive dynamics highlight the tactical nature of counter-framing. The example 
discussed above shows how both channels chose to use the sub-frames according to the short-
gain effectiveness60 of the framing devices employed by RT and CNN. Thus, within a very 
short period of time, the sub-frames get adopted by the rival channel to then be forwarded 
back to the initial frame sponsor.  
                                                 
60  Here I do not refer to the overall framing effects but to the frame-sponsors tactical aims.  
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The following section will unpack the way in which this was achieved through a detailed 
interpretation of the sub-frames. 
 
Historical Mistakes Sub-Frame 
 
In order to counter President Obama’s pro-intervention narrative, RT often evoked historical 
mistakes sub-frame that was briefly mentioned above. By doing so, the channel shifts meanings 
towards portraying the US as an aggressor and a threat rather than a guarantor of the World’s 
security. Thus Russia, within RT’s framing, unlike America, does all in its power to protect the 
world from another disaster caused by the American “warmongering”. CNN’s correspondents, 
on the other side of the discourse, often tend to undermine Russia as a global power, while 
maintaining US legitimacy as the only superpower that is able to resolve the conflict in Syria 
and thus save millions of lives. In particular, the historical mistakes sub-frame links the 
chemical conflict in Syria to the war in Iraq, or the “American invasion” in Iraq. Within this 
sub-frame, RT also often evokes Yugoslavia bombing and even the context of the Vietnam 
War, the latter is mentioned in two news pieces. The comparison is usually achieved by the 
combination of the linguistic structures and images. In terms of the linguistic structures, RT 
often uses the following catchphrases in order to evoke the desired image in the audience, 
which are usually used within one TV piece: 
 
“America’s murky past”, 
“US painting Syria-Iran-Hezbollah axis of evil”,  
“Bush’s mistakes”, 
“Syria: War Similarities”, 
“Iraq US led invasion”, 
“US might be embarrassed”, 
“western finger pointing”, 
“unintended consequences”, 
“US double standards” (RT, 2013).61 
 
 
                                                 
61  As these phrases appeared repeatedly in the broadcasts throughout the case study period, the following 
references will not further detail specific dates but refer to the analysed material collectively.  
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Replying to the arguments which RT raised in their coverage almost in every Syria-related 
piece, CNN’s anchors and correspondents emphasise President Obama’s promises that it would 
not be a ‘full-scale intervention’ but rather ‘limited strikes’ (CNN, 3 September 2013). Thus, 
CNN counters RT’s historical mistakes frame and defends Obama’s pro-intervention rhetoric 
by suggesting that this time the evidence of the chemical attack is real: 
 
On-screen quote: “People want to see proof”, 
 
Background voice of a correspondent: “US will issue their report that will prove that 
Syrians did use chemical weapons”, which will include: “… intercepted 
communications” and “forensic data” (CNN, 30 August 2013). 
 
While covering the Syrian crisis, CNN thus seemed to have been prepared for the discursive 
attacks, and immediately countered the sub-frames of RT that invokes the war in Iraq and other 
“US failures in the Middle East” (RT, 2013). 
 
New Threat Sub-Frame 
 
Apart from framing the Syrian crisis as an issue of a recurring ‘American mistakes’, the meta-
frame component of aggression was enhanced by the continuous usage of the new threat sub-
frame. The feeling of a looming disaster, which is coming from the West, was mainly created 
by the linguistic structures within the headlines, which would usually appear in the subscripts 
to the news pieces. The results of the analysis allow me dividing the identified frames into 
groups according to the linguistic intensity of the vocabularies. For instance, expressions such 
as ‘war weary’ would be rated 3 on a scale from 1 to 5, while phrases such as “Obama is ready 
to bomb Damascus” would be rated 4. This classification is helpful in assessing the evolution 
of the narrative within the chosen time frame: 
 
“… aggressive language of US administration” {2}, 
“Syria: Trigger Timer” {2}, 
 “Syria: Countdown to War” {4}, 
“Syria: Fumes of War” {4}, 
 “Obama ready to strike” {5}, 
“US war machine” {5}, 
“US officials bang the drums of war” {5} (RT, 2013). 
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While RT was aiming to link the metaphor of threat to the US intervention as a new horrific 
treat, CNN’s “Western correspondent on the ground” portrays the situation in Damascus as a 
“mood of uncertainty rather than fear” (CNN, 2013). This hidden counter-narrative intensifies 
when CNN’s correspondents reply to Russia’s “fears of the regime change” in Syria. They 
emphasise that Obama’s administration’s strike would not aim at regime change, but would be 
a rather rapid military intervention, which will only hit local targets “aimed at perpetrators to 
make sure the attack doesn’t happen again” (CNN, 2013).  
 
Obstacle Sub-Frame 
 
CNN devoted a significant amount of its broadcasting time to constructing the image of Russia 
as the blocking element for solving the crisis in Syria. While RT used the “countdown” 
metaphor to create an image of a looming US attack as a threat of disaster, CNN appealed to 
the time-related metaphor to evoke the feeling of time slipping through the global community’s 
fingers, suggesting that if the World does not act now, it might be too late. The following 
catchphrases were often spotted in CNN’s headlines: 
 
“You Cannot Wait Forever”, 
“The Bar Has Been Raised On When You Could Intervene” (CNN, 2013). 
 
The UN and Russia in CNN’s narrative appear as slowing down factors, the system that has to 
be bypassed by the reactive “world police”, which, within CNN’s framing, is represented by 
the US.  
 
War as Business Sub-Frame  
 
For the construction of the US as an aggressor at the meta-level of discourse, RT employed the 
war as business sub-frame. In particular, the channel emphasised that America cannot be trusted 
when it comes to the evidence. But unlike the historical mistakes sub-frame, the war-as 
business framing device is employed to suggest that someone might benefit from another US 
invasion. Textually, this is achieved by the combination of different references. For example, 
RT creates a colourful presentation of the US weapons and military equipment, naming the 
companies which produce it, assuming that these corporations would benefit from the military 
solution. The following catchphrases are also often used in order to encourage the public to 
think of the issue in terms of war as business: 
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 “The talk may be about saving the world from tyrants, but the actions and figures 
also point to big money”, 
 
“US struggles to sell strike” (RT, 2013). 
 
Similarly, CNN also enacts this sub-frame by emphasizing, for example, the ‘friendship’ 
between Russia and Syria, uncovering that it dates back to the Soviet period. The following 
catchphrases frequently appeared in the news headlines as well as were mentioned by anchors 
and correspondents:  
 
“Russia’s factor”, 
“Countries have been in a tight embrace since Soviet times”, 
“Syria has been buying military weapons from Russia”, 
“Ties of blood” (many Russians married to Syrians), 
“Ties of religion” (CNN, 2013). 
 
The channel then suggested that these ties are also business-related, which contributes to the 
reconstruction of Russia as an agent that has a strategic interest in the region. Thus, CNN 
countered the RT’s narrative of Russia’s non-involvement in the conflict.  
 
Diplomacy Sub-frame 
 
In this particular case, RT’s main intention was to promote the image of a diplomatic and 
peacekeeping Russia. The diplomacy frame, for instance, is usually created with the means of 
headlines and catchphrases, such as the following extracts: 
 
“[Russia’s] focus on talks, not strikes”, 
“last diplomatic push”, 
“… diplomatic marathon to avoid possible strikes”, 
“constructive meetings” (RT, 2013). 
 
Once the desired outcome was achieved and the countries signed the UN chemical weapons 
convention, RT explicitly praised Russia’s diplomatic achievements: 
 
“A Landmark Deal on Syria”, 
“Diplomatic Breakthrough” (RT, 2013). 
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However, even then RT did not claim that this was solely Russia’s achievement, emphasising 
collaborative diplomatic work of several countries. This proves RT’s attempt to distance Russia 
from the issue, while focusing on the rightfulness of its political position. All this is aimed at 
constructing Russia as a great power at the meta-level of the discourse. Tactically, this is 
achieved by the continuous emphasis on Russia’s “influential” position in the world that is able 
to counter the “American aggression” in Syria by the means of diplomacy rather than force.  
 
Legitimacy Sub-frame 
 
The legitimacy sub-frame was another framing tactic aimed at constructing Russia as a 
protector in RT’s discourse. CNN also employed this technique to achieve a rather similar 
effect, except for an opposite meta-aim, that of constructing USA as a powerful protector. Thus, 
RT identified Russia with a global policeman whose responsibility is to ensure that all countries 
comply with the international rules and regulations, which in the Syrian case conveniently 
worked in favour of Russia’s intentions. The West, in RT’s discourse, was attempting to break 
the rules of international law and thus posed a severe threat to global security. This message 
was delivered through the words of commentators who would often bring up the following 
linguistic structures, accusing Obama of non-compliance: 
 
“illegal under international law’, 
“Russian president warns against bypassing UN”, 
“international alarm” (RT, 2013). 
CNN, on the other hand, was consistently promoting the argument for an immediate strike. 
Within this framing, the quicker the US gets involved in the conflict, the quicker the situation 
would be resolved. The following catchphrases appeared on the channel:   
“Limited strikes are legal”, 
“it could change things on the ground” (CNN, 2013). 
By invoking the context of legitimacy, CNN adopted the official frame of the White House, 
emphasizing that the administration has the legal right to sanction an intervention without the 
approval of the UN: 
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“Going alone is an option for America, according to the US official, but the US would 
prefer to work with international actors” (CNN, 2013). 
At the same time, it insisted that despite its legal right to intervene without the international 
approval, it would prefer to have the support of other countries. This point textually positions 
the US within the International Law discourse. 
 
Humanitarian, Terrorism, and Multiculturalism Sub-frames 
 
Framing the victim is often an important tactic due to its ability to evoke “resignation, passivity, 
subordination, weakness, powerlessness and dependence” (Mardorossian, 2014, p. 31) and 
therefore proclaiming the dominance of a powerful protector. Thus, this framing works towards 
evoking an emotional response in the audience. Humanitarian, terrorism, and multiculturalism 
sub-frames were often employed together within the news pieces and contributed to the creation 
of the victim and the enemy elements of the meta-frame. Unlike the coverage of the crisis on 
CNN, the large proportion of the Syria-related bulletins on RT included reporting from the 
ground, often from the village of Maaloula, which was, according to RT’s reports, occupied by 
terrorist-linked groups at the time: 
 
Headlines: 
 
“Al Qaeda linked rebels oust army from ancient Christian sanctuary”, 
 
“Ravages of Jihad: Army liberates Christian village” (RT, 2013). 
 
While RT’s report appealed to compassion in the audience, the focus on this village being 
predominantly inhabited by the Christian population links the situation to the context of 
multiculturalism. Thus, along with the emotional reports from the war zone, with images of 
people in pain and grief after losing their homes and loved ones, RT pieces also emphasize that 
the “terrorists” destroy what used to be a unique and multicultural society: 
 
“Syria is a land of history and of love” (RT, 2013). 
 
Therefore, the US who support rebel groups within RT’s framing are on the same side as the 
“evil forces”. RT also put plenty of effort in identifying the “enemy”, which in their 
understanding were rebel groups and terrorists fighting together. To confirm this, RT’s Maria 
Finoshina, the foreign corresponded on the ground who was embedded with the Syrian army, 
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interviewed Syrian citizens who would blame the opposition groups and emotionally condemn 
their violent actions against the nation. The following headlines and catchphrases were often 
used to support this image: 
  
“Syria ends the extremists’ reign of terror in Maaloula/Rebels linked to Al-Qaeda”, 
“War of God: Mapping Syria’s Jihad and the flow of religious mercenaries”, 
“Global Jihad chose Syria as a battlefield”, 
“Jihadists’ aims go far beyond just toppling Assad” (RT, 2013). 
 
Thus, the victim framing contributes to constructing Russia as the protector that, within RT’s 
discourse, aims to save the democratic society in Syria, which is under threat. This resulted in 
the defensive response from the CNN correspondents, 60 % of which remained ‘pro-
intervention’ throughout the coverage of the crisis. In order to reconstruct President Assad as 
an evil force, the channel employed the following linguistic structures: 
 
“The US strike may be more dangerous than the regime because Assad will blame 
America for the massacre” 
 
“The more they (the regime) are backed into a corner, the more vicious they become” 
(CNN, 2013). 
 
Thus, the fact that the chemical strike took place is treated as a proof of President Assad’s 
responsibility for the attack, portraying him as a ruthless ruler who acted against his own 
people. Such framing once again invites the audience to think about the issue in terms of Syrian 
government as an evil force and the US as a protector and the guarantor of the world’s security.  
 
Pro-intervention and Anti-Intervention Sub-frames 
 
The anti-intervention sub-frame was one of the most common in the RT’s output messages 
throughout the coverage of Syrian crisis. Notably, RT’s correspondents as well as 
commentators hardly ever mentioned explicitly that the US should not intervene, but in order 
to achieve this effect, RT employed the proof by contradiction logic. In other words, RT was 
continuously unveiling all the risks and possible damages, which the US intervention in Syria 
might trigger. For example, the warning that Israel might suffer from a provocation attack due 
to the new threat of US intervention was in RT’s headlines three times: 
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“Chemical Reaction: Provocation attack warning. Direct threat to Israel” (RT, 2013). 
 
Moreover, by avoiding direct non-intervention statements, RT focused on reporting opinion 
polls of the US public instead, which were contradicting President Obama’s position. RT 
repeatedly mentions Obama’s lack of support from the other Western countries, yet again 
isolating Russia’s bias in the situation. The following catchphrases are often used in headlines 
and by RT reporters: 
 
“fatally flawed Syrian intervention”, 
“Has Obama lose his appetite for war or not? Amid lack of support from home and 
abroad”, 
“Obama struggling to gather international support”, 
“Obama isolated”, 
“Divided war leaders”, 
“Obama failed” (RT, 2013). 
 
Within CNN’s discourse, the above-mentioned sub-frames of RT were continuously being 
dismissed, and the channel was promoting the pro-intervention narratives throughout the 
coverage. The following phrase is an example of the kind of linguistic framing tactic the CNN 
employed to achieve this meta-level aim:  
 
Josh Earnest, Deputy White House Press Secretary: “Other totalitarian dictators around 
the globe should see that the international community will not tolerate the use of chemical 
weapons” (CNN, 2013). 
 
  
 
 
142 
ii. Visual Framing and Counter-framing 
In most of the broadcasts, the visual and linguistic cues do not directly speak to each other but 
rather covertly communicate with the audience through association. Hence, in order to extract 
the meaning from the visual information, the research was conducted in two stages: denotative 
and connotative.62 In other words, I looked both at the primary level of meaning in the visual, 
and the ‘added’ meaning resulted from the arrangement of this image within the structure of 
TV packages through editing. As I argued in Chapter 3, the combination of audio and visual 
framing material often works at enhancing the meaning of messaged. At the same time, 
employing visual material tactically allows the frame sponsors to obscure the very intentions 
of promoting ideas. In other words, persuasion has a more powerful effect on the audience if 
it integrates both flows of information. 
 
For example, RT often edited together the Syria-related footage and the archived videos of the 
conflicts with the American involvement in Iraq and Yugoslavia. Thus, on 28 August 2013, 
RT broadcast John Kerry giving a speech that justified the US viewpoint on the Syrian 
chemical crisis. The footage was immediately followed by the archived interview with then 
US Secretary of State Colin Powell and the sequence of shots capturing the US invasion in 
Iraq. Hence, RT created a clear link between the potential US strike in Syria and the war in 
Iraq, suggesting to the audience that the solution proposed by the US will lead to the similar 
devastating consequences. In this respect, the particular interpretation is constructed through 
juxtaposing unrelated visuals in such a way that draws an associative parallel between the 
current situation and the historical one. The visuals thus enrich the textual framing by 
metaphorically serving RT as the ‘proof’ that enhances Russia’s argument that the US is 
repeating the mistakes of the past.  
 
Another example of RT employing this montage technique to create an emotional effect in its 
audience was the tactical effort to construct the US as an aggressor. For example, a 
humanitarian TV piece shows Syrian citizens who are clearing the basements in preparation 
for the US strike. RT immediately cuts from those Syrian citizens to President Obama’s pro-
intervention speech (RT, 2 September 2013). With this, RT is delivering the message that the 
US threat is even more frightening than the on-going civil war. 
                                                 
62  See Chapter 3 of this dissertation for the detailed methodology.  
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CNN, for example, often uses similar techniques, while aiming at creating an opposite effect. 
For example, CNN often emphasised the Russia-Syrian friendship. In order to enhance this 
visually, the channel showed multiple images of President Assad and President Putin shaking 
hands or having an entertaining conversation, while their anchor is reading the news about 
Russia’s position on Syria and their anti-intervention proposals. This montage tactic adds 
another dimension to the argument that Russia supports Assad due to the economic and 
political ties with the country rather than their genuine peace-making interests. By choosing to 
deliver this notion through the visual channel, CNN is able to convey the message in a less 
direct manner. 
 
Another example of CNN’s visual framing tactics is demonstrated in Captions 1 and 2. In the 
news analysis piece headlined Russia Watching Syria’s Back, the correspondents provide 
possible scenarios of how the American strike could unfold. In order to complicate the targeted 
strikes of the US, the state “we know that the Syrian government” are moving the deposits of 
chemical weapons close to the hospitals (CNN, 2 September 2013). This narrative is 
accompanied by sequence of shots in the background that begins with an image of the Syrian 
chemical weapons stockpiles (Caption 1), followed by the video of an explosion (Caption 2).  
 
 
 
Caption 1. Montage on CNN (CNN, 2 September 2013)  
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Caption 2. Montage on CNN (CNN, 2 September 2013) 
 
This embeds the implicit message into the narrative that President Assad’s regime would be 
responsible for all the potential civilian casualties after the US strikes. Framing the enemy thus 
dominates both the visual and the textual tactics of the channel. It is important to note that the 
example discussed above is not a conventional TV package but rather a synthesis of an 
interview, a piece-to-camera, and a report that is enriched by the use of computer graphics.  
 
RT also extensively utilises graphics in order to enhance the clarity of the message to the 
audience. It is particularly noteworthy how RT uses video material within its tactical counter-
framing. In broadcasting, graphic material is often aimed at simplifying the textual information 
and ensuring that the most important elements of the message are salient. Thus, in order to 
enhance the tactical effort to sub-frame the US as the threatening force that is able to act 
‘unilaterally’, RT employs visual framing by visually separating the blocks that are in support 
of strikes against Syria and the countries that are against the intervention (Caption 3). This 
technique enhances significantly the interpretation by drawing the metaphorical ‘us’ and 
‘them’.  
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Caption 3. Graphics on RT (RT, 7 September 2013 
 
Caption 4 is another example worth elaborating on due to its powerful graphics, tantamount to 
the war-time propaganda posters. In particular, it plays with the icon of American freedom by 
transforming the figure of freedom into the symbol of war. The fire element signifies tragedy, 
set against the background of the Syrian nation, denoted by the flag of the country, that is 
unable to win this lingering and bloody war.  
 
 
 
Caption 4. Graphics on RT (RT ,5 September 2013) 
 
The use of the Statue of Liberty in order to subvert the original symbolism of the icon may 
have been borrowed from the Soviet posters, such as, for example, the famous propaganda 
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print of the 1970s Svoboda po-Americansky63 (Prorokov, 1971) that portrays the statue as 
unhappy and crying as opposed to the traditional glorious connotation. The juxtaposition of 
the image and the headline as depicted in Caption 4, adds another dimension of meaning to the 
visual, that encourages the audience to think in terms of a media war in which the US is a clear 
‘villain’, in RT’s discourse. A similar pattern can be traced in Caption 5. Similar to Caption 4, 
this visual worked within the threat sub-framing and enhanced the image of the potential US 
strike as a looming disaster, a ‘time-bomb’ that is uncontrollable and can go off at any moment.  
 
 
 
Caption 5. Graphics on RT (RT, 9 September 2013) 
 
 
Importantly, both examples, Captions 4 and 5, showcase how the textual and visual information 
on television work in synergy to convey meaning. Unlike words that have the ability to provide 
detailed explanations and add concreteness to phenomena, images work with resemblance and 
similitude, engaging with the practice of figuration. In this respect, visuals are less connected 
with the rationalising component of framing but more focus on familiarising the audience with 
the new information through bringing in the contexts they are accustomed to. Moreover, apart 
from the rare no comment streaming, television images are predominantly supported by the 
textual comments that contextualises the visual information. In this respect, journalists engage 
in several layers of framing. First, the image is framed through the choice of camera focus; 
second, the images are packaged within a news piece through the selection of shots; third, the 
                                                 
63  Russian: Freedom American-style. 
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text/scenario further arranges these images by adding another layer of interpretation. In fact, 
the textual sub-frames often explicitly manifest themselves in the visuals. For example, Caption 
6 demonstrates how RT pushed the narrative that Russia aims to solve the problem peacefully. 
Here, the protest sign is juxtaposed to the on-screen caption “Russia wants Syria Chemical 
Demilitarisation in Four Stages”, which brings an added meaning to the visual frame. In 
particular, the caption works as a confirmation of the US public anger with President Obama’s 
push for strike and helps construct the international support of Russian anti-intervention policy. 
This is enhanced through the symbolic elements, such as the peace sign enclosed in the “o” 
letters. In fact, it is unclear whether this protest is in any way connected to President Putin’s 
calls for diplomatic solution, but the skilful selection of this particular image and packaging it 
together with the caption creates the effect of public approval. 
 
 
 
Caption 6. Word and Image on RT (RT, 12 September 2013) 
 
CNN also employs the combination of visual and textual meaning construction. In Caption 7, 
the presenter reports on the possible scenarios and the nature of the US military strikes in Syria. 
Here, the image of the US military is titled “Command and Control”. Although this is an official 
US army term, it gains a rhetorical undertone in CNN’s hands. In particular, the channel’s sub-
framing was structured around the idea that the potential US strikes would take form of fast, 
precise, victim-free attacks, specifically targeting Assad’s chemical weapons deposits. Thus, 
with the help of pictorial tools CNN constructs the image of the US as a skilful peacekeeper 
that is able to achieve quick and ‘clean’ conflict resolution.   
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Caption 7. Word and Image on CNN (CNN, 27 August 2013) 
 
Captions 8 and 9 further highlight how the channels combine their textual and visual framing 
techniques to counter the rival interpretations at the tactical level of discourse. For example, RT 
often operates with the so-called ‘citizen-journalist’ materials, obtained through various social 
media platforms, which is, in fact, an important component of conflict reporting today (Ahva 
& Hellman, 2015). An example of this is depicted in Caption 8. Interestingly, the channel does 
not have the authenticity claims regarding this image. On the contrary, the caption states that 
these photographs are “unverified pics”. This journalistic technique allows to safely run the 
visual material without the risk of being accused of lies. 
 
However, in the case of the Syrian crisis, this was also tactically used to achieve a rather 
different persuasive target. Bearing in mind that RT continuously doubted the fact that chemical 
strike took place in reality, by using the “unverified footage” caption that accompanied almost 
every visual of the chemical attack victims, RT reinforces this suspicion in the audience, 
suggesting that the footage is a ‘fake’, ‘disinformation’. In fact, the channel chose to focus on 
its own report from the ground in order to construct the  
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Caption 8. Citizen Images on RT (RT, 3 September 2013) 
 
 
enemy. Thus, RT aired the stories of devastated areas in Syria, reported by its correspondents, 
embedded with the Syrian army (Caption 9). These pieces bring the violence of the terrorist 
groups that fight against Assad into the focus. 
 
 
 
Caption 9. Reports from Syria on RT (RT, 15 September 2013) 
 
 
CNN, on the other hand, used 30 per cent more disturbing images than RT, sourced from the 
social media platforms of the Ghouta chemical attack footage as well as other attacks in Syria. 
CNN thus utilised a method which usually evokes an emotionally negative response in the 
audience and devoted long-time pieces to the analysis of the chemical attack’s effects on the 
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victims (see Caption 10). These are used as proof that the chemical weapons were used, the 
blame for which, in CNN’s framing, was automatically attributed to President Assad’s regime.  
 
 
 
Caption 10. The Use of Citizen Images on CNN (CNN, 29 August 2013)  
 
An important dimension of visual framing is the depiction of political leaders. Notably, 
President Putin appeared on RT only three times throughout the period under scrutiny in the 
case study, while President Obama was shown five times as much. In part, this can be 
explained by Putin’s PR tactic. Unlike Western politics that values rhetorical speeches, 
Kremlin’s relations with the press is based on the smaller frequency of public appearances. 
This technique makes public addresses to be perceived as more substantial, inducing the 
public to discuss one speech for longer periods of time. The fact that RT reduced the 
appearance of President Putin on air, while keeping showing Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Sergey Lavrov, who is more associated with diplomacy than Putin, might also suggest that it 
was RT’s deliberate tactic. Putin has an image of a powerful ruler, and RT might have been 
wary of the unwanted association they could have invoked if they broadcast the Russian 
president too often. Even when RT was reporting Putin’s letter to the American citizens, 
which was published by the New York Times, his image was never shown. Instead, the 
graphics on the screen displayed bits of the letter, where Putin expresses his concerns and 
mentions international law. RT used the following headline for the news: “Putin’s ‘Plea for 
caution’ warns of diminished role of international law” (RT, 2013). In turn, RT directed its 
attention to depicting Sergey Lavrov (Caption 11).  
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Caption 11. Depiction of Political Figures on RT (RT, 15 September 2013) 
 
 
CNN, by contrast, extensively broadcasted images of Obama and Putin in their coverage of the 
Syrian crisis. The example in Caption 10 depicts one of the cases in which the channel 
employed three forms of discourse: visual, verbal, and written. Here, the selection of this 
particular image of Putin, which portrays him as an assertive personality, reinforced by the 
caption on screen “Putin’s Influence” and supported by the commentator’s narration, evokes 
associations of an assertive if not aggressive leader, driven by self-interest rather than the 
genuine (“true”) motives (Caption 12).  
 
 
 
Caption 12. Depiction of Political Figures on CNN (CNN, 14 September 2013) 
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This contrasts substantially to the relaxed, conversational tone of Obama’s interview (Caption 
13), bringing the US president closer to the audience and subtly detracting the viewers’ 
attention from the constructed aggressiveness to a more familiar image of a calm and 
responsible leader.  
 
 
 
Caption 13. Depiction of Political Figure on CNN (CNN, 9 September 2013) 
 
Another noteworthy element that Caption 11 contains is the “message” metaphor in the 
headline. This feeds back to the idea of the ability of international broadcasting to serve as an 
implicit platform for political conversation. This example represents the case when the space 
of the dialogue transcends the borders of official communications, reinforcing the argument of 
this dissertation that television is an important facet of international relations that should not 
be dismissed in the discipline. 
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e. Conclusion 
By analysing the linguistic and visual structures surrounding RT’s and CNN’s narratives, this 
case study exposed the various tactical framing techniques that in turn contributed to the 
construction of the meta-frames promoted by the two channels. Overall, the overarching 
message of RT’s and CNN’s coverage was that of non-intervention and pro-intervention, 
respectively. Interestingly, the metaphorical formula for constructing the actors involved in the 
conflict was the same on both channels. Thus, as illuminated through the analysis of the Syrian 
case study, in order to gain rapid political outcomes, states tend to appeal to similar normative 
arguments directed to essentially the same audience, which allows me to conclude that Russia 
and the USA exist within one normative environment. 
 
The argument that originates from this is that the ideas that underpin the tactical messages 
conveyed through sub-framing are less relevant for the frame sponsors than the meta-level 
formulas, which are the ultimate units of discourse. This notion counters the argument that 
Russia promotes a distinctive ideology that is based on opposing the West’s ethical norms.64 
Rather, it shows that the discursive manifestation of Russia’s desire to be perceived as a great 
power is often reflected in rather contradictory discursive messages that are reactive and 
defensive. Moreover, paying particular attention to the tactical framing mechanisms allowed 
me to unveil the dynamic nature of the discourse that manifests itself through the contagious 
nature of sub-framing and is often subject to various communicative distortions.  
 
The following Chapter 6 will continue looking at the levels of framing to further unpack the 
relationship between the strategic and tactical elements of discourse by analysing a different 
conflict of international politics, the Crimean Crisis.  
 
  
                                                 
64  See discussion in Chapter 1. 
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Chapter 6. 
 
Case Study II: Framing the Crimean Referendum 
 
 
“Vladimir Putin has put boots in the ground – over the airwaves, he is taking the 
west on a tour of the propagandist’s playbook” 
(Yuhas, 2014). 
 
 
a. Introduction 
The annexation of Crimea in March 2014 has been and remains a point of contention 
between Russia and the West. Despite President Obama’s warnings, the events on the 
ground – including escalating mass upheaval, President Yanukovych’s flight from 
Ukraine and the emergence of separatist movements in Crimea – led to a rapidly 
coordinated referendum on whether the republic should join Russia or remain part of 
Ukraine as an autonomous republic. The result on 17 March in favour of joining Russia 
was followed the second day by President Putin’s signing of a bill integrating Crimea 
to the Russian Federation. While Kremlin stated that it was guided by its genuine 
interests to protect compatriots and acted within international law, the West, including 
Ukraine, considered the referendum illegal (Sengupta, 2014). Similar to the Ghouta 
attack coverage, an international political crisis resulted in a heated tactical game 
between the two rival broadcasters to promote their interpretation of the events. Both 
networks prioritized interpretation over investigation when reporting the conflict.  
This chapter exposes this discursive battle by applying the analytical lens of framing 
and counter-framing to the audio-visual output of RT and CNN. It showcases the trends 
and dynamics at the tactical level of framing, the process that entails continuous cross-
referencing between the rival channels. By applying textual, visual and intertextual 
analysis to the Crimea-related news that RT and CNN broadcasted, I was able to trace 
the sub-frames that were tactically enacted by the channels within their strategic 
attempts to construct meanings on the meta-level.   
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This chapter follows the same structure as the pervious case study. Thus, section b 
presents the overview of the RT’s and the CNN’s coverage, followed by section c on 
meta-level framing that unveils strategic aims of frame sponsors when covering the 
Crimean referendum. Section d deals with the tactical level and showcases how the two 
channels exchanged sub-frames throughout the case study. This is presented through a 
detailed analysis of the textual and visual data. Section e concludes this chapter.   
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b. Case Study Overview 
In order to examine RT’s rhetorical response to CNN’s coverage of Crimean crisis and 
vice versa, I applied textual and visual analysis to the 30-minute extracts from the news 
broadcasting of both channels. The data collection within the Case Study II employed 
sampling methodology based on the news points selection. The news points refer to the 
signifying events that have an information value that triggers a new TV package to 
appear on air. In other words, the specifics of 24-hour news broadcasting, scheduled to 
run news bulletins every hour, often requires the channels to repeat pre-broadcasted 
stories with very little proportion of the added news material appearing on air. Thus, 
structuring the analysis around those points allowed me to pinpoint issue-specific and 
thus pertinent audio-visual material. The time frame for the case study covered the 
period between 20 February and 19 March 2014. According to the chronology of the 
events, I picked the following news points: 
23-24 February 2014, pro-Russian demonstration are held in Sevastopol, the 
capital of autonomous republic of Crimea. 
27-28 February 2014, unidentified groups of people take over the Supreme 
Council of Crimea and other sites across Crimea, which leads to the Aksyionov’s 
appointment to the government in Crimea. 
1 March 2014, Russian parliament approves the use of force in Ukraine; Putin 
hasn’t signed it off yet. 
11 March 2014, Crimea declares independence from Ukraine. 
16 – 17 March 2014, Crimean people vote in the status referendum with 96,77 
per cent supporting integration with Russia. 
These news points correlated with the chronologically nearest daily news programmes. 
Thus, I watched 26 half hour news bulletins, rotating between 12:00 and 17:00 bulletins 
on RT with the focus on Crimea-related stories only. These were accessed through the 
British Library’s Multimedia Archive65. Similarly, I watched 21 one-hour news 
bulletins on CNN, excluding weekend news, rotating morning and afternoon issues, 
                                                           
65  RT limited public access to its online archive access shortly after I finished the data collection 
for the Case Study I. 
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also accessed via the British Library’s Multimedia Archive. Overall, 33.5 hours of the 
issue-specific audio-video material were analysed. 
Case Study II scrutinised rhetorical justifications surrounding the Crimean crisis by 
exposing the textual and visual structures through which the events were framed and 
counter-framed by RT and CNN. Thus, the aim of this chapter is to illuminate both how 
framing and counter-framing are employed as persuasive tools and with which 
particularities they are functioning. This is highlighted by studying two different levels 
of discourse: the macro-level, where strategic framing and counter-framing operates, 
and the micro-level, where the tactical sub-frames can be identified and intertextually 
traced. Strategically, both channels employed framing and counter-framing in order to 
promote their interpretations of the events in Crimea.  
Analysing the sources that RT and CNN used in their coverage, the study exposed that 
both channels were predominantly focused on discussing Russia’s moves and the US 
role in the crisis, while paying considerably less attention to the wishes of the Crimean 
people. In particular, RT often aired interviews or directly cited the speeches of Russian 
officials (54 per cent). The second most frequent source of information for the Russian 
broadcaster were officials and experts from the US, whose statements would often be 
countered by the channel (22 per cent). The channel devoted nearly the same 
broadcasting space to the representatives of Ukrainian Interim Government (19 per 
cent) and only 10 per cent to Crimean citizens (see Table 6. 1).  
 
RT Framing Sources CNN 
54% Russian Sources 39% 
22% Experts from USA 28% 
19% Ukr Interim. Govt  24% 
10% 
Crimean People.  
Other Sources 
4% 
 
Table 6. 1. Sources on RT and CNN 
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A rather similar prioritizing model was used by CNN. Thus, the channel very often 
cited or directly interviewed Russian sources (39 per cent), particularly focusing on 
Kremlin apparatus. At the same time, the channel broadcast the official statements of 
the White House (28 per cent) and very commonly cited the speeches coming from the 
Ukrainian Interim Government (24 per cent), devoting as little as 4 per cent of their 
reporting to interviewing Crimean people. 
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c. Meta-level Framing 
As the analysis revealed, RT structured its meta-frame around the notion that Russia 
has legitimate geopolitical interests in the Crimean region and, therefore, Crimea 
joining Russia is the only truly just way of resolving both the identity and governance 
crisis on the peninsula. Kremlin and Crimean Russians, within RT’s coverage, appear 
on the “right” and “democratic” side of the conflict, while both the Ukrainian interim 
government and the US, stirring turmoil in the country, are labelled “nationalistic” and, 
consequently, “evil” forces. CNN, by contrast, focused on Russia’s aggressive mood 
and its efforts to “intervene” in the conflict, constructing USA as a mediating force. 
Thus, Yatsenyuk’s government, within CNN’s discourse, is portrayed as democratic 
and peaceful as opposed to pro-Russian forces in Crimea.   
Both channels employed identical framing strategies for their coverage of the Crimean 
crisis. Similar to the previous case study, CNN and RT focused on providing the 
audience with the guidelines on how to understand the events through assigning three 
metaphorical dichotomies of protector/aggressor, provocateur/ mediator, 
victim/enemy to the structural framing subjects of the issue: Russia, the US, the 
Ukrainian interim government, and the Crimean people (see Table 6. 2).  
 
RT Framing Subjects CNN 
Protector Russia Aggressor 
Provocateur USA Mediator 
Enemy Pro-Maidan Kiev Victim 
Victim  Pro-Russian Groups Enemy 
 
Table 6. 2. Meta-level Framing. Case Study II 
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In CNN’s coverage, for example, Russia appears as an aggressive force that 
destabilises Eastern-Ukrainian region. The US in this discursive space is portrayed as 
mediator between the democratic and peaceful Ukrainian government and the violent 
separatists in Crimea under the control of Russia. In RT’s narrative, America is 
labelled provocateur which aims at destabilising Ukraine and supports the illegitimate 
anti-Russian government. Russia, in this case, is assigned a role of the protector that 
looks to shield the population of Crimea from Kiev’s aggressive policies.  
 
These ‘labels’ were crystallized during the coding process that took place at the 
connotative stage of this research and combined linguistic and visual materials.66 It is 
important to disclaim that these labels, which some framing scholars define as 
“archetypes” (Van Gorp, 2010), are the result of interpretive investigation that does 
not aim to provide objective claims but rather to highlight the dominant patterns of the 
representations. In this respect, it is possible to suggest that another researcher would 
have labelled these elements of the meta-frame differently. Despite the boundaries of 
subjectivity that frame-analysis operates within, the inferences generated through this 
method of inquiry allow deconstructing elements of discourse to highlight the 
processes of meaning construction. The chapter thus will continue to unfold these 
patterns through presenting detailed discursive evidence, both textual and visual. 
 
The findings of the case study suggest that both channels mainly focused on justifying 
Russia’s and the US’s actions rather than providing their audience with the detailed 
reportage from the ground. In order to construct these four pillars that organize the 
structure of the meta-frame, both RT and CNN employed a number of sub-frames that 
the following section will unpack in greater detail. These sub-frames, operating at the 
tactical level, are thus the building blocks of the strategic structure of discourse that is 
aimed at promoting a particular interpretation of the event. However, they are applied 
in a more targeted way, compared to meta-framing, and thus are better able to deal with 
reactive reporting that is characteristic of the daily news genre. Thus, examining RT’s 
output during the chosen period crystallised the following sub-frames: 
  
                                                           
66 For the details on methodology see Chapter 3 of this dissertation.  
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❖ Threat 
❖ Legitimacy 
❖ Illegitimacy 
❖ Democracy 
❖ National Security 
❖ Double Standards 
Similar to the previous case study, I identified these sub-frames as rather broad 
contexts that were invoked by the channels in order to promote a tactical interpretation 
of the events within the chosen time frame of the case study. Most of the sub-frames 
enacted by RT were also employed by CNN; however, the way in which the two 
channels used these contexts differed starkly. Thus, the focus of this study was less on 
the normative nature of these contexts but rather on the structural relationship between 
these sub-frames and the overarching meta-frames of the discourse. Examining CNN’s 
reporting of the Crimean crisis, I extracted the following sub-frames from the 
discourse: 
❖ Threat 
❖ Legitimacy 
❖ Illegitimacy 
❖ Democracy 
❖ Diplomacy 
❖ Responsibility 
As highlighted in the previous chapters, my methodological approach does not aim at 
unpacking each of these sub-frames as stand-alone elements of discourse but rather at 
analysing how these contexts work together to shape an overarching meta-frame. In 
this respect, I looked at the way in which the units of visual and textual meaning 
implicitly link together the contexts to the particular actors of the context. In other 
words, the channels guide the audience to make an intuitive association between an 
issue and the tactical interpretation that is promoted by the frame sponsors. For 
example, RT consistently invoked the Russo-Turkish Wars, 67 the bloodiest battles that 
                                                           
67  This refers to the series of Russo-Turkish Wars, which took place in 1676-81, 1687, 1689, 
1695-96, 1710-12, 1710-12, 1735-39, 1768-74, 1787-91, 1806-12, 1828-29, 1828-29, 1856-56 
(the Crimean War), and 1877-78. As a result of these wars, Russia extended its territory 
southward, which included the Annexation of Crimea in 1783.  
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carried lives of hundred thousand elite troops of the Russian Empire and were 
eulogized by the poets of Russian Golden Age. Thus, the reference emphasised the 
symbolic meaning of Crimea for the Russian identity. This tactical sub-frame, in turn, 
works both to vilify the Ukrainian interim government, portraying them as violently 
anti-Russian, and at the same time constructs Russia as a benevolent protector of its 
compatriots in its closest geopolitical neighbourhood. Thus, at a meta-level, this frame 
contributes to the building the structural elements of protector, victim, and enemy (see 
Table 6.3). 
 
Meta-
Frame Protector Victim Enemy Provocateur 
Sub-
Frames 
National Identity National Identity National Identity Double Standards 
 Threat Threat Threat 
Democracy Democracy Democracy  
Legitimacy  Illegitimacy   
 
Table 6.3. Meta and Sub-frames relationship in RT’s coverage of the Case Study II 
 
Table 6.3 also illuminates how RT actively engaged in enemy framing by invoking a 
large number of sub-contexts to construct the image of the “violent” and “anti-
democratic” government in Kiev. At the same time, the channel employed the national 
identity sub-frame that was aimed at constructing protector, victim, and enemy 
elements of the meta-frame. Also, the double standards sub-frame was used to 
downplay the USA’s arguments that Crimean referendum is illegal, the tactical 
framing aimed at constructing America as a destabilising the Eastern Europe region 
provocateur. Within CNN’s coverage, appeals to violence, legitimacy and illegitimacy 
were among the most frequently enacted sub-frames that worked towards constructing 
an image of aggressive Russia that forced Crimeans to vote for joining the country 
“under a barrel of a gun” (CNN, 2014). Less sub-frames were utilised to construct the 
USA, which indicates that the channel insisted on the USA’s distant role as mediator 
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of the conflict rather than a role of an actively involved and thus interested actor (see 
Table 6.4).  
Meta-
Frame Aggressor Victim Enemy Mediator 
Sub-
Frames 
   Responsibility 
 Democracy  Democracy 
Threat Threat Threat Diplomacy 
Illegitimacy Legitimacy Illegitimacy  
 
Table 6. 4. Meta and Sub-frames relationship in CNN’s 
coverage of the Case Study II 
Overall, looking at the strategic formulas of RT’s and CNN’s discourses allows me to 
understand their strategic framing. In other words, these formulas show the primary 
discursive terms within which the channels operate to provide the public with their 
explanation of the events. The following section of this chapter deals with the tactical 
level of this process. Although the two are tightly interlinked, as showcased in the 
tables above, looking closely at the way in which tactical sub-frames contribute to the 
construction of the overarching discursive structure allows me to trace dynamics and 
thus understand certain controversies and inconsistencies that manifest themselves 
through the various genres of communication. 
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d. Tactical Level Framing 
As this study has argued earlier, counter-framing is common in today’s communicative 
space due to its tactical, rather than strategic efficacy. This notion allows to revisit the 
traditional understanding of persuasive practices, which is thought to operate through a 
set of lies and deceptions. Notably, the factual information that the two channels 
operated with –  in particular the images from the Crimean Peninsula and the quotations 
of the official representatives – had very little margin of difference. However, the way 
in which this material was used expressed rather polar interpretations. This section will 
present the results derived from the linguistic and visual frame analysis and the 
intertextual examination. In particular, the focus of the three methods of analysis was 
on producing a detailed picture of how the contexts migrate from one discourse to 
another and thus create an inter-network dialogue. In turn, this affected the way in 
which sub-frames and thus tactical interpretations were subject to communicative 
distortions of the rival discourse and thus evolved throughout the time frame of the case 
study.  
 
i. Textual Framing and Counter-framing 
As discussed in the previous Chapter 5, framing and counter framing are part of one 
process of meaning construction. In this respect, intertextual analysis allowed me to 
take a better look at the dynamic nature of this process. Firstly, the findings of the 
second case study illuminated that the dialogic relationship between the discourses can 
manifest itself in several ways. The classification of the two types of counter-framing 
proposed in the previous chapters applies to the Crimean crisis as much as it applied to 
the Syrian crisis. Firstly, I will focus on the explicit referencing of the context that was 
initially enacted by the rival channel, or the vertical intertextuality.68  This type of 
explicit countering employs efforts to identify the opponent’s framing and encourages 
the audience to question these meanings. Commonly encountered in RT’s narratives 
technique included pointing, often unambiguously, to CNN’s coverage of the Ukrainian 
crisis, showing captions from the reports of their discursive rival. Linguistically, RT 
often defends President Putin’s role in the crisis: 
                                                           
68  See Chapter 3 of the dissertation for the details on the methodological framework of this 
research.  
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Headline: “Western coverage of Ukraine crisis blames Putin for all the turmoil”, 
“Blaming Russia for the chaos has become a recurring theme in mainstream 
coverage even though president Putin clearly distanced himself from the 
situation” (RT, 23 February 2014). 
This was commonly complemented with labelling Western news outlets as being 
hostile towards Russia. For example,  
“Hate-driven media coverage of the events”, 
“America having Cold War attitudes about Russia”, 
“blame game” (RT, 23 February 2014). 
Condemning the way in which Western media covers the events, therefore, 
demonstrates RT’s efforts to play down the impartiality of the news outlets. By doing 
so, such counter-framing seeks to win over the rival’s audience and consequently 
prepare the ground for instilling their interpretations of the events. Moreover, this 
reveals that framing is a reversible process. To be more precise, the same framing 
mechanism can be received, deconstructed and forwarded to the opponent. In fact, re-
evaluation of stereotypes and promoting alternatives, as its determinant components, 
can be exercised via direct as well as indirect channels. 
Intertextual analysis allowed me to trace a more implicit form of reinterpreting the 
events in a way that is constitutive or interdiscursive counter-framing. Unlike the 
vertical tactic, interdiscursive technique works with hidden cues. In particular, it 
refocuses the narrative from the opponent’s interpretation by providing an alternative 
view, but the source of original framing remains suppressed in this case. An important 
example of this phenomenon, encountered in the Crimean crisis case study, was RT’s 
and CNN’s contextual choice in their coverage of Yanukovych’s flight from Ukraine, 
followed by the citizens wandering around his expensive house. Importantly, RT did 
not show Yanukovych’s ‘palace’ on screen, refocusing audience’s attention from his 
lavishness, while emphasising that ‘extremists’ threatened him. Therefore, the images 
of Ukrainians wondering around his house, had an opposite effect from the one, created 
by CNN. In particular, the wondering public is no longer seen as demos, but rather seen 
as threatening to the country’s peace element. For example, 
“Ruptured Revolution: Yanukovych asks Russia to protect him from extremists”, 
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“Yanukovych: Decisions on Ukraine’s new parliament not legitimate” 
(RT, 27 February 2014). 
Compared to CNN: 
“Ukraine at a crossroad: Ousted Pres. Yanukovych accused of mass killings” 
(CNN, 24 February 2014). 
Hence, in RT’s narrative, Russia is given the structural role of a peacemaker, while the 
interim government of Ukraine along with unidentified supporters is regarded 
“extremists”. CNN, on the other hand, structures its discourse around the personality of 
the pro-Russian president, focusing on his near-criminal style of ruling Ukraine. Thus, 
countering processes involve an evident demarcation between ‘us’ and ‘them’, or 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ (see Tables 6.3 and 6.4 for meta-level framing). Tactically, RT links 
this story to their report from Simferopol on “the rise of ultra-nationalists”. In this vein, 
groups of ‘pro-Russian’ activists that took over the local parliament and raised the 
Russian flag on top of it are constructed as protecting force against the backdrop of 
“nationalists coming to power”, as narrated by RT. This preventive countering tactic 
illuminates that in anticipation of the “blames” that would emanate from the ‘rival’ 
sources, the channel is ready to take the defensive stance. Thus, such mechanism of 
implicit countering is limited to an event with a well-defined time frame, actors 
involved, and operates through the use of ‘concrete’ contexts and references with a 
limited number of metaphors.  
Another example of such parallel counter-framing is RT’s and CNN’s coverage of the 
Referendum day. On 16th March 2014, vast crowds gathered on Simferopol’s Lenin 
Square in celebratory mood, showing an unambiguous picture of pride and victory, as 
portrayed by both channels. There were fireworks, emotional speeches, and patriotic 
songs. Interestingly, the happiness of people, looking forward to joining Russia wasn’t 
a matter of contention between the two discourses. It was rather the nature of this 
contentment that was at question. Thus, instead of denying or suppressing Crimean 
people’s excitement to join Russia, CNN’s narrative focused on the predictability of 
the referendum’s results, denoting them as “no surprise to anyone”.  Such phrasing 
made it difficult to recognise the rightfulness of these celebrations. Moreover, their 
coverage emphasises that the voting was ‘controversial’ and ‘hastily organised’ in a 
very limited political process. For example, 
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“… there hasn’t been any political space for the pro-Ukrainian votes to actually 
be heard by voters here” (CNN, 16 March 2014). 
Such sceptical analysis of the seemingly cheerful events enables CNN to portray an 
event as a mockery of a democratic process instead of the victorious manifestation of 
people’s choice, as RT interpreted it. In order to enhance such effect, CNN employs 
generalisations which link the voting to all political processes in Russia. For example, 
“Like many political decisions made in Russia, it is about endorsing political 
decisions made by people considered to be their leader and not by giving a choice 
between two competing sides” (CNN, 16 March 2014). 
What is noteworthy is that such phrasing unveils the underlying assumption that 
Crimea, while not technically part of Russia, is already being ruled by Kremlin, even 
before the voting process is completed. While focusing on the lack of legality in the 
voting process, CNN also highlighted the role of Russia’s hard power in influencing 
the referendum’s outcome: 
“Completely manufactured referendum with the barrel of a gun, with 
Russian troops present” (CNN, 16 March 2014). 
RT, by contrast, covered that day in all the traditions of glorious war-time rhetoric, 
labelling the event a “historical referendum”, emphasising that it was “democracy in 
action”. Moreover, the channel often employed cultural and social links with Crimea: 
“We feel like we are going home!” (RT, 16 March2014). 
Apart from focusing on the referendum’s outcomes, the major point of discursive 
contention between RT and CNN was the essence of the choice given to the people. In 
particular, the wording of the question in the ballot paper, although never explicitly 
shown in CNN’s or RT’s coverage, was interpreted by both channels in rather different 
manners. Thus, CNN’s correspondents kept mentioning that Crimean people did not 
have an opportunity to stay in Ukraine. For example, 
“{T}he choice was to become part of Russia or virtual independence”  
(CNN, 16 March 2014). 
While, for example, Vladimir Pozner – a prominent Russian journalist – in his interview 
to CNN states: 
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“No, you are wrong. The choice was to become part of Russia or to stay in 
Ukraine” (CNN, 16 March 2014). 
This implicit assumption that the Crimean people are not given even a formal choice to 
stay in Ukraine points to the rhetorical tactic of CNN. According to the ballot paper, 
the first question asked the voters in three languages whether they “support reunifying 
Crimea with Russia as a subject of the Russian Federation”, while the second question 
indicated an option to restore “the 1992 Crimean constitution and the status of Crimea 
as a part of Ukraine” (BBC News, 2014). However, none of the channels provides 
extensive details on what either of these options would mean for the Crimean people, 
but rather simply imply one or another interpretation of the fact. Employing this 
persuasive technique, therefore, both encourages the audience to view the situation in 
terms of unambiguous realities and normalises the frame sponsor’ narrative. This 
reframing strategy thereby demonstrates the tactical efforts of both channels to 
construct meanings in the discursive space of a single undeniable fact.  
Below I will further unpack the way in which the sub-frames were used by looking at 
the sub-frames. 
 
National Identity Sub-frame 
The findings of this research demonstrate how RT structured its coverage of the 
Crimean crisis within the context of Russia’s historical and cultural ties with the region. 
In other words, the focus on the Crimean people who identify themselves as Russians 
discursively places the peninsula within Russia’s geopolitical space. At the same time, 
such rhetoric, invoking heroic framing in the tradition of American presidential oratory 
(Shaw, 2010), implicitly positions contemporary Russia at the power level of the US. 
CNN, on the other hand, continuously countered this sub-frame. 
In RT’s textual space, Russia appears as key to maintaining stability and therefore 
resisting Western aggressive efforts in Eastern Europe. RT’s correspondents, 
employing countering techniques, often emphasise the USA’s lack of knowledge about 
the region. For example, 
“<…> hate driven media coverage of the events, especially when it involves 
events so far from the US and so close to Russia” (RT, 23 February 2014). 
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Moreover, commonly emphasising that 87 per cent of Crimean population are 
ethnically Russian, RT links this to the idea of national identity. In this respect, the 
peninsula is metaphorically detached from Ukraine in RT’s discourse, which is often 
reinforced by references to the “nationalist” threat that the Russian-speaking population 
of Ukraine is facing since the Maidan events. The following linguistic structures were 
employed to achieve this effect: 
“People are more and more concerned about nationalists coming to power and 
they will stand here to protect their national identity” (RT, 27 February 2014). 
In fact, RT explicitly points to the issue of identity and often elaborates on the meaning 
that Crimea constitutes for Russian citizens. References to Russia being “close” to the 
Ukrainian conflict have several dimensions of meaning. On the one hand, this 
emphasises Russia’s geopolitical sphere of influence; on the other hand, it implicitly 
refers to the country’s cultural unity. The key to understanding this ideological structure 
is that united Russia, for example, apart from being the name for the ruling party, is 
also a symbol that has been historically linked to the war context. Starting from the 
Kievan Rus, the idea that Russia can only withstand foreign aggression by uniting its 
entire people, erasing the peaceful time differences and tensions, has been embedded 
in war-time narratives (Fedotova, 2007). Crimea, in this respect, has been central for 
Russian identity, pervading political and academic discourses (Kiselev, 1994; Starikov 
& Belyaev, 2015). This notion provides explanation for why RT commonly invoked 
historical background for the events, particularly focusing on the events surrounding 
Crimea becoming part of Ukraine and the reasons behind the high share of Russian 
population on the peninsula. Within the national identity sub-framing, RT often 
implicitly links the situation in Crimea with the concept of ‘the right side of history’. 
This commonly used phrase in contemporary Russian political discourse is an 
interesting linguistic structure. Encountered in almost every debate about Ukraine, 
Crimea and sanctions, this formula serves as an absolute argument to support 
essentially any claim. In the case study, this structure was rarely encountered coming 
from RT’s journalists but was often introduced by quotes of witnesses on the ground, 
commonly accompanied by the following linguistic elements: 
“Historic referendum!” (RT, 16 March 2014). 
“It’s time for justice to prevail!” (RT, 27 February 2014). 
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Coming from a source directly involved in the conflict, the latter phrase intends to 
evoke compassion towards the Crimean people who are on the verge of a ‘historically 
right’ change. National identity framing, therefore, both encourages the public to view 
the crisis in terms of unambiguous moral truths by appealing to justice with elements 
of praise. Significantly, the same phrasing was used by President Obama, as appeared 
on CNN, in his rhetorical efforts to condemn Russia’s moves in Crimea: 
“Russia is on the wrong side of history on this”, 
“we are strongly supportive of the interim Ukrainian government” 
(CNN, 3 March 2014). 
This counter-framing example indicates that the same linguistic structure is used to 
promote a polar evaluation of the situation. Moreover, both channels, explicitly 
appealing to the public’s sentiment, neglect substantiating their claims. This indicates 
that such linguistic structures, being commonly employed by various public figures, 
have entered the international realm of ‘common sense’. In this respect, the normative 
dimension of frames transcends the ideational borders indicating that the global media 
communication that manifests itself in the discursive conversation between channels 
dictates its codes to its users.  
Within RT’s national interest framing, the channel often villainises the role of the West 
in the Eastern Europe’s turmoil, emphasising that Ukraine is inherently Russia’s sphere 
of concern. The discursive strategy, often utilised to deliver this notion, employed citing 
pro-Western ‘experts’. For example, 
Headline: Western Influence 
Gorbachev: “Issuing recommendations is unacceptable” 
(RT, 24 February 2014). 
These words, coming from the former President of the Soviet Union and today a 
renowned critic of President Putin, seemingly instil the audience with an impression 
that the content is less partial than the one delivered by Kremlin’s officials, which 
exemplifies an attempt to legitimise this tactical interpretation. Far from being an empty 
rhetoric, this statement also condensed the deep-seated belief in Russia’s distinctive, 
non-Western path. The Ukrainian revolution, in this respect, is seen as an epitome of 
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American expansionist efforts and unwillingness to respect Russia’s geopolitical 
interests.  
Headline: Russia responds to West Threats 
“West helped create crisis; people are priority” (RT, 3 March 2014). 
CNN, by contrast, denies that Russia has the ability to act according to a consistent and 
overarching strategy. The channel portrays the country as being driven by sentiment 
rather than logic – be it irrational moods or Putin’s egomania. In particular, CNN 
deconstructs the genuineness of Russia’s national interests in the region by focusing on 
Putin’s ‘fears’ that Maidan revolutionary spirits can migrate to Russia. For example, 
Headline: Understanding Vladimir Putin 
“Putin is paranoid about the uprising”, 
“He is not going to let it go easily”, 
“Putin is in a very assertive mood” (CNN, 23 February 2014). 
Evoking this context metaphorically shifts Putin’s image from a peacekeeper to a 
possessive and self-righteous political figure that would not allow Ukraine to be 
separate from Russia, neither geopolitically nor economically. Such framing also 
implicitly links his character to hard power. In other words, portraying Putin as an 
unpredictable political figure works at instilling anxiety in the audience. Moreover, by 
equating Putin to Russia, the channel employs a metonymy, a particularly common 
tactic on CNN. This linguistic device reinforces the representation of Russia as highly 
homogenous, reinforcing the emphasis on the authoritarian element of Kremlin’s ‘rule’. 
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Threat vs. Diplomacy Sub-frames 
Apart from disputing about whether Crimea should belong to the Russian or Western 
sphere of influence, RT’s and CNN’s narratives discursively clashed over the role of 
protector and aggressor. This brought up a threatening ‘them’ versus peaceful ‘us’ 
dichotomy. Within this dialogue, both channels commonly employed enemy imaging. 
In particular, the West in RT’s narrative appears to be ‘cynical’ provocateur, stirring 
turmoil in the country. For example, 
“The West has been taking advantage of Ukrainian’s fragile politics” 
(RT, 27 February 2014). 
Victimisation of Ukraine in this case serves as a threat constructing element. In this 
discursive space, the West appears a calculating villain who would not hesitate to 
exploit the unstable situation in the region. The more explicit point of contention 
between RT’s and CNN’s narratives was the presence of Russian regular troops on the 
peninsula or the absence thereof.  
“Moscow’s explanations are that they are unarmed regular forces serving at the 
local Russian navy base that has been permanently stationed at Sevastopol for 
decades” (RT, 27 February 2014). 
Moreover, RT labels these forces as “self-defence groups” who united to protect their 
land and its citizens from the “right wing radicals”, who, according to the channel’s 
interpretation of the events, overtook the government in an “armed coup”. In their 
enemy imaging, therefore, RT links the US to the Ukrainian far-right movements, 
explicitly stating that the US would support any extremist as long as they can facilitate 
“regime change”. The implicit connection between radicals and the US acts as a 
multivectoral technique. It plays down American authority on the one hand, and 
portrays pro-Maidan population of Ukraine as near-criminals, on the other. By contrast, 
in CNN’s narrative, Crimea’s “self-defence squads” appeared as Putin’s troops, 
invading Ukraine, violating its sovereignty. The following phrases were used to identify 
these men: 
“Gunmen seize Crimean regional parliament”, 
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“A convoy of Russian armed personnel has been seen on roads beyond its regular 
limits [beyond the military base], according to the local [interim Ukrainian] PM” 
(CNN, 27 February 2014). 
Significantly, both phrases were used at the very beginning of the social uprising in 
Crimea, having little confirmed evidence of who exactly these people are and whose 
interests they represent. Therefore, the word choice made by both channels testifies the 
ideological nature of it. Interestingly, CNN seemingly admits their rhetorical efforts, 
emphasising that the instability in the region is alarming. For example, 
“Whether the reports are true or not, the situation remains extremely volatile” 
(CNN, 27 February 2014). 
Thus, the escalating conflict dictates its discursive rules. Linguistic expressions evoke 
eerie feelings, which is reinforced by the sound effects. CNN also commonly focused 
on invoking military threat references in relation to the movements in the region: 
 “Risk of Russian boots on the ground” (CNN, 27 February 2014). 
The idea of definitive danger coming from Kremlin was often promoted with the use 
of even stronger language, such as: 
Headline: “Clear Threat: Conflicting reports about military threats from 
Moscow” (CNN, 27 February 2014). 
Thus, CNN potrays the situation in unambiguous terms, continuously constructing the 
evil and threatening Russia. By contrast, RT’s narratives were surrounded by the 
metaphors of ‘protector’ and ‘peacekeeper’. In particular, RT emphasised Russia’s role 
in the crisis, focusing on its mediating strategies. For example,  
“Russia has been a stabilising force in Ukraine since the beginning of the 
turmoil”, 
“<…> calling on Russia to help”, 
“Moscow trying to protect the lives of Russians” (RT, 1 March 2014). 
Within CNN’s narrative, Russia’s ‘protective’ and ‘peacekeeping intents are 
deconstructed and reframed. For example, 
“We heard Moscow say earlier that they will protect Russian human rights in the 
region; all sounds rather ominous” (CNN, 27 February 2014). 
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This clear invitation to doubt Russia’s words is juxtaposed against the US seeking to 
“diplomatically encourage Russia not to [move troops to Ukraine]”. Therefore, the 
counter-framing that CNN utilises plays down Russia’s peacekeeping intentions toward 
Crimea and promotes the idea that the US are acting as such instead. What is 
particularly interesting in CNN’s discursive strategies is that they do not suppress 
Russian-Crimean historical links, but rather often provide an explicit explanation of the 
reasons of unrest on the peninsula. However, this often comes along with reports of 
Russia’s internal military disposition. For example,  
“Russia ordered surprise military exercises” (CNN, 27 February 2014). 
This news was delivered out of context without further elaboration on the exact location 
of these military exercises. Given the context of the Ukrainian crisis, this 
unambiguously suggests the link between the war games and the situation in Crimea. 
This was amplified by relating the tensions between Russia and Ukraine to the US’s 
security. For example, 
“[Russian troops] could move so quickly, the US might not notice it is 
happening”, 
“<…> warning time is cut to zero”, 
“last minute US diplomatic pressure” (CNN, 28 February 2014). 
Time related metaphors are aimed at evoking threat, implicitly linking it to the image 
of ‘aggressive’ Russia. At the same time, the US in this framing appears to be a 
mediating and consequently peaceful force. This effect is enhanced by the associative 
video editing. For example, focusing on the possibility of Kremlin’s military aggression 
in Ukraine, CNN shows archived images of the Russian military war games. Such 
parallel montage metaphorically links military context to Russia’s role in Ukraine. 
CNN, by contrast, countered RT’s narrative:  
“The West doesn’t buy this sort of justifications, because they are unaware of 
these threats or any sorts of danger to Russian speakers in Eastern regions”, 
“Obama is giving Putin a way out” (CNN, 3 March 2014). 
Explicitly denoting Russia’s arguments as ‘justifications’ to get involved in the region, 
CNN, implying the presence of Russian aggression on the peninsula, signifies the use 
of stereotyping technique. By increasing hostility towards Russia, CNN reinforces the 
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US’s positive image through the references to the forgiving president who would not 
deprive Putin of a chance to cool down his temper. 
 
Legitimacy, Illegitimacy, and Double Standards Sub-frames 
The concept of legitimacy has two semantic sides to it, both of which were employed 
by RT and CNN. On the one hand, the channels invoked this context when referring to 
the area of international law; on the other hand, it may also concern domestic politics. 
The international law context was a structural element of both channels’ narratives from 
the moment reports about the upcoming referendum in Crimea appeared in their 
coverage of Ukraine’s unrest. While CNN was mainly preoccupied with the 
illegitimacy of the referendum, RT commonly pointed out the hypocrisy of Western 
judgment when it comes to recognizing or not-recognizing the independence of states. 
For example, 
“The West had nothing but praised Kosovo’s independence, which set the 
precedent”, but “when it comes to Crimea, it is suddenly a very different story” 
(RT, 11 March 2014). 
This framing, which is authentic for RT, is important not only because it allows to 
deconstruct opponents’ rhetoric but also because it prepares the ground for promoting 
justifications for political acts. Double standards, in this discursive space, concern not 
merely the legal framework but also penetrate the realm of Western values. For 
example, 
“But the US turns a blind eye when it comes to provocative statements coming 
out of Kiev” (RT, 1 March 2014). 
By contrast, CNN was not involved in a direct countering of the ‘double standards’ 
frame but rather promoted the US’s official stance on the situation in Crimea. The 
coverage was predominantly structured around Russia being on the wrong side of the 
international law. For example, 
“UNSC stressed importance for countries to exercise restraint”, 
“West warns Russia: Slow down and back off”, 
“UN, NATO, White House urge calm in Ukraine” (CNN, 1 March 2014). 
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Marrying UN, NATO and the US in one sentence implicitly links them to the territory 
of international law, which is responsible for sustaining peace and stability. This 
associative link evokes imageries of a strong and just US as opposed to the 
uncontrollable Russia, which is essentially focused on gaining influence through 
military power rather than abiding by the rule of law. In legitimacy discussions prior to 
the referendum, RT emphasised the idea that the Kiev government is not only 
illegitimate but also takes advantage of its powerful position by hastily introducing 
legislation which is not serving in favour of all citizens of Ukraine. For example, 
“The gap between East and West is growing and some of the legislation passed 
by Kiev is not easing the situation” (RT, 28 February 2014). 
Here, RT refers to the language bill passed by the interim government shortly after the 
Maidan events. The bill repealing the law approved in 2012 cancelled Russian along 
with other regionally spoken languages as a second official language on the provincial 
level in Ukraine. This move by the Yatsenyuk government was labelled by RT as 
‘nationalistic’ and anti-Russian. Within this frame, Crimean people, perceiving it as a 
threat to their rights, were seeking to “move away from Kiev”, as reported by RT. 
Evoking law context functions on the one hand as a tool to reconstruct the opponent’s 
rhetoric. On the other hand, it frames the enemy which is identified as the interim 
government in the following example: 
“An armed takeover of power does not easily fit into the framework of 
International Law, in fact, from the legal point of view it was a power grab” 
 (RT, 1 March 2014). 
Moreover, the use of this framing device is not limited to the exterior of the narration, 
but also partakes in the implicit process when the notion of the illegitimacy of Kiev’s 
ruling elite is delivered through references to the public’s needs: 
“South and East simmer with rebellion as public goes unheard by new 
government” (RT, 3 March 2014). 
Consequently, the context of legitimacy naturally leads to the metaphor of anarchy to 
be invoked. For example, 
“<…> great deal of uncertainty as of who actually holds the power here”, 
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“<…> self-proclaimed leaders in Kiev”, 
“<…> separation from Kiev’s rule” (RT, 3 March 2014). 
Therefore, international law references, appearing in RT’s coverage at the early stages 
of the unrest in Crimea, structured the narrative around the unwillingness of the West 
to admit the ‘lawfulness’ of the events when it does not serve their geopolitical interests. 
Invoking this context allows RT to play down Western authority on the one hand, 
promoting image of Russia as a touchstone for democracy, protecting and satisfying 
wishes of the local population, on the other. 
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ii. Visual Framing and Counter-framing 
In line with the methodological strategy defined in Chapter 3, the analysis of the 
Crimean crisis included the assessment of the way in which the visuals contributed to 
constructing frames at the tactical level of discourse. Similar to the previous case study, 
the evaluation of visuals was conducted in two stages: denotative and connotative. Thus, 
it directed the focus of the research on both, the primary meaning that visuals denote 
and the ‘added’ connotation generated through the various techniques of arranging the 
images in TV pieces. Some of the tactics employed by the two channels, such as 
montage and graphic effects, were similar to the ones highlighted in the previous 
chapter. Other particularities are rather specific to the channels’ coverage of the unrest 
in Crimea. Below I will present how analysing visual information helped me identify 
frames due to the ability of images enhance interpretations. As insightfully noted by 
Fiske and Hartley,  
 
“Television, a highly conventional medium, constantly uses signs that teeter on 
the brink of becoming clichés” 
(Fiske & Hartley, 1978, p. 63). 
 
In fact, the more frequently signs are used and re-used the deeper they become engrained 
into journalistic practice. This recurrence if not repetitiveness of certain images can 
often reduce the more complex and comprehensive representation of events on the 
ground. Applying intertextual analysis to television news allows us to take a better look 
at how the meaning construction is influenced by the normative dimensions of the 
journalistic practice and at the way in which the techniques of media competitors are 
borrowed and advanced as part of the dynamic and changing field. This, in turn, 
broadens our understanding of what informs meaning construction strategies and tactics. 
As Griffin (2004) contends, different media outlets often borrow and reuse photographs 
and video materials of their rivals. In this respect, broadcasters gather a significant part 
of their content from the same pool of news material. Of course, this is not to claim that 
channels operate with the identical images and interview the same people, but some 
patterns of representation are being continuously reinforced. This concerns both the 
ethical norms that are country and history-specific and the influences of rival discourses 
on the news output.  
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This was highlighted in the previous chapter by showcasing how RT employed elements 
of graphic design in the tradition of Soviet propaganda. The channel’s coverage of the 
Crimean crisis is not dissimilar in this respect. RT’s use of colourful means of 
expression is particularly noteworthy. The channel’s broadcasting style often extends 
the boundaries of the neutral, detached manner characteristic of Anglo-Saxon news 
reporting, invigorating their stories with powerful pictorial tools. Caption 14 is an 
example of such visual framing. Here, RT counters liberal media by insinuating that the 
interpretations emanating from CNN and BBC are tantamount to propaganda, inviting 
the public to think in terms of the “word war”. Colours are shouting and associative; 
bullhorns, stop signs supported by the written titling are strongly charged rhetorical 
elements that bring conflict and ideology battle into stark focus.   
 
Caption 14. The Use of Colours on RT (RT, 11 March 2014) 
The Crimean crisis coverage on CNN was likewise dense in signifying elements, 
particularly with respect to the use of military imagery. Images of army equipment are 
highly emblematic in the way that defines the boundaries of meaning through their 
associative effects. Notably, the threat sub-framing is unambiguous in Caption 15. The 
emotional effect is enhanced through the connotative relationship between the image 
and the titling. As semioticians theorize, there are two types of images, depending on 
their ideational charge, “mimetic” picture and “artificial”, or “expressive” image 
(Mitchell, 1986). The first one represents what it “captures”; the latter does not only 
signify what is shows but carries other, abstract meanings that can only be conveyed in 
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words. In this respect, written signs of this image add the interpretive dimension to the 
factual depiction, which is an essential purpose of television production. Thus, using the 
example in Caption 15, it is possible to break down the rhetorical elements that construct 
the threat sub-frame at a tactical level of discourse. Here, the mimetic picture of “the 
little green men”69 is reinforced by the textual title “clear threat” that invites the audience 
to think in unambiguous terms of the Russian danger in the region. In fact, CNN 
continuously rebroadcast these images, creating a pattern of representation that 
emphasised the presence of troops rather than, for example, expanding the focus to 
include other facets of the situation on the ground. 
 
Caption 15. Pictorial Expressiveness on CNN (CNN, 3 March 2014) 
Another example of such visual framing is depicted in Caption 16. Here, the choice of 
footage showing President Putin in the company of army officers emphasises that Russia 
is in “operational control of Crimea.” The intra-frame sentences link the leader’s 
attendance of the “war games” to the Russian “ultimatum to the troops in Crimea”. By 
bullet pointing these statements, the channel intensifies the assertiveness of its 
argument. In doing so, CNN’s sub-framing is polar to RT’s attempts to construct 
Kremlin as protecting and peacekeeping force at the strategic level of discourse.  
                                                           
69  This expression refers to the armed men with no insignia that were present on the Crimean 
Peninsula in the short period before the Referendum. In Russia, they are colloquially referred to 
as “polite people”. 
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Caption 16. Pictorial Expressiveness on CNN (CNN, 3 March 2014) 
 
In order to counter the dominant on CNN threat sub-frame, RT engaged in explicit 
countering, or horizontal intertextuality.70 In Caption 17, for example, RT directly 
engages with “western claims of Russian invasion”, suggesting that these are 
misinformation, part of Western deliberate efforts to delegitimize Russia. 
 
 
Caption 17. Pictorial Expressiveness on RT (RT, 16 March 2014)  
                                                           
70  See Chapter 3 of this dissertation for the definitions of intertextuality.  
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This is reinforced by the vivid textual graphics in the best traditions of Hollywood. Thus, 
the titling, which is moderate in tone, is reinforced by a highly rhetorical statement 
“Tanks, but no tanks”, referring to the news of Russian tanks heading towards Ukraine 
that previously appeared on CNN.  
 
Thus, the dialogue between the channels manifests itself in the use of images. In the 
highly emotional report, depicted in Caption 18, the images play a crucial role in RT’s 
counter-framing efforts by visually enacting the response to rival discourse. Here, the 
correspondent theatrically points to the lack of credibility of the footage that appeared 
on CNN. Moreover, the channel deconstructs CNN’s reporting by indicating that these 
particular “phantom” tanks were captured “50 km away from the border”, adding, 
sarcastically, that the “Western” broadcaster “could have checked the location.” Thus, 
instead of promoting interpretations in a monologic manner, RT explicitly engages in 
the conversation with CNN.   
 
 
Caption 18. Visual Counter-framing on RT (RT, 16 March 2014) 
 
A further example of the way in which counter-framing worked at the tactical level 
visually has been briefly mentioned in the beginning of the textual analysis presented 
in this chapter. Here, I will further delve into the visual aspects of this case. Reporting 
on Yanukovych’s flight from Ukraine, the channels operated with the very different 
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visual materials. CNN, for example, focused on reporting of how the Ukrainian public 
“visited” the former president’s “palace”, highlighting the absurd, immense wealth that 
its walls hid, “while their country stagnated”. Textual interpretations that accompany 
images (Caption 19) clarify the ‘added’ meaning that CNN connotes. Here, the visual 
emphasis is the symbols that evoke association with ‘criminal’ mentality and 
corruption, while the citizens are portrayed as engaging in the rightful act of public 
justice.  
 
Caption 19. Visual Counter-framing on CNN (CNN, 24 February 2014) 
 
RT, on the other hand, maintained that Yanukovych was “kicked out” of Ukraine by 
the “nationalist” protestors in Kiev. Visually, this was enhanced through broadcasting 
the full version of the former president’s press conference, as depicted in Caption 20. 
The choice of images by RT journalist is thus dramatically different to the footage that 
appeared on CNN. The representative and presidential depiction of Yanukovych, 
reinforced by the presence of Ukrainian heraldic, emphases that Yanukovych is still the 
“legal” president of the country. This, in turn, contributes to constructing the interim 
government in Kiev as “illegitimate”, a result of an “armed coup”. 
Later in their coverage, RT invokes military motifs as part of their tactical efforts to 
vilify ‘pro-Ukrainian’ Kiev. Caption 21, for example, depicts the channel’s emphasis 
on the aggressiveness of the interim government, which, in turn, contributes to 
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Caption 20. Visual Representation of Political Figures on RT (RT, 24 February 2014) 
 
constructing ‘pro-Russian’ supporters as a peacekeeping force that is able to protect 
the non-violent Russian-speaking population of Ukraine from the “rule of 
nationalists”. Here, the depiction of tanks in motion serves as the symbolical support 
to the verbal voice-over that erases ambiguity or uncertainty. 
 
 
Caption 21. Depiction of Armed Forces on RT (RT, 16 March 2014)  
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Some scholars have argued that images are worth attending to due to their ability to 
“symbolize generalities”, preparing “pre-existing interpretive schema”, evoking 
associations in a less explicit manner than linguistic structures (Griffin, 2004; Kuhn, 
1995). In this regard, a noteworthy example is depicted in Caption 22. Here, the 
correspondent reports on the High Council of Crimea adopting the Declaration of 
Independence, presenting the event in the positive light, pre-emptively engaging in the 
potential conversation with the counter-discourses through references to the matter of 
Kosovo. The presenter, however, does not in any way comment the image that we can 
see on the screen. Thus, it implicitly supports the overarching narrative of the piece 
through promoting the notion of Russian-speakers in Ukraine asking Kremlin for help.  
 
Caption 22. Image and Word on RT (RT, 11 March 2014) 
 
CNN also uses the images from the streets of Simferopol, although the commentary 
that supports the visual depiction in Caption 23 calls the truthfulness of this support 
into question, suggesting that the Crimean public’s desire to join Russia was 
manufactured by Kremlin’s “propaganda” efforts and the military “threat” on the 
peninsula. This interpretation overshadows the primary impressions of a happy and 
victorious event that the image originally denotes. In doing so, CNN contributes to the 
construction of Russia as a power-driven and aggressive force in Eastern Europe, which 
is part of the threat sub-framing.  
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Caption 23. Image and Word on CNN (CNN, 16 March 2014). 
 
Similar to CNN’s coverage, RT did not provide much visual coverage of the ongoing 
situation in Crimea from the people’s perspective. Apart from interview fragments with 
the people, the visual reporting focused predominantly on celebrating the pro-Russian 
triumph. Thus, Caption 24 demonstrates such an example. Enhanced by the symbolism 
of the Russian tricolour and a photograph of Sergey Aksyonov, the victorious Head of 
Crimea, the caption outlines a detailed plan of action for the newly “freed” republic, 
invoking the sentiment of hope and positive change. 
 
Caption 24. Crimean Referendum Results Coverage on RT (RT, 17 March 2014).  
 187 
Of course, the static and mute reproductions of the audio-visual material presented in 
these chapters cannot convey fully the emotional charge with which both channels 
report on current affairs. In fact, the expressive style of presenting that ‘performers’ 
master on air deserves particular attention. The characteristic that distinguishes RT’s 
presenters is their theatrical, near-grotesque way of delivering news. Passionate and 
assertive performance is often aimed at instilling suspicion in the audience in respect 
to the Western coverage. Thus, the performative style of the channel’s journalists 
reinforces substantially the meanings that are conveyed textually and visually, 
accompanied by an expressive use of sound and sometimes music. Similarly, anchors 
in CNN’s studios are highly assertive in their performance style, but the sarcastic 
overtone that constitutes a large part of RT’s ‘performances’ is less prominent on the 
“Western” broadcaster. In fact, CNN’s style is more monologic if not monotonic in the 
way they structure stories, both stylistically and performatively. The dramaturgic effect 
of CNN thus lies in the confidence of their reporters and the assertiveness of their 
statements. 
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e. Conclusion 
By analysing the rhetorical structures surrounding RT’s and CNN’s narratives, this 
chapter exposed the use of various contextualisation techniques. As the analysis 
presented above demonstrates, it operated through the systematic approach to construct 
meanings. The visual analysis enriches frame analysis with the material that allows us 
to trace both the patterns of representations, achieved through the various pictorial tools 
and the associative montage, and the intertextual links that constitute the implicit 
communication between the channels.  
By reproducing the frames promoted by the elites, the channels engaged in both 
legitimizing particular interpretations and eliciting the rival discourse. My approach 
allowed to demonstrate this through presenting the dynamics of sub-frames and their 
relationship with the meta-level frames. Thus, combining appeals to international law 
and history with the elements of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ imaging, both channels’ discourses 
aimed not only at shaping a particular image of Russia and the US, but also attempted 
to persuade their audience to view the situation in terms of the discursive dichotomies. 
Thus, in the global communicative environment, agents and frames can be seen as the 
co-constitutive elements of discourse. This allows to further theorise that the states’ 
ideational resources are not always organized around a strict system of values or norms, 
but rather commonly employ a much subtler process of open reference between the 
various interpretations of the same facts. 
Therefore, analysing RT as the Kremlin’s voice for communicating its foreign policy 
to the world provided the empirical evidence for identifying both the origins of 
interpretations and the way in which the discursive practice is subject to change 
depending on the volatility of the contextual environment. In particular, it allows us to 
understand better such inconsistencies of foreign policy as, for example, Russia 
continuously promoting anti-Western ideas, and, at the same time, consistently 
appealing to liberal norms when it comes to providing justifications of its actions or 
providing analysis to current affairs. This very paradox will be the starting point of the 
discussion in the following Chapter 7.  
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Chapter 7. 
 
Discussion: Framing and Counter-framing 
 
“{T}he principle is timeless, and the construction of ‘enemies’, both real and 
imagined, is perennial; many of its incarnations have been employed on both 
sides in what, since 2001, the West has called the ‘war on terror’. A human 
tendency to think of ‘them’ and ‘us’ is always liable to be exploited by those with 
the means and the power to do so” 
 (Welch, 2013, p. 188). 
 
 
a. Introduction 
The objective of this dissertation has been to understand the way in which RT covers 
events that are politically relevant for Russia and to highlight how the communicative 
environment may help us better understand the relationship between various countries 
in the international system. As I argued in Chapter 1, the lack of detailed explanation 
of the often-contradictory foreign policy messages coming from Moscow as well as the 
significant gap in the literature on Soft Power, Public Diplomacy, and the fragmented 
Constructivist research can be addressed by delving into the tactical dimension of 
discourse. In order to do so, this study conceptualised the multi-level framing model 
that offers an analytical lens with the capacity to illuminate the mechanisms that 
constitute the meaning construction processes in international media broadcasting. 
 
As the quote in the epigraph to this chapter insightfully notes, the organising principles 
of the persuasive practices are the constants that in large part sustain and reinforce these 
processes. This study argues that the structural pillars that constitute frames at the meta-
level are the stable structures of discourse. In fact, informed by the theoretical 
assumption that no text can be defined as new in absolute terms, the persuasive 
techniques should not be assessed in the sterile environment of a monologue. By 
comparing the two case studies, this chapter fleshes out this notion through a detailed 
comparative analysis. This chapter thus highlights the empirical findings that were 
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generated through the application of the multi-level framing model conceptualised in 
this research. 
 
Following up on the case studies, the chapter starts by presenting a detailed comparative 
summary of the findings in section b. The inferences discussed here concern both the 
theoretical and the empirical aspects of the dissertation. By comparing RT’s and CNN’s 
discourses of the two cases, the analysis on the one hand generates insights into Russian 
foreign policy, and on the other hand contributes to our understanding of the persuasive 
mechanisms in international politics. The subsequent part c restates the argument, 
followed by section d that highlights the role of these inferences as the contribution to 
the field of IR. Section e details the implications of the frame and counter-frame 
analysis approach and sketches potential avenues for further research. The part f pulls 
together the insights of this project and concludes the dissertation.  
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b. Comparative Summary of Case Studies I and II 
As I have pointed out in the beginning of this dissertation, the two cases represent large 
scale global conflicts that not only triggered international legal debates but in large part 
influenced Russia’s relationship with the EU and the US (Ciolan, 2016). However, at a 
discursive level, these cases exemplify almost opposite situations, when the two 
channels virtually exchanged their discursive roles, mirroring each other’s discourses.  
This is particularly notable when comparing the two case studies. For example, both 
channels’ discourses continuously focused on the four key actors involved in the 
conflicts: Russia, the US, the Ukrainian interim government/Syrian government and 
citizens (Crimeans/Syrians). By contrast, there are little references to the UN and other 
NATO countries (UK, France, Italy). For example, the coverage of the Syrian crisis 
showed that both channels were mainly preoccupied with justifying the country’s 
actions in global politics, while coverage of the humanitarian crisis in the country 
appeared less important in their narratives. In particular, RT devoted 45 per cent of their 
coverage on condemning the US’s aggressive intentions in the region, while promoting 
Russia’s democratic role in the crisis (40 per cent). 31 per cent of the coverage was 
focused on supporting Assad’s government, with only 14 per cent devoted to the 
situation on the ground. Similarly, CNN was mainly promoting Obama’s pro-
intervention line (39 per cent), while portraying Russia as an obstacle (35 per cent), 
paying much less attention to Assad (27 per cent) and as little as 7 per cent to the 
citizens of Syria (see Table 7.1).  
RT FRAMING SUBJECTS 
Syrian Crisis 
CNN 
40 % Russia 35 % 
45 % USA 39 % 
31 % Syrian Government 27 % 
14 % Syrian Citizens 7 % 
2 % United Nations 1 % 
5 % France/UK/Italy 4 % 
 
Table 7.1 Frequency of Framing Subject Appearance. Syrian Crisis  
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The Crimean crisis coverage showed that both channels were predominantly 
concentrated on reporting Russia’s moves and the US’s role in the crisis, while paying 
considerably less attention to Crimean people’s wishes or Syrian citizens. In particular, 
53 per cent of RT’s coverage was devoted to explaining Russia’s interests in the region, 
being also largely preoccupied with the US’s provocative behaviour in Ukraine (24 per 
cent), with 20 per cent of coverage focused on the new Kiev government, paying as 
little as 11 per cent to reporting the Crimean people’s wishes. Similarly, CNN’s eyes 
were on Russia (41 per cent) and the US (35 per cent) with 29 per cent focusing on the 
Ukrainian interim government, devoting only 5 per cent of their coverage to the 
population of Crimea (see Table 7.2). 
 
RT FRAMING SUBJECTS 
Crimean Crisis 
CNN 
53 % Russia 41 % 
24 % USA 35 % 
20 % Ukrainian Interim Govt. 29 % 
11 % Crimeans 5 % 
0,5 % United Nations 2 % 
0 % France/UK/Italy 1 % 
 
Table 7.2 Frequency of Framing Subject Appearance. Crimean Crisis 
 
Strategically, the Syrian crisis was an example of Russia’s active use of persuasion 
through its public diplomacy outlet, RT. In September 2013, Russia took a clear stance 
on the situation in Syria, attempting to prevent the potential US strike. Thus, through 
the use of public diplomacy, their short-term goal can be understood in terms of 
influencing the international public opinion through promoting sub-frames that would 
highlight the ‘inconsistencies’ in Washington’s rhetoric. The Crimean crisis dictated 
very different discursive terms for RT’s strategic framing. Thus, the goal was to justify 
Russia’s interest in the region. However, in order to promote this interpretation, RT 
employed similar discursive instruments as in Case I. This mechanism was exposed 
through the detailed intertextual examination of the strategic and tactical levels of 
discourse.  
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i. Comparing RT’s and CNN’s Meta-frames 
Although the two cases diverge in their issue-specific tactical interpretations, the 
overarching meta-frames contain similar structural elements that hold the discourses at 
the strategic level. In particular, the Syrian crisis demonstrates a situation in which 
Russia explicitly attempted to block the American intervention in Syria, acting as a 
peacekeeper against the aggressive US, as constructed by RT’s strategic framing. The 
White House and CNN framed the events in terms of a humanitarian intervention, 
where the US is driven by the issue of national security and acts as the responsible 
world policeman. The Crimean crisis demonstrates an almost polar situation, in which 
the main actors – namely Russia and the US – virtually exchanged their discursive roles. 
Once the country’s political ambitions have altered, the discursive aims changed 
accordingly. Thus, Russia takes over the aggressor’s rhetoric, while the US is acting as 
a peacekeeper by mediating the conflict. As it will be presented in this chapter, the 
discursive tools both channels utilised are exceptionally alike.  
 
For example, CNN was constructing Russia as an aggressor in the Crimea-related 
coverage at a strategic level. In other words, these frame-building elements are 
indispensable to the existence of a frame. As the conceptual framework of this 
dissertation outlines, I see meta-frames as the formulas that are constituted by the 
structural elements. For example, the analysis of the two cases allowed me to identify 
two meta-frames that are organized by the structural metaphors of Peacekeeper – 
Rival/Provocateur – Enemy – Victim (Meta-frame 1) and Mediator – Aggressor – 
Enemy – Victim (Meta-frame 2) (see Figure 7.1). These elements were denominated 
by attributing the structural metaphors to the particular actors of a conflict. Within these 
formulas (meta-frames), the structural elements reinforce each other and thus sustain 
the discourse. In other words, the building blocks of these formulas are the stable pillars 
of the meta-frames. For example, if we remove the Victim framing, the country 
Peacekeeper would effectively lose its pacification mission – an essential element of 
legitimizing intervention. Therefore, the structural metaphors are contingent on one 
another. 
 
That said, at a tactical level, framing is always a subject and an object of change. For 
example, in order to deliver the message that Russia is an aggressor in Crimea, CNN 
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did not limit their persuasive techniques to a single interpretation but rather 
continuously deconstructed and countered Russian officials at a tactical level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Meta-level Framing Process. Meta-frames 1&2 
 
Figure 7.1 demonstrates how the two channels exchanged their discursive strategies at 
the meta-level. For example, while covering the Syrian crisis, RT employed meta-frame 
1 through which Russia was constructed as Mediator, Assad and Syrian citizens as 
Victims, anti-government groups as Enemy, and the US as Aggressor. When the 
Crimean crisis began to unfold, the channel employed a meta-frame structure very 
similar to the one that was used by CNN to cover the Syrian crisis. However, the roles 
within it were reattributed to different actors. Thus, Russia was constructed as a 
Peacekeeper, Crimean people as Victims, the US as Provocateur, and the Ukrainian 
interim government as Enemy. In this respect, counter-framing can be and should be 
understood in terms of the discursive dynamics that it creates. For example, on the 
strategic level, reattribution of the discursive roles from one actor of the conflict to 
another is the dynamic process within the stable structure of the meta-frame (see Figure 
7.1).  
 
Moreover, a frame seizes to exist as a unit of discourse once it has lost even a single of 
its elements (structural metaphors). In other words, if these labels are not applied 
together within the discourse, they are rather unsystematic topics that do not provide a 
Peace-
keeper
Rival/Pro
-vocateur
Enemy
Victim
Mediator
Aggres-
sor
Enemy
Victim
	 195	
specific treatment to action which frames ultimately are. This skeleton that is a defining 
property of frames is therefore central to understanding the statics of framing. Directing 
my research at the processes that take place in communication has enabled me to 
understand better the dialogue that is the standpoint of discourse. In other words, the 
production of meanings through discourse is a relational process. This particular study, 
by providing relevant evidence, shows that frames appear in the narratives if not as 
immediate but always as a strategic response to an opposing narrative.  
 
 
ii. Comparing RT’s and CNN’s Coverage at the Tactical Level 
The striking similarity of the prioritising model that channels use in their coverage of 
the seemingly different political situations demonstrates continuous attempts of both 
news outlets to construct meanings through providing polar interpretations of events. 
This becomes particularly vivid when comparing the sub-frames that the channels used 
in both cases. It shows that both channels used very similar framing strategies with a 
slight variation of sub-frames, which was mainly due to the contextual differences. By 
analysing this tactical facet, it is possible to understand the functioning aspect of 
framing better by looking at the dynamics in contrast with the stable normative 
structures. Table 7.1 lists the sub-frames used by both channels unveiled in the two 
cases studies. 
 
For example, the most frequent sub-frames in CNN’s coverage of the Syrian crisis were 
national security , legitimacy  and illegitimacy  with responsibility  as the 
second most frequent frame. Identically, RT’s most frequent sub-frame in their 
coverage of Crimean crisis was national security  and legitimacy/illegitimacy 
sub-frames, while threat  sub-frame, the dominant enemy constructing device, was 
the second most used (see Table 7.1). This comparison clarifies that channels adopt 
identical framing tactics in similar political contexts. In other words, when a channel 
adopts an ‘interventionist’ rhetoric, they frame the situation in terms of a national 
security crisis, justifying it by continuous references to international norms. Similarly, 
once the channels’ discourse has altered its direction in almost polar political 
circumstances, the narratives adjust accordingly. For example, when Russia takes the 
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role of mediator in the Syrian crisis, RT mainly uses sub-frames of threat , 
responsibility , and diplomacy . In the similar case of Crimea in which the US 
becomes a mediator, CNN invokes the same contexts of diplomacy , constructing 
Russian threat in the region. This point will be further clarified by comparing the 
meta-level framing later on in this chapter.  
 
I Case Study. RT I Case Study. CNN 
Humanitarian Humanitarian 
Legitimacy Legitimacy 
Chemical Controversy Chemical Controversy 
Threat Responsibility 
Diplomacy National Security 
War as Business War as Business 
Historical Mistakes Credibility 
Terrorism  
Multiculturalism  
II Case Study. RT II Case Study. CNN 
Threat Threat 
Legitimacy Legitimacy 
Illegitimacy Illegitimacy 
Democracy Democracy 
National Security Diplomacy 
Double Standards Responsibility 
 
Table 7.3. Comparing Sub-frames 
 
By comparing the two cases, it is possible to expose which contexts are dynamic 
structures and which elements of discourse remain rather stable. Democracy, for 
example, is a stable structure in RT’s and CNN’s narratives.71 Dynamics, in this case, 
refer to the way in which interpretations originate in a narrative. Unlike the static 
framing, when a frame is determined by the sponsor’s preconceptions and/or rhetorical 
aims, counter-frames are always a response to opponents’ narratives. Therefore, the 
                                               
71  It is important to point out that stability here is not understood in absolute terms but rather 
refers to the discursive stability. Thus, stable is the structure of discourse that remains unchanged 
and resistant to the communicative distortions throughout the case. 
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process is not stable in its nature but is constantly subject to change or transformation, 
depending on the volatile context. Therefore, focusing on the dynamics of the context, 
at the same time, reveals exactly how stable the elements of the overarching frames are.  
 
Specifically, the so-called ‘rule of the majority’, used by RT as a discursive element to 
justify and explain the situation in Crimea, meets CNN’s interpretation of the Maidan 
events as the just manifestation of citizen power. Here, the discursive stability manifests 
itself through both channels appealing to this liberal norm. The only difference is that 
it migrates from one actor to another actor, depending on the contextual goals of a meta-
framing at the strategic level. Significantly, both instances mobilize a particular 
appraisal of the processes that maintains the realm of ‘common-sense’ in the audience 
both on RT and CNN. In other words, the stable normative structure of discourse is not 
subject to change (none of the channels attempted to dispute whether democracy is 
good or bad) but is used instrumentally in order to make a case.  
 
Furthermore, the contexts of legitimacy and illegitimacy invoked in both cases by RT 
as well as CNN are another example of how the channels operate with the same 
normative ideas in order to achieve polar interpretations. For example, much of the 
Syria-related coverage on both channels discursively engaged with UN rules and 
regulations. Thus, the channels constructed Russia (in RT’s coverage) and the US (in 
CNN’s coverage) as the countries that highly value international law and therefore are 
willing to abide by it. Significantly, the narratives of both channels rarely contained 
detailed explanation of the normative specifics of the international rules but rather 
rhetorically appealed to international law as the vital ideal.  
 
Another frame-building element that appeared particularly often in the narratives of 
both channels was the threat sub-frame. This sub-frame condenses the variety of the 
linguistic and visual codes within the connotative spectrum of violence. Thus, threat 
has an inherently negative overtone which is particularly amplified within the liberal 
discourse. This discursive element is rather explicitly linked to the soft power construct 
that focuses on non-violent and non-coercive influence through attraction rather than 
military power. In the case studies that this research explored, the idea of aggression 
does not limit itself to the military intervention as such but is also connected to the 
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realm of intentions. Thus, for example, RT in the Syrian crisis is deeply preoccupied 
with the possibility of American ‘boots on the ground’ (RT, 2013). Similarly, CNN in 
the case of the Crimean crisis expresses concern that Russia might intervene into 
mainland Ukraine. This anticipatory, precautionary sub-framing highlighted how the 
channels both headed towards painting an image of a peacekeeping country (be it 
Russia in RT’s coverage or the US in CNN’s coverage). The threat sub-frame thus 
provides a clear demarcation between the ‘violent’ and the ‘non-violent’ as the mutually 
exclusive actors. Thus, the audience is provided with two dramatically different options 
as the guidelines for thinking about the events. Such approaches show that frame 
advocates on both channels share the normative ideas that ultimately shape their 
strategic narratives as well as the tactical responses to each other.  
 
Employing the methodology that allowed me to assess discourses of the two channels 
at two levels of abstraction has thus highlighted that norms, as the stable elements of 
discourse, remain relatively unchallenged by both channels. Rather they serve as 
orientation points to which both channels commonly appeal in order to promote a 
convenient interpretation. This goes in line with Morozov’s argument that as a subaltern 
empire Russia ‘re-acts’ the West in the space the term of which are defined by the 
Western normative subject (Morozov, 2015). In other words, the two channels share 
the same ‘pool’ of norms from which they can pick and choose which norm would 
serve best for constructing tactical explanations. Thus, although at a first glance it may 
appear surprising that RT employs similar framing mechanisms as CNN, bearing in 
mind that Russia’s explicit message to the world is traditionally underpinned by the 
idea of its unique, non-Western cultural path (Saari, 2014), the country’s ideational 
arsenal is in fact not as different. 
 
This notion complements the arguments proposed by some identity scholars, who 
emphasise the dualism in Russia’s foreign policy, being on the one hand influenced by 
the pro-Western liberalist elite discourse and the anti-Western nationalism on the other 
(Tsygankov, 2016). Thus, the West has served as the defining object of Russia’s 
national identity, with the elite discourses being constructed around the understanding 
that liberal norms are the ideal to strive for or a threat against which the country needs 
to protect itself from. In any respect, the norms of the West have never been ignored. 
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This can further explain RT’s deliberate orientation on the Western audience. In 
particular, RT’s management has frequently stated that their target audience in the West 
is the opinion generating elite (Interview 2). Therefore, in order to persuade the foreign 
public to adopt the interpretation desired by the frame sponsors, the channel chooses to 
play by the normative ‘rules’ that are accepted in the West. Indeed, the analysis of the 
two cases highlighted that the two channels operate within the same normative space. 
In fact, much like in Europe, the ideals of civil society, human rights and the importance 
of international progress have been occupying the public discourse in the Russian 
society since the end of the Cold War (Sulashkin et al., 2013). Moreover, Russian 
liberalism is not strictly post-communist but has its roots in the political thought of the 
zapadniki72 group that dates back to the mid-19th century. It is thus fair to conclude that 
overturning the norms does not seem to be on Russia’s foreign policy agenda. Instead, 
the country seeks to promote its own interpretation of the political actions within the 
existing normative boundaries. In fact, RT operates these norms instrumentally on the 
discursive level in order to legitimise its rightfulness and thus to be accepted within the 
liberal normative realm (Kuhrt & Feklyunina, 2017).  
 
In fact, a number of scholars studying Russian foreign policy from a constructivist 
perspective have identified that Kremlin’s messages are often contradictory. This is 
usually shown when comparing the ‘ideal’ image that the country is projecting abroad 
and Russia’s actions in the near-abroad in practice, which is often explained by Putin’s 
administration policy of pragmatism or more hard-line, depending on the geo-economic 
vision (Feklyunina, 2008).  This shift, in fact, can also be seen in RT’s discourses. Thus, 
there is a shift from a more ‘laid back’ and emotionally reserved reporting during the 
Syrian crisis to a rather intense and assertive coverage of the Crimean referendum. 
However, this research argues that RT should not be studies as the network that simply 
promotes a constructed image of Russia. Rather it aims to reconstruct the entire 
international set-up as it seen in the West. This does not, however, entail substituting 
                                               
72  Russian: “Westernisers”. This political and philosophical movement manifested itself in the 
discursive debates with slavyanophils (“slavophils”). This fragmented group of political thinkers 
of the 1840s and 1850s was highly influenced by ideas of Hegel, in particular the notion of 
progress. In this vein, they proposed a Western-style development for the Russian Empire through 
political reforms. Writers, journalists and publicists, from the moderate liberals Granovsky, T., 
Katkov, P., Annenkov P.  to the more left-leaning, Alexander Herzen, were among the few who 
formed the social class of intelligentsia in the 19th century Russia (Poroshin, 1905).  
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the existing norms with entirely different ones. In fact, the idea of what is good and 
what is bad is never challenged. But the legitimacy of an actor, such as Russia, to freely 
operate with these norms, to decide what role to attribute to what actor is how the 
persuasion process of RT can be interpreted.  
 
The findings of this research have thus demonstrated in detail how this tactical level 
framing allows the frame sponsors to produce the arguments without shifting the 
normative dimensions entirely. Moreover, the intertextual analysis that explains the 
process of framing highlighted that the choice of contexts (sub-frames) that are invoked 
at a tactical level is never random. On the contrary, the sub-level framing mechanisms 
entail constant referencing to the original narratives that come across in the dialogue 
between the channels. 
 
Within this environment, communicative distortions affect frame sponsors’ behaviour 
in a way that determines which context they mobilize while covering a particular event. 
The distortions in this research refer to several aspects of the dialogue. 73 For example, 
when covering the Crimean crisis, RT invoked the ‘human rights’ context by focusing 
on the intentions of Kremlin to protect Russian compatriots in the region. CNN chose 
to include this context to its narrative with a different interpretation – mocking the 
integrity of Russia’s intentions (‘all sounds rather ominous’, CNN, 27 February 2014). 
This virtual reply to RT’s narrative was evidently a shift from the direct framing to a 
countering effort. Also, the deconstructing strategies that RT commonly employs is an 
explicit example of such distortions. In fact, these distortions are the existential 
elements of the dialogue in the sense that they establish the virtual communication 
between the narratives. 
 
  
                                               
73  See Chapter 2 for the definitions of the key terms that are employed in this study.  
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c. Restating the Argument 
In its quest to shed new light on understanding the mechanisms of meaning 
construction, this study has first developed and deployed the multi-level 
methodological model of frame and counter-frame analysis. Second, framing and 
counter-framing, as objects of research, have been analyzed through the conceptual 
prism of persuasion.74 These intentional efforts to promote interpretations in order to 
achieve a shift in meanings are thus strategic discourses. Third, this study has also 
opened up to the tactical dimension of discourse in order to understand how strategic 
meaning construction may, to a certain extent, be subject to communicative distortions 
of rival discourses in the international ideational environment. Therefore, this project 
analyzed both functioning75 and instrumental76 frames.  
 
With regard to the instrumental framing, my primary focus was on RT. In this strategic 
sense, Russia’s focus on countering can be understood in terms of re-establishing its 
powerful status on the global arena. This discursive defense, largely informed by the 
Soviet tradition, is rooted in Russia’s conceptual understanding of soft power that is 
seen to pose an inherent threat to the country’s stability. Within this framework, RT 
continuously employed counter-framing. While direct framing is rather aimed at 
maintaining or confirming a state’s prestige, counter-framing is focused on 
undermining the powerful status of a rival state, while re-establishing the legitimacy of 
the new interpretations by attempting to transform them into intersubjective 
understandings. The study argues that this process took various shapes. On the one 
hand, there is direct countering that explicitly references the discourse it is aimed at 
deconstructing. On the other hand, there is implicit countering that preemptively 
engages with the counter arguments that the rival discourses are anticipated to produce. 
In this respect, counter-framing is relational, dialogic process that is inward and 
outward oriented. Within this discursive practice, response and argument are 
dialectically merged and mutually constituted in the way that makes them existentially 
                                               
74  For an elaboration of the conceptual assumptions that organise this study refer to Chapter 2. 
 
75  This refers to the tactical level of framing. 
 
76  This refers to the first, the strategic, facet of framing. 
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dependent on one another. As a result of this juxtaposition, new interpretations are 
produced that are tactical steps on the way to construct strategic discourse.  
 
Figure 7.2. Multi-Level Frame Analysis Model 
 
As Figure 7.2 demonstrates, strategic and tactical framing are part of the same 
discursive space. At the macro-level, meta-frames are rather stable elements that hold 
together the discourse. Persuasive strategies are thus directed at constructing the 
elements of the meta-frames. Counter-framing is a rather dynamic process that operates 
at the tactical level, operating with sub-frames that form ad hoc interpretations. It is 
due to this responsive nature of counter-framing that some foreign policy messages 
may not always seem to fit into the overall discursive strategy. Thus, for example, the 
paradox that despite Russia’s ‘special’ power identity (Massari, 1998), it consistently 
appeals to liberal norms, can be explained by pointing to the instrumental efficacy of 
these norms to produce reactive responses to rival discourses. Thus, tactically, meaning 
construction is highly contingent on the contexts dictated by empirical circumstances, 
normative boundaries, and procedural factors of communicative practice. In this 
respect, sub-frames are not only instrumental but also functioning elements of 
discourse. 
 
  
Enemy
M acr o - Lev e l
M ic r o - Lev e l
Sub 
Frame
Sub 
Frame
Sub 
Frame
Sub 
Frame
Sub 
Frame
Sub 
Frame
Sub 
Frame
Victim Mediator
S t r a t e g i c  F r a m i n g
Ta c t i c a l  F r a m i n g  
D y n a m i c s
	 203	
d. Filling the Gap: A Contribution to IR 
The trends in IR reviewed in Chapter 1, although from different angles, all point to the 
importance of communication for enriching our understanding of global politics. 
However, few of these approaches provide practical solutions for studying it. This 
study’s contribution to the field is, therefore, two-fold. On the one hand, it proposed a 
systematic methodological strategy that allows us to study the facets of discourse that 
were previously side-lined. In this respect, it offers an analytical tool that can be applied 
across the different approaches in the discipline. On the other hand, by presenting a 
detailed examination of the discursive processes that take place at the two levels of 
communication, this work exposed the various contextualisation techniques that shed 
the new light on the ideational elements that inform Kremlin’s discursive practices. It 
thus contributes to the understanding of Russian foreign policy. 
 
The theoretical inferences of this project are relevant to the field of International 
Relations not least because a better understanding of the strategy and tactics of the 
political communication process sheds new light on foreign policy. Challenging the 
traditional emphasis on strategy and monologue, this work insists that the dialogue 
between the discourses is an important object of analysis that unfolds the relationship 
in the international system. To use a metaphor, deconstructing the structure of the 
dialogue between two people in conflict and addressing these communicative mistakes 
may not save the relationship between the two individuals but will at least de-escalate 
tensions. Extending this notion to the social realm, understanding the mechanisms of 
international communication opens up the possibilities to move past certain conflict-
sustaining fixations. With this in mind, this work represents an invitation to integrate 
the tactical level of discourse to the discussion of language as a social and 
intersubjective process. This, in turn, offers some insights into the ideational 
underpinnings of foreign policy. In particular, we are better able to understand the 
boundaries of discursive legitimacy. In other words, by tracking contexts intertextually, 
we can see which frames create resonance in target audiences and which frames are 
neglected. Here, the news broadcasting realm is particularly relevant for analysis due 
to its immediate nature. Unlike the official political communication that is highly 
formalized, the media sphere offers the analyst more proximity to the processes that are 
often understood beyond agency. Bringing together textual and visual analysis under 
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one methodological umbrella enriches the analysis from the one-sided understanding 
of strategic communication to the multifaceted picture where functioning elements and 
communicative procedures partake in the process. Putting it figuratively, it invites the 
researchers to read what they see and watch what is written.  
 
The study, in a way, took a step back methodologically and re-introduced a notion of 
discourse that is possible to be operationalised effectively as an analytical tool. By 
doing so it does not strip the concept off its critical element, but rather locates it within 
a methodological model that can be effectively applied across theoretical paradigms. 
For example, unlike the normative liberal perspectives that the Public Diplomacy and 
Soft Power research often operate within, the framing and counter-framing concept that 
utilizes intertextual analysis offers a more neutral backdrop as a starting point for the 
scientific inquiry. In other words, tracing contexts moves us to a more accurate 
rendering of the complex mechanisms of international political communication that, in 
turn, sheds new light on the representations that underpin foreign policy strategies.  
 
As the comparative summary of the two case studies presented in the beginning of this 
chapter, the performative aspect of international communication can provide insights 
into the dynamics and statics of normative ideas in world politics. In particular, framing 
and counter framing within the model proposed in this dissertation can showcase the 
relationship between normative ideas and the interpretations that are used for the 
purposes of persuasion. This allows moving constructivist research away from the 
meta-debates to engage better with the practical aspects of their theory. For example, 
the constructivists’ claims about the co-constitutive nature of international relations is 
rarely highlighted in the necessary brightness due to the methodological limitations. By 
looking at the dialogue and analyzing the intertextual links between the discourses of 
the two channels, we are better able to understand how procedural factors of global 
communication are informed by the historical practice of the professionals and how 
ideational elements constitute each other. Thus, the Russian foreign policy 
inconsistencies that are often brought to the discipline’s attention by the researchers 
who focus on meaning can be better explained by analyzing the tactical facet of 
communication in comparison to the strategic persuasive practices. However, unlike 
post-structuralist research that is inherently critical in its focus on discourses between 
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the dominant and the marginalized, the approach that is essentially aimed at uncovering 
the hierarchies in societies, the multi-level framing model of this research provides a 
rather neutral theoretical backdrop for the analysis of meaning from the strategic and 
functioning perspectives.   
 
The analytical framework of framing and counter-framing that has been developed and 
applied to the case studies of this research, generated a range of theoretical and 
empirical insights about the mechanisms of persuasion, with its internal dynamics and 
statics. This approach, however, did not aim at testing the theory in a strictly positivist 
sense, nor can a researcher make absolute objective claims within this framework. 
However, within its interpretivist approach, the work strived to provide deeper insights 
into the mechanisms of persuasion and dig deeper to deconstruct the co-constitutive 
elements of the process. In particular, coding and the systematic methodological 
structure are what makes this approach more easily applicable and better fit as 
analytical tools for different approaches in IR.  
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e. Implications and Avenues for Future Research 
Framing is often said to be the more rigorous method of textual analysis as compared 
to critical discourse analysis.77 Indeed, it provides a more structured framework for 
evaluating text, and within the methodology proposed here also includes visuals. 
However, the inferences generated through this research cannot and are not being 
proposed as objective claims. On the contrary, the work adopts a critical lens within 
which post-structuralist approaches often operate. In this respect, the goal of frame 
analysis is to deconstruct the systems of signification. What deconstructive research 
means is that it separates the discursive dichotomies and reverses hierarchies. Frame 
and counter-frame analysis is thus most effectively employed to generate suppositions 
about the characteristics and processes that surround normative ideas and their 
relationship with persuasive practices. Ideas, manifested through contexts, may in fact 
transcend discourses and the analysis of frames can help explain the possibility. 
However, if the conclusions generated by frame analysis are offered positively as casual 
claims to explain change in international relations, the limitations of this approach 
should be carefully considered.  
 
This work thus has proposed a systematic analytical lens through which different 
conundrums of international relations, in particular those that are related to persuasive 
practices of communication, can be studied. However, this does not imply that this 
methodology has no venues for further development and clarification. Building upon 
the results generated in this study, at least three venues for further research should be 
highlighted.  
 
The first road that the researcher could embark on from this point is to dig deeper into 
the conceptual facets of the proposed methodology. In particular, the relationship 
between the strategic and tactical framing deserves to be in focus of the future research. 
Moreover, the further theoretical understanding of which frames are employs 
instrumentally and how this process correlates with the functioning aspect of the 
dialogue deserves greater attention. 
 
                                               
77  For the review of framing theory see Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
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Second, the empirical expansion on Russian foreign policy is a fertile avenue for further 
research. Novel inferences can be generated within the analytical lens of framing and 
counter framing by applying the toolkit to the other objects of analysis. For example, 
in order to expand and further unpack the normative underpinnings of Russian foreign 
policy, it is often noted that researchers should analyze this in relation to domestic 
politics. In this respect, looking at the discourses produced by the domestic Russian 
media outlets and tracing the origins of contexts that are being counter-framed may 
provide a more detailed account of the state of Russian identity.  
 
Moreover, the research can move in the direction of scrutinizing the actual political 
dialogues in international politics. In fact, any form of dialogue, be it rhetorical 
conversations that do not bear the formal dialogic structure or the long-lasting debates 
that have little hope for resolution, could all be approached from the systematic framing 
and counter-framing perspectives. Thus, the linguistic confusions can be deconstructed 
in order to shed new light on the mechanisms of political negotiations, in particular 
those that take place in the open discursive space. For example, the conundrums of 
climate change, Brexit talks, peace negotiations and territorial disputes can be 
potentially scrutinized for the normative clash and thus the communicative distortions 
that sustain or reinforce the gap of understanding between the actors of these conflicts. 
 
The third route that this analysis opens up is the focus on social media as the object of 
analysis. The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine as well as the rising 
political tensions between Russian and the West are often reflected in the heated 
discussions over the Kremlin’s social media manipulation. Academic research has been 
engaging in social media analysis that often employs tracing Twitter and Facebook 
posts or other forms of online activity from the perspective of these platforms’ ability 
to challenge regimes (White & McAllister, 2013). Other studies look at social effects 
of media (Morris, 2012) or the impact of social media on the mainstream news in Russia 
(Simons, 2016). Less studied, however, is the extent to which the manipulation 
strategies of authoritarian governments are reinforced and amplified by the citizens 
actively participating, enhancing, and disseminating the dominant discourses that are 
imposed upon them through disinformation practices. The analytical lens of framing 
and counter-framing that employs intertextual analysis could help unravel, by analysing 
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conflicting narratives, the way in which the internet is controlled and, at the same time, 
the way in which the freedom that the internet offers can be used as a tool of 
manipulation. Tracing sub-frames intertextually in social media discourses, also from 
a dialogic perspective, could prompt theorizing on the co-constitutive aspect of actors 
and influences in social media. 
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f. Conclusion  
“Of course the method of presentation must differ in form from that of inquiry. 
The latter has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyse its different forms 
of development, to trace out their inner connexion. Only after this work is done, 
can the actual movement be adequately described. If this is done successfully, if 
the life of the subject-matter is ideally reflected as in a mirror, then it may appear 
as if we had before us a mere a priori construction” 
(Marx, 1873, p. 14). 
 
Indeed, the course of research is never fully reflected in the textual form, just as the 
reality cannot be fit in its absolute complexity into a single narrative. This work started 
with a number of guiding insights that presupposed the practice of inquiry. Upon 
confronting the object of research, these were adjusted and refined, the process that can 
be broadly referred to as theory generation. In this respect, it was an immersive journey 
into the discursive battle between the two channels that operate within the dialogic 
environment of global communication. The fruits that this research has yielded are of 
two kinds: methodological and theoretical advancements that can be applied to the 
future cases and empirical clarifications of Russian foreign policy.  
 
As the Introduction to this dissertation problematized, the discursive construct that 
Russia is somewhat dichotomous to the West often defines the boundaries that organise 
the empirical research on the country’s foreign policy. This dissertation has challenged 
the existing normativity of the frameworks that is often implicit. By taking a closer look 
at the contradictions which are born in the discourse that is not isolated from the 
environment of the global communication but is responsive and dialogic, the 
dissertation addresses the lack of coherent explanations of the inconsistencies of 
Russian foreign policy that are often explained as solely dependent on the individuals 
in Kremlin’s apparatus.  
 
By focusing on the countering efforts of RT within the inclusive multi-level framework, 
the research opened up another dimension of discourse. On the one hand, it allowed to 
highlight the underpinnings behind Russia’s ‘defensiveness’. Part of these reasons are 
hidden in the principles that organise the persuasive practices within the country’s 
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public diplomacy strategy. On the other hand, it allowed to see that at the tactical level 
of discourse the journalists of RT operate with ad-hoc justifications that are reactive 
towards the rival discourses are thus highly contingent on them. This allows to counter 
the traditional approaches to Russian foreign policy that portray the country’s 
persuasive efforts as operating in a vacuum. Unlike the Soviet Union that was 
characterized by the high degree of isolation, Russia is highly embedded in the 
international ideational environment. In this respect, the fact that both channels, while 
intending to achieve the opposing outcomes, utilize identical framing mechanisms, both 
appealing to liberal norms, does no more seem as a paradox. The conclusions here, 
however, do not deny that there are normative elements that constitute Russia’s 
rhetoric. Instead, by breaking down the normative ideas, meta-frames and sub-frames 
and exposing both the dynamics and statics of these elements of discourse, the analysis 
showed how they relate to each other within the process of persuasion.  
 
This, in turn, sheds new light on our understanding of global interaction, broadening 
the strategic bias in IR that often overlooks both dialogue and media. As such, it pushes 
an agenda for a more-inclusive theoretical approach that does not side-line the various 
channels of communication but at the same time does not limit itself with normative 
critique.   
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